Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Amos

Decision Date01 August 1927
Citation115 So. 315,94 Fla. 588
PartiesATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. AMOS, State Comptroller.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1928.

En Banc.

Suit by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company against Ernest Amos State Comptroller, to enjoin the collection of taxes. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the complainant's bill and denying complainant's application for a temporary injunction, complainant appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Whitfield J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

That change in existing law was intended to extent indicated by amendment must be assumed unless contrary intent appears from all statutes on subject; courts should give appropriate effect to amendment of statute unless contrary intent appears from all enactments on subject. Where an amendment to a legislative act is adopted, it must be assumed that a change in the existing law to the extent indicated by the nature of the amendment was intended unless a contrary intent appears from all of the enactments on the subject, and courts should give appropriate effect to the amendment.

Before statute extending its scope, statute held not to authorize special taxing districts in 1924 to tax apportioned value of named classes of railroad personal property not actually located therein (Laws 1925, c. 10284; Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 747, as amended by Laws 1923, c. 9178). Prior to the enactment of chapter 10284 of the Laws of 1925, extending the field of the operation of section 747, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920 as amended by chapter 9178 of the Laws of 1923, so as to include special school, road, and other special districts said section 747, as amended by chapter 9178 of the Laws of 1923, did not in and of itself confer any authority for the assessment and collection by such special taxing districts of taxes for the year 1924 upon the apportioned value of the named classes of railroad personal property, such as rolling stock and appurtenances, shop equipment, and other personal property mentioned in the act, but not actually located within such districts.

Purpose of statute as amended was to apportion railroad's personal property to track mileage for county and municipal taxation (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 747, as amended by Laws 1923, c. 9178). It was evidently the intention of section 747, Rev. Gen. St. 1920, as amended by chapter 9178 of the Laws of 1923, to apportion the described railroad personal property to track mileage for the purpose of county and municipal taxation by the counties and municipalities into or through which each railroad runs.

Statutes held to authorize special districts in 1924 to tax only railroad's personal property situated therein (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 572, 593, 1634, 1644; Const. 1885, art. 12, §§ 10, 17, and art. 16, § 16). If authority to impose such taxes during the year 1924 be sought in sections 572, 593, 1634, 1644, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920, relating to the imposition of taxes by special school tax districts and road and bridge districts, it will be found that these statutes only authorized the imposition of such taxes upon railroad property situated within such special districts.

Statute creating constructive situs of personal property for local taxation should not be constructively extended to include other taxing units not named in act. A statute creating a constructive situs of personal property for local taxation by certain specified local taxing units should not be constructively extended so as to include other taxing units not named in the act. That is, a constructive situs created by statute for one purpose will not be extended by construction to or for another purpose.

Legislature may, in absence of constitutional prohibition, apportion value of railroad's personal property to track mileage for local taxation. The power of the Legislature, where there is no constitutional provision prohibiting it, to apportion the value of railroad personal property to the track mileage for purposes of local taxation is well recognized.

Generally, situs of personal property for taxation is primarily at owner's domicile; ordinarily, owner of personal property must be resident of, or property be situated within, district attempting to tax it. The general rule is that the situs of personal property for the purpose of taxation is primarily at the domicile of the owner, subject to certain exceptions, such as the acquisition of a fixed situs different from that of the owner. It is ordinarily essential to the power of taxation that either the owner of personal property be a resident of, or the property be situated within, the district attempting to exercise the power to tax.

Specially created district established by or under authority of statute has no inherent power to tax; specially created district established by or under statute has no power to tax except that clearly conferred or indicated by law either organic or statutory (Const. art. 9, § 3). A specially created district, established by or under the authority of a statute, has no inherent power to tax. It has no power to tax except in so far as that power is clearly conferred or indicated by law, either organic or statutory; section 3 of article 9 of our Constitution providing that, 'No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law.'

Tax statutes must be construed strictly in favor of taxpayer. Statutes conferring authority to impose taxes must be construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer and against the grantee of the power.

Legislature may determine whether just and reasonable portion of railroad's rolling stock and movable personal property may be taxed by special taxing district through which railroad runs; Legislature may decide whether or for what purpose reasonable portion of railroad's rolling stock and other movable personalty may be taxed by special taxing district through which railroad runs; without Legislature's authorization, special taxing district may not tax railroad's rolling stock and other movable personal property not actually therein (Const. art. 9, § 3). Since a railroad's rolling stock and certain other movable personal property have no actual situs in any particular county or district, it is within the lawful power of the Legislature to determine whether a just and reasonable proportion of such personal property shall be constructively embraced within the limits of a special taxing district, through which such railroad runs, and whether, and for what purpose, it shall be taxed by such district; but until this is done, such a special district is without power to impose taxes upon such property.

During 1924 before enactment of statute, special school road, drainage, and canal districts could not tax railroad's personal property not having actual situs within district (Laws 1925, c. 10284; Laws 1923, c. 9178, amending Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 747). During the year 1924, after the enactment of chapter 9178 of the Laws of 1923, and before the enactment of chapter 10284 of the Laws of 1925, amending said section 747, special school, road, drainage, and canal districts had no power to tax railroad personal property not having an actual situs within such respective districts; their statutory power, during such year 1924, being expressly conferred upon, and confined by statute to, property within such districts.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Leon County; E. C. Love, Judge.

COUNSEL

W. E. Kay and Doggett & Doggett, all of Jacksonville, for appellant.

J. B. Johnson, Atty. Gen., and H. E. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The appellant filed its bill in the circuit court for Leon county seeking to enjoin the collection of certain taxes, amounting to $83,837.40, assessed against the appellant in favor of certain special school districts, school bonds, special drainage districts, and a special canal district, within the counties over which the line of appellant's railroad runs, the assessment being upon certain classes of property known as 'appurtenant supplies,' 'station operating equipment,' and 'rolling stock'; such assessment being in addition to an apportionment to each of said counties of its proportionate value of such personal property of the appellant subject to taxation in this state. The purpose of the bill was to test the validity of such special taxes assessed for the year 1924. The appellant had paid its state and county taxes for that year on all other property assessed for said year, but refused to pay such special taxes. The court below sustained a demurrer to complainant's bill and denied complainant's application for temporary injunction, and from this decree the complainant appealed.

Appellant contends that at the time these special taxes were assessed there was no statutory authority under which they could be assessed or levied. This contention involves the construction of section 747 of the Rev. Gen. Stats., as amended by chapter 9178 of the Laws of 1923. The effect of the amendment to section 747, Rev. Gen. Stats., by the act of 1923 was to make the provisions of such section applicable to certain additional personal property, to wit, 'shop equipment tools, stock in warehouse and other personal property used or to be used in connection with the construction, operation or maintenance of the property of the company,' and otherwise left section 747 as it was. By an act of 1925 (chapter 10284), the act of 1923 (chapter 9178) was amended and re-enacted so as to manifest the intention to make section 747 apply also to 'special school districts, special road districts, and other special district that may exist,' and the title of the act of 1923 and of said section 747 was thereby amended so as to add to the title such new matter. In order to show the terms of section 747,...

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