Aubrey v. Precision Airmotive LLC
| Decision Date | 22 November 2010 |
| Citation | 7 A.3d 256 |
| Parties | Barbara L. AUBREY, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of James R. Aubrey, Deceased, Appellee v. PRECISION AIRMOTIVE LLC, Precision Airmotive Corporation: and Mark IV Industries, Inc.,: Lycoming a/k/a Textron Lycoming: Reciprocating Engine Division, A Division of AVCO Corporation. Appeal of Precision Airmotive LLC, Precision Airmotive Corporation and Mark IV Industries, Inc., Appellant. Barbara L. Aubrey, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of James R. Aubrey, and Jennifer Aubrey, Appellee v. Precision Airmotive LLC, Precision Airmotive Corporation and Mark IV Industries, Inc., Lycoming a/k/a Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, A Division of AVCO Corporation. Appeal of AVCO Corporation, on Behalf of its Lycoming Engines Division, Appellant. Barbara L. Aubrey, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of James R. Aubrey, Deceased, and Jennifer Aubrey, Appellee v. Precision Airmotive LLC, Precision Airmotive Corporation and Mark IV Industries, Inc., Lycoming a/k/a Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, A Division of AVCO Corporation. Appeal of Precision Airmotive LLC, Precision Airmotive Corporation, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Mary P. Gaston, Seattle, WA and Kristen E. Dennison, Wayne, for Precision Airmotive LLC, Precision Airmotive Corp., and Mark IV, appellants.
Bradley J. Stoll, Philadelphia, for Aubrey, appellee.
James E. Robinson, Philadelphia, for AVCO, Lycoming and Textron.
Appellants, Precision Airmotive, LLC, Precision Airmotive Corporation and Mark IV Industries, Inc. (collectively, "Precision") and AVCO Corporation, on behalf of its Lycoming Engines Division ("Lycoming") appeal from the orders of the trial court denying their respective motions for summary judgment. 1 The Appellees are Barbara Aubrey, individually and as executor of the Estate of James R. Aubrey, and Jennifer Aubrey. We quash the appeals in part and affirm the order of the trial court in part.
On October 12, 2003, a Piper Cherokee aircraft flying from Hazleton, Pennsylvania,to Cheswold, Delaware, crashed, killing James Aubrey and injuring Jennifer Aubrey. The aircraft was manufactured on December 7, 1967. It was equipped with a Lycoming O-360-A4A engine,2 which included a Marvel Schebler MA4-5 carburetor.3 On March 30, 1989, the original engine underwent an overhaul, during which new compression rings were installed and the carburetor received a brass float system replacement.
Appellees filed suit against Precision and Lycoming, alleging that a malfunction in the aircraft engine's carburetor, in combination with reduced power resulting from a broken compression ring, caused the crash. Appellees asserted claims of strict liability, breach of warranties, negligence and failure to warn.
On November 5, 2007, Lycoming moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Appellees' claims pursuant to the 18-year statute of repose included in the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 () (hereinafter "GARA").
The general statute of repose is set forth as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b), no civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred ... after the applicable limitation period [of eighteen years].
In addition, GARA provides a rolling period of repose, which extends the general statute of repose an additional 18 years from the date of the installation into an aircraft of replacement parts with regard to any claim arising from the replacement part. The rolling provision modifies the general statute of repose in the following manner:
with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced another component, system, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, injury, or damage, after the applicable limitation period [of eighteen years] beginning on the date of completion of the replacement or addition.
GARA § 2(a)(2) ("the rolling provision").
Further, the statute of repose does not apply:
if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove, and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to a type certificate or airworthiness certificate for, or obligations with respect to continuing airworthiness of, an aircraft or a component, system, subassembly, or other part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration,required information that is material and relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered.
GARA § 2(b)(1) ("the fraud exception").
On February 1, 2008, the trial court granted Lycoming summary judgment as to Appellees' claims for strict liability but denied summary judgment as to all other claims. See Trial Court Order, February 1, 2008 ("Lycoming Order"). 4 Lycoming timely filed a notice of appeal and complied with the trial court's order to file a Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors, claiming that the trial court erred in its application of GARA.
On December 5, 2007, Precision filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all claims against it pursuant to GARA. The trial court denied this motion. See Trial Court Order, February 1, 2008 ("Precision Order"). 5 Precision timely filed a notice of appeal. Precision's notice states that it appeals "that portion of the [o]rder ... that denied [Precision's motion] under [GARA], allowing [Appellees'] claims against [Precision] to go forward predicated on a replacement part that was not manufactured by [Precision]." Precision Notice of Appeal, February 19, 2008, at 2. The trial court did not order Precision to file a Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. On March 25, 2007, the trial court issued an opinion addressing its decision to deny in part Lycoming's and Precision's motions for summary judgment. Trial Court Opinion, March 25, 2008 ("Joint Opinion").
Precision also filed an Omnibus Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking dismissal of the claims against it based upon various state law grounds. See Omnibus Motion, December 5, 2007. The Omnibus Motion does not identify a GARA basis for summary judgment. The trial court granted this motion in part, dismissing the strict product liability and breach of warranty claims but denying the motion as to all other claims. Trial Court Order, May 21, 2008 ("Omnibus Order").6
Precision timely filed a notice of appeal, which stated that its appeal is limited to "the issue of the liability of Precision as a successor in interest to the actual manufacturer of the aviation component part that is protected by [GARA]." Precision Omnibus Notice of Appeal, June 16, 2008. The trial court directed Precision to file a Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In its timely statement, Precision asserted that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the GARA rolling provision applied to Appellees' claims because Precision was not the manufacturer of the allegedly defective brass float and (2) an indemnification provision is sufficient to hold a manufacturer liable under the GARA rolling provision for a part it did not actually manufacture. See Precision Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, July 16, 2008. The trial court issued a responsive opinion. Trial Court Opinion, August 12, 2008 ("Omnibus Opinion").
Appellees have filed motions to quash the appeals of Lycoming and Precision, asserting that this Court lacks jurisdiction under Pa. R.A.P. 313 andPridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 588 Pa. 405, 905 A.2d 422 (2006) (" Pridgen I "). See also Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 974 A.2d 1166, 1171 (Pa.Super.2009) (" Pridgen III "), citing Moyer v. Gresh, 904 A.2d 958, 964 (Pa.Super.2006) (). We address them first.
A trial court may grant summary judgment as a matter of law whenever there is no genuine issue of material fact or "the record contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to a jury." Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2, Note. An order denying summary judgment is interlocutory. It is generally not appealable. See Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 482 Pa. 615, 394 A.2d 491 (1978); Pa.R.A.P. 311 and 341. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that the collateral order doctrine may provide a narrow exception to the general rule. Pridgen I, 588 Pa. 405, 905 A.2d 422 (.2006).
"An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of ... [a] lower court." Pa.R.A.P. 313(a); Pridgen I, 905 A.2d at 426; Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978).
A collateral order is an order [1] separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where [2] the right involved is too important to be denied review and [3] the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
Pa.R.A.P. 311(b). All three factors must be present before an order may be considered collateral. Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 836 A.2d 42, 47 (2003); Pridgen III, 974 A.2d at 1171, citing J.S. v. Whetzel, 860 A.2d 1112, 1117 (Pa.Super.2004).
In Pridgen I, the Supreme Court permitted review of a legal question involving the...
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