Atlanta Journal v. Mayson

• Decision Date: 30 October 1893
• Citation: 18 S.E. 1010,92 Ga. 640
• Parties: ATLANTA JOURNAL v. MAYSON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

18 S.E. 1010

92 Ga. 640

ATLANTA JOURNAL v. MAYSON.

Supreme Court of Georgia

October 30, 1893

Syllabus by the Court.

Code, § 3749, declares that "in all civil cases the preponderance of testimony is considered sufficient to produce mental conviction." This phraseology includes actions for libel in which a plea of justification presents the issue to be tried, although such plea imputes to the plaintiff the commission of a crime as charged in the publication alleged to be libelous. In order to sustain the plea, it is requisite that the jury shall have a mental conviction of its truth, but they need not be "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt," as this phrase is commonly understood in criminal procedure. This question was not directly presented in Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga 351, nor was it directly decided in Williams v Gunnels, 66 Ga. 521.

Error from city court of Atlanta; T. P. Westmoreland, Judge.

Action for libel by C. C. Mayson against the Atlanta Journal. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

W. P Andrews and Ellis & Gray, for plaintiff in error.

Mayson & Hill, for defendant in error.

SIMMONS J.

This was an action for libel, the alleged libelous matter consisting of publications in the defendant's newspaper charging the plaintiff with the crime of forgery. The defendant admitted the publications, and pleaded justification. There was a verdict for the plaintiff of $1,000. The main question before us is whether or not the trial court erred in charging that "the burden is on the defendant to sustain the plea of justification by the same degree of evidence that would be required to convict the plaintiff if he were charged with a crime; that is to say, beyond a reasonable doubt." We think this was error. In order to sustain the plea of justification, it is requisite that the jury shall have a mental conviction of its truth, but they need not be "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt," as this phrase is commonly understood in criminal procedure. In respect to the degree of mental conviction required, our Code places all civil cases upon the same footing. Section 3749 declares: "In all civil cases the preponderance of testimony is considered sufficient to produce mental conviction. In criminal cases a greater strength of mental conviction is held necessary to justify a verdict of guilty." The decisions in civil cases cited for the defendant in error, in which it is said that the proof on certain points must be such as to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, are explained in the case of Schnell v. Toomer, 56 Ga. 169, as meaning simply that the jury must be clearly satisfied. In that case, Judge Bleckley says: "In regard to the evidence of adverse possession, etc., the court was requested to charge the jury, as laid down in Durham v. Holeman, 30 Ga. 619, that the plea of the statute must be supported by proof so conclusive as to exclude reasonable doubt. The court declined so to charge, but seems to have given what we think is the true meaning of the cases on the subject, namely, that it is only necessary for the proof to clearly satisfy the minds of the jury of the truth of the plea. In civil cases, as in Wyche v. Greene, 11 Ga. 160; Durham v. Holeman, 30 Ga. 619; and Printup v. Mitchell, 17 Ga. 559,--the exclusion of reasonable doubt means that, and no more, (Code, § 3749;) and as 'reasonable doubt' is a phrase more appropriate to criminal cases, its employment to instruct the jury in civil cases had best be avoided. There is certainly a difference in the strength of conviction required by the law in the two classes of cases; and, that being so, it is desirable not to confound in language what should be distinguished in thought." Moreover, the cases referred to were decided prior to the adoption of the Code. It was contended, however, that cases in which there is a plea charging the plaintiff with a crime stand upon a different footing in this respect from other civil cases; and in support of this view the cases of Ransome v. Christian, 56 Ga. 352, and Williams v. Gunnels, 66 Ga. 521, are cited. In Williams v. Gunnels, one of the exceptions was that the trial court refused a request to charge that, to support a plea of justification, it requires the same degree of evidence as would be required to convict the plaintiff if he were charged with a criminal offense; but as it appeared from the judge's certificate that this request was not in writing, and no error being assigned on the charge given on this point, the court declined to consider it, and simply "suggest" that the rule as embodied in the request is "seemingly recognized" in Ransome v. Christian, supra. Upon looking to Ransome v. Christian, we find that nothing is said as to the degree of mental conviction the jury must have, to authorize a verdict in favor of the plea. In that case there was a plea of justification of a libel charging perjury; and the question was whether it was error to instruct the jury that, where but one witness testifies to the truth of the charge, the corroborating circumstances must be sufficient to amount to another witness, or to support the one witness to that extent. It was held that this instruction required too much, and that it is enough if the circumstances corroborate the one witness to the satisfaction of the jury. It was not held that the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. So it will be seen that these cases do not decide the question now before us.

In some of the decisions elsewhere, the distinction is made that while it is necessary to support the plea with such proof as would be sufficient to convict the plaintiff on an indictment for the offense, yet it is not necessary, as in a criminal prosecution, that it should be of that degree of certainty requisite to remove all reasonable doubt from the minds of the jury. See Newell, Defam. (1890,) p. 795. In Ellis v. Buzzell, 60 Me. 209, the court, in holding that the proof need not be such as to exclude reasonable doubt, say: "It is worthy of remark that, with a very few unimportant exceptions, the cases in which it has been held that, to sustain a plea of justification, the defendant in an action of slander must adduce such proof as would suffice for the conviction of the plaintiff upon an indictment, have been cases in which the words used imputed perjury to the plaintiff, and in most of them the matter more directly under consideration has been the propriety of regarding the plaintiff's testimony upon the occasion referred to as evidence in the case, to be overcome by the production of more than one witness to prove its falsity,--the necessity of showing that his testimony was false in intent as well as in fact,--its materiality, or some point affecting the truth of the charge, and not the necessity of proving the commission of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We have no occasion to question those decisions, so far as they enforce the necessary of proving all the elements necessary to constitute the crime charged by an amount of evidence sufficient to overbalance the plaintiff's side of the case. It may be and probably is true that the compendious phrase, 'sufficient to convict the plaintiff upon an indictment,' has had reference more frequently to matters which it was necessary to establish than to the degree of assurance upon which the jury should act." See, also, the note of Judge Redfield to this case in 12 Am. Law. Reg. (N....