Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 4 EAP 2021,4 EAP 2021
• Citation: 259 A.3d 359
• Parties: Wanda BROOKS v. EWING COLE, INC., d/b/a Ewing Cole and City of Philadelphia and Family Court of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District Court Appeal of: Family Court of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

259 A.3d 359

Wanda BROOKS

v.EWING COLE, INC., d/b/a Ewing Cole and City of Philadelphia and Family Court of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District Court

Appeal of: Family Court of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District

No. 4 EAP 2021

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: May 18, 2021

Decided: September 22, 2021

Michael Daley, Esq., Megan Linsley Davis, Esq., Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, for Appellant.

Jonathan F. Bloom, Esq., Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, LLP, for Appellant General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Amicus Curiae.

John Bartley Delone, Esq., for Appellant Attorney General Of Pennsylvania, Amicus Curiae.

Rachel Renee Hadrick, Esq., Kandice Kerwin Hull, Esq., McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, for Appellant County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors, Pennsylvania Municipal League, Amici Curiae.

Kenneth Lawson Joel, Esq., Office of General Counsel, for Appellant Governor Wolf, Amicus Curiae.

Anthony Thomas Kovalchick, Esq., for Appellant Attorney General Of Pennsylvania, Amicus Curiae.

Karl Stewart Myers, Esq., Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, LLP, for Appellant General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Amicus Curiae.

Keli Marie Neary, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Appellant Attorney General Of Pennsylvania, Amicus Curiae.

Theron Richard Perez, Esq., Gregory George Schwab, Esq. Pennsylvania Office of General Counsel, for Appellant Governor Wolf, Amici Curiae.

Joshua Minnick Feissner, Esq., City of Philadelphia Law Department Claims Unit, for Appellee City of Philadelphia.

Anne Avery Gruner, Esq., Duane Morris LLP, for Appellees Ewing Cole, Inc., Ewing Cole.

Jerry Lyons, Esq., Joseph Chaiken & Associates, P.C., for Appellee Brooks, Wanda.

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

We granted allowance of appeal to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in quashing the notice of appeal filed by the Family Court of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District (the Family Court) on the basis that the trial court's order was not an appealable collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. Because we conclude the trial court's order denying summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds is a collateral order, appealable as of right under Rule 313, we reverse the Commonwealth Court and remand to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of personal injuries Appellee Wanda Brooks allegedly sustained when she walked into an unmarked glass wall while she was attempting to exit the Family Court building in Philadelphia on January 8, 2015. Second Am. Compl., 2/8/17, at 2, ¶ 7. On December 8, 2016, Brooks commenced this action with claims for negligence against Ewing Cole, Inc., the architectural firm that designed and constructed the building; the City of Philadelphia (City), as a lessor of the building; and the Family Court, as a leasee of the building. Id. at 1-4, ¶¶ 2-6, 8, 10. Brooks also asserted a claim of professional liability against Ewing Cole. Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 12-13. After the Family Court filed preliminary objections to the complaint, Brooks filed an amended complaint. The Family Court again raised preliminary objections to the amended complaint, arguing it is a Commonwealth entity, not a municipal entity, and it did not design or construct the building. Family Court's Prelim. Objections to Plaintiff's Am. Compl., 2/6/17, at 2, ¶ 5-7 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 102, 301(4) ; Russo v. Allegheny Cty. , 125 A.3d 113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), aff'd per curiam , 637 Pa. 398, 150 A.3d 16 (2016) ). Brooks then filed a second amended complaint on February 8, 2017, rendering moot the Family Court's preliminary objections. See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(1).

Relevant to this appeal, the second amended complaint averred that the Family Court "is an entity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ... and is subject to liability under the real estate exception to sovereign immunity, [42] Pa.C.S.A. § 8522(b)." Second Am. Compl., 2/8/17, at 2, ¶ 4. In its answer to the second amended complaint, the Family Court admitted that it was "a Commonwealth entity." Family Court's Answer to Second Am. Compl. with New Matter and Cross-Claim, 3/10/17, at 2, ¶ 4. The Family Court further asserted in its new matter that the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521 - 8527, barred Brooks's negligence action against it. Id. at 4, ¶ 14.

