Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell

• Decision Date: 15 July 1919
• Citation: 124 N.E. 97,227 N.Y. 1
• Parties: AUBURN DRAYING CO. v. WARDELL et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

227 N.Y. 1

124 N.E. 97

AUBURN DRAYING CO.

v.WARDELL et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 15, 1919.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by the Auburn Draying Company against William Wardell and others. Judgment for plaintiff (89 Misc. Rep. 501,152 N. Y. Supp. 475) was affirmed by the appellate Division (178 App. Div. 270,165 N. Y. Supp. 469), and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Frederick A. Mohr, of Auburn, for appellants.

Walter Gordon Merritt, of New York City, for respondent.

COLLIN, J.

This is a contest between the plaintiff and the labor unions of the city of Auburn, N. Y. There is no serious dispute concerning the material facts. In so far as there is a dispute, we have concluded that the findings of the Special Term are supported by the evidence. While there was not unanimity in the decision of the Appellate Division the divergence related to legal conclusions or the applicability of legal principles.

The action was commenced November 29, 1913. The plaintiff, a corporation, was extensively and prosperously engaged in the general trucking business in the city of Auburn, N. Y. It employed from 30 to 45 men, the greater number of whom were not members of a labor union. There existed in Auburn, as voluntary unincorporated labor organizations, 22 local labor unions, representing the various trades and occupations, with an aggregate membership of about 1,400 persons. There existed also the Central Labor union, an unincorporated association, made up of delegates from the individual unions, and the members of the local unions were members of it and bound by its constitution, rules, regulations, and by-laws. It and certain of the local unions are, through representation by officers, defendants in the action. Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 1919-1924. Expressed objects of the Central Labor Union were to secure united action in defense of the rights and for the protection of the interests of the working classes and to arbitrate and adjust difficulties that might arise between workmem and their employers. Objects of the local unions were increased wages, greater efficiency, employment, and the improvement of working and social conditions through united action.

The defendant Teamsters' Union No. 679 was organized November 9, 1912. The plaintiff neither forbade nor encouraged its employes to join. In July, 1913, representatives of the unions stated to the plaintiff that unless it took the necessary means to get its men to join the union, Teamsters' Union No. 679, it would be placed on the unfair list. The plaintiff refused to so act, and Teamsters'Union No. 679 passed a resolution placing the plaintiff on the unfair list, that is, listed it as an employer who refused to employ and discriminated against union labor and refused to give its employes the conditions asked for by labor organizations with respect to hours of labor, shop conditions, and other similar working conditions. Union No. 679 reported, in accordance with a standing resolution of the Central Labor Union, the placing of the plaintiff on the unfair list. The Central Union insisted to the plaintiff that all its employes must join the union and the plaintiff replied they were free to join if they so chose. They refused to join. The Central Labor Union indorsed the placing of the plaintiff upon the unfair list, thus making, under its rules, the action final and operative. The declaration of principles of the Central Labor Union provided, among other things, as follows:

‘We shall withdraw and use our influence to have others withdraw all patronage from any unfair employer, or any person patronizing such unfair employer, let his calling be what it may.’

The by-laws and regulations of the unions provided penalties of fines and expulsion for nonconformity. The Central Union and other local unions took the position that they would consider the company unfair toward organized labor until such time as their employes became members of the Teamsters' Union. They withdrew, and used their influence and positions and their members used their influence and positions to have the employers of their members withdraw patronage from the plaintiff. The findings set forth at length their acts and their effects. In summary, it may be stated that dealers, ice deliverers, bakers, butchers, builders, plumbers, and contractors, because of the notices, warnings, and declarations of the defendants, in varying and serious degrees discontinued business with the plaintiff, and refused further to employ it to do carting, hauling, or collection work for fear of loss of business and labor troubles on account of the defendants' combination if they continued business with it. Further findings are:

‘(49) The ultimate hope of the defendants was to better the condition of the members of the unions by bringing into said organization all of the craftsmen and laborers in Auburn, so that their united efforts for higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions might be more persuasive and effectual, and without such motive or ultimate purpose the boycott would not have been inaugurated; but the immediate business in hand, the specific and direct thing which the defendants were then and there devoting their energies to and focusing all of the disciplined power of their organization upon, was the destruction of the plaintiff's business, in order that the plaintiff, through its sufferings, might be forced to yield to the demands of the union. What was threatened, intended, and in part accomplished by the defendants was injury to the business and property of the plaintiff; the acts performed and results accomplished being also necessarily injurious to trade and commerce, which injury to trade and commerce was intended to be brought about by the defendants through the performance of such acts.

‘(50) All of the foregoing acts of the defendants and those acting in conjunction with them were done in furtherance of the combination and conspiracy to compel the plaintiff to employ union men exclusively, and to discharge any employe who refused to join the union. * * *

‘(52) The said combination of the defendants and all acts in furtherance thereof were calculated and intended to injure and destroy the plaintiff's good will, trade, and business, and all of the defendants were members of said combination and acting in furtherance thereof.

‘(53) At the time of the commencement of this suit, plaintiff was suffering irreparable loss and damage to its trade, good will, and business from the acts of the defendants in furtherance of their said combination. * * *

‘(55) There has been, during the entire trouble, no force or violence used or threatened. There has been no misstatement of facts, unless the use of the word ‘unfair,’ when applied to the plaintiff, may have been misleading; and it is not charged that there was any intention to misrepresent the facts in this respect.

‘(56) * * * What was feared by the customers (of plaintiff) was not any voluntary, self-initiated movement of their own employes to quit, but that they would quit because ordered to do so by the organizations to which they belonged, which possessed disciplinary powers to enforce obedience. * * *

‘(58) The said combination of defendants originated solely from the refusal of plaintiff's employes to join the union, the demand made by defendants that plaintiff compel them to join the union, and the refusal of the plaintiff to comply with the demand.’

As conclusions of law the Special Term found that the combination of the defendants constituted an illegal conspiracy to injure the plaintiff's business and property, and their acts were illegal as an intended injury to the plaintiff's business and as unreasonably restrictive of and injurious to trade and commerce, and the conspiracy was unlawful as designed to prevent the plaintiff from exercising its lawful trade and calling by threats to do illegal acts; the plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law. The plaintiff was entitled to a decree to recover the damages and a reference to ascertain and report the amount of damages, and on the incoming and confirmation of said report to a final judgment against all of the defendants for the amount of said damages thus ascertained, and to a further decree for a permanent injunction against the defendants ‘to prohibit the enforcement of resolutions, rules, or orders of the defendant unions, requiring their members to quit the service of employers who patronize the plaintiff, and the giving of notices by or on behalf of said organizations or the officers thereof the such employers, or the public, of an intention to quit, provided such employers continued to patronize the plaintiff, and any other attempt or effort to use the powers or authority of the defendant unions over their own members for the purpose of inducing or compelling patrons of the plaintiff, or the public generally, against their will, to refrain from dealing with the plaintiff.’ A final judgment was entered for such relief, upon the confirmation of the report of a referee.

[1][2][3] The briefs and arguments of counsel are concerned with a wide range of problems and principles relative to the rights of labor unions and of employers and employes. The determinative facts presented in the case at bar are, however, few, and the decisive principles are established. The defendants, in concerted actions and measures, interfered with the property rights and the property of the plaintiff. As a part of its property was the right to...