Atwater v. Kortum

Decision Date05 July 2012
Docket NumberNo. SC11–133.,SC11–133.
Citation95 So.3d 85
PartiesJeffrey H. ATWATER, Appellant, v. Frederick W. KORTUM, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Held Unconstitutional

West's F.S.A. § 626.854(6)Michael H. Davidson, Florida Department of Financial Services, Tallahassee, FL; Cynthia S. Tunnicliff of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, FL; Maria E. Abate and Elana H. Gloetzner of Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky & Abate, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.

Wilbur E. Brewton and Kelly B. Plante of Brewton & Plante, P.A., Tallahassee, FL; Talbot D'Alemberte and Patsy Palmer of D'Alemberte & Palmer, PLLC, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee.

CANADY, J.

This case concerns a statutory regulation affecting public insurance adjusters, who are authorized to assist insureds and thirty-party claimants in the filing and settlement of insurance claims. We have on appeal Kortum v. Sink, 54 So.3d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), in which the First District Court of Appeal declared invalid section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), a provision regulating solicitation by public adjusters. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm the First District's decision that the statute unconstitutionally restricts the commercial speech of public adjusters because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests in ensuring ethical conduct by public adjusters and protecting homeowners.

I. BACKGROUND

During a 2007 special session, the Florida Legislature created the Task Force on Citizens Property Insurance Claims Handling and Resolution (Task Force) to make recommendations regarding the 20042005 hurricane claims of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. Among other recommendations, the Task Force proposed that the Legislature enact the following provision governing public adjusters:

A public adjuster shall not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 72 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant.

Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1014.

During its 2008 regular session, the Legislature enacted a law similar to the Task Force's proposal. The Legislature added to the proposal a provision stating that a public adjuster may not “initiate contact” with a claimant and reduced the period of the restriction from seventy-two to forty-eight hours. Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), thus provides:

A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant.The Legislature passed amendments to other portions of section 626.854 in 2009 and 2011, but there have been no revisions to section 626.854(6) since its enactment.

In October 2009, Frederick W. Kortum, Jr., a public adjuster, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief “alleging that section 626.854(6) violates his constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection of the laws, and to be rewarded for his industry.” Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1014. Kortum asserted that the statute prohibits all public adjuster-initiated communication during the forty-eight-hour period. In response, the Department of Financial Services (Department) contended that section 626.854(6) does not prohibit a public adjuster from using written methods of communication to contact a potential claimant. Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1015.

The trial court determined that section 626.854(6) is ambiguous, accepted the Department's interpretation that the statute prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, and ruled that the statute is constitutional. The trial court concluded that because section 626.854(6) primarily regulates conduct—not speech—the case was governed by United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), in which the United States Supreme Court stated:

[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1015 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673). In O'Brien, the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of selective service certificates.

In the decision now on review, the First District reversed the trial court's decision. After determining that the plain language of section 626.854(6) “prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral,” the First District concluded that section 626.854(6) regulates commercial speech—not merely conduct. Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1018. As a result, the First District applied the test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), rather than the more deferential O'Brien standard.

In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court set out a four-prong test to be used to evaluate the constitutionality of a statute regulating commercial speech:

At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must [1] concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask [2] whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343. The First District concluded that section 626.854(6) satisfies the first three prongs of this test but held that the statute does not satisfy the fourth prong of Central Hudson. The First District concluded that the Department failed to demonstrate “that prohibiting property owners from receiving any information from public adjusters for a period of 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may undulypressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior.” Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1020. Because the First District concluded that section 626.854(6) unconstitutionally burdens the commercial speech of public adjusters, it did not address Kortum's assertions that the statute violates his right to equal protection of the law or his right “to be rewarded for his industry” guaranteed by article I, section two of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 1014.

Jeffery Atwater, in his capacity as Chief Financial Officer and head of the Department, appealed the First District's decision. The Department contends on appeal that section 626.854(6) does not restrict written communication and that because the statute regulates conduct and not the content of speech, the requirements of Central Hudson are not applicable. Based on this narrow reading of the statute, the Department thus argues that the statute is in “the rational relationship test category for the regulation of conduct” and that the statute should be sustained under this test. Appellant's Initial Brief at 4.

II. ANALYSIS

In the analysis that follows, we first conclude that section 626.854(6) prohibits public adjusters from initiating any form of communication with a potential claimant during the hours immediately following a claim-producing event and that the statute regulates protected commercial speech. We then conclude that the First District was correct in applying the test outlined by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson to evaluate the constitutionality of section 626.854(6). The Department's argument is predicated entirely on its position regarding the proper interpretation of the statute—a position that we reject. No alternative basis is asserted by the Department for sustaining the constitutionality of the statute and reversing the First District's decision.

Section 626.854, Florida Statutes (2008), defines and regulates public adjusters in Florida. It states in part:

The Legislature finds that it is necessary for the protection of the public to regulate public insurance adjusters and to prevent the unauthorized practice of law.

(1) A “public adjuster” is any person, except a duly licensed attorney at law as hereinafter in s. 626.860 provided, who, for money, commission, or any other thing of value, prepares, completes, or files an insurance claim form for an insured or third-party claimant or who, for money, commission, or any other thing of value, acts or aids in any manner on behalf of an insured or third-party claimant in negotiating for or effecting the settlement of a claim or claims for loss or damage covered by an insurance contract or who advertises for employment as an adjuster of such claims, and also includes any person who, for money, commission, or any other thing of value, solicits, investigates, or adjusts such claims on behalf of any such public adjuster.

....

(6) A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant.

....

The provisions of subsecti...

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