Aughe v. Shalala

• Decision Date: 21 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. C94-1237D.,C94-1237D.
• Parties: Valarie AUGHE and Dallas Loghry, behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Donna SHALALA, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Jean Soliz, Secretary of Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

885 F. Supp. 1428

Valarie AUGHE and Dallas Loghry, behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Donna SHALALA, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Jean Soliz, Secretary of Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Defendants.

No. C94-1237D.

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle.

February 21, 1995.

Yvette Hall War Bonnet, Elizabeth Schott, Evergreen Legal Services, Snohomish County Office, Everett, WA, for plaintiffs.

Charles Pinnell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Evelyn McChesney, Asst. Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel of Dept. of Health and Human Service, Seattle, WA, Dana Marie Reid, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, WA, for defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DIMMICK, Chief Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on five motions by the parties. The plaintiffs seek summary judgment against both the federal and state governments. In addition, the plaintiffs move to certify a class action and to amend the complaint to add another party. Both the state and federal governments have made cross motions for summary judgment. The Court, having considered the motions, memoranda, and affidavits submitted by the parties and having heard oral argument, hereby grants the summary judgment motions of the state and federal governments. Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint is denied as futile, and plaintiff's motion to certify a class is denied.

I

The plaintiffs in this case are Dallas Loghry and his mother Valarie Aughe. Loghry, who recently turned eighteen years of age, is a full-time student in the Everett School District. Loghry apparently suffers from a learning disability that has impaired his learning progress.

Aughe has received Aid for Families with Dependant Children ("AFDC"), 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., from Washington Department of Social and Health Services. When Loghry turned eighteen, DSHS terminated AFDC benefits because Loghry would not complete high school by his nineteenth birthday and was thus deemed ineligible for further benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(a). Aughe appealed the termination of benefits, which was upheld by the administrative law judge.

Aughe brought this lawsuit, contending that this application of Section 606(a) violates the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. In addition, Aughe contends that Section 606(a) violates the equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution.

Aughe brings the instant summary judgment motions against Donna Shalala, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Department ("Shalala" or the "federal government"); and Jean Soliz, Secretary of DSHS ("Soliz" or the "state government"). In addition, Aughe seeks to have a class action certified and asks that the Court grant her motion to amend her complaint so that she can add an additional class member. Both Shalala and Soliz have brought cross motions for summary judgment.

II

Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden under Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). To create a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

It is clear enough from our recent cases that at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.... There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1989).

III

AFDC, a welfare program for dependant children and their parent or relative who provides care, is jointly funded by the federal and state governments. See 42 U.S.C. § 601. Each state administers its own plan, which must meet federal guidelines and which must be approved by the Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Department. See 42 U.S.C. § 602.

Section 606(a) of the AFDC defines a "dependant child" as a needy child who is deprived of parental support because of death, absence, or incapacity of one parent and who is living with the other parent or certain specified relatives and who meets an age requirement. To meet the age qualification, the child must be "(A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-time student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of vocational or technical training), if, before he attains age nineteen, he may reasonably be expected to complete the program of such secondary school (or such training)." Id. § 606(a)(2). The