Following the completion of discovery, the Family Court moved for summary judgment. Relying on Russo , the Family Court contended it "is subject to sovereign immunity and is immune from tort claims." Mot. for Summ. J., 4/5/18, at ¶ 17. The Family Court explained that Section 8522 of the Sovereign Immunity Act provides that " ‘acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages’ " in enumerated circumstances. Id. at ¶ 10 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b) ). The Family Court, however, argued that Section 8522 was inapplicable as it was not a "Commonwealth party" based on Russo , in which the Commonwealth Court determined that " ‘the courts of the unified judicial system are not ‘Commonwealth parties’ within the meaning of the Sovereign Immunity Act.’ " Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Russo , 125 A.3d at 118 (holding "the courts of the unified judicial system retain their sovereign immunity as related to tort claims")). Accordingly, the Family Court argued it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 18. In response, Brooks contended that summary judgment was improper because courts are Commonwealth entities, entitled to sovereign immunity and also subject to the waivers of sovereign immunity listed in Section 8522(b). Answer to Mot. for Summ. J., 4/25/18, at ¶ 11. Brooks asserted that the real estate exception to sovereign immunity in Section 8522(b)(4) applied in this case. Id. at ¶¶ 21-23. The real estate exception, in context of Section 8522, provides:

§ 8522. Exceptions to sovereign immunity

(a) Liability imposed.— The General Assembly, pursuant to section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, does hereby waive, in the instances set forth in subsection (b) only and only to the extent set forth in this subchapter and within the limits set forth in section 8528 (relating to limitations on damages), sovereign immunity as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties, for damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity.

(b) Acts which may impose liability.— The following acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:

...

(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks.— A dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks, including Commonwealth-owned real property, leaseholds in the possession of a Commonwealth agency and Commonwealth-owned real property leased by a Commonwealth agency to private persons, and highways under the jurisdiction of a Commonwealth agency, except conditions described in paragraph (5)[, relating to potholes and other dangerous conditions of highways].

42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a), (b)(4).

On June 4, 2018, the trial court denied the Family Court's motion for summary judgment. Trial Ct. Order, 6/4/18. On June 28, 2018, the Family Court filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court amend its June 4, 2018 order to include a statement specified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b), which would permit the Family Court to take an interlocutory appeal. Mot. for Recons., 6/28/18, at 3. That same day, the Family Court filed a notice of appeal to the Commonwealth Court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313, which provides that collateral orders are appealable as of right. Notice of Appeal, 6/28/18. On July 2, 2018, the trial court vacated its June 4, 2018 order pending reconsideration. Trial Ct. Order, 7/2/18. On July 3, 2018, the trial court entered an order denying summary judgment and further denying the Family Court's request to certify the case for an interlocutory appeal. Trial Ct. Order, 7/3/18.

On July 5, 2018, the Family Court filed a second notice of appeal to the Commonwealth Court pursuant to Rule 313. Notice of Appeal, 7/5/18. On July 9, 2018, the Commonwealth Court issued an order staying the trial court proceedings pending appeal and directing the trial court to issue an opinion in support of its June 4, 2018 and July 3, 2018 orders denying summary judgment and reconsideration. Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 7/9/18. Thereafter, on August 28, 2018, Brooks discontinued her case against Ewing Cole, and the parties agreed that the cross-claims against Ewing Cole, asserted by the City and the Family Court, were outstanding and unaffected by the partial discontinuance. Consent & Stipulation to Discontinue per Rule 229(b)(1), 8/28/18.

Revising its position on appealability, the trial court stated in its November 5, 2018 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that it now considered its July 3, 2018 order denying summary judgment immediately appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1312(a)(2). Trial Ct. Op., 11/5/18, at 2 n.2. The trial court explained that it had previously denied the Family Court's request to certify the matter for an interlocutory appeal because at that time Brooks had outstanding claims against Ewing Cole and the City. Id. However, because Brooks had subsequently discontinued her claims against Ewing Cole, and because the City's defense was that it was immune as a landlord out of possession, the trial court opined that the Family Court's sovereign immunity defense " ‘involves a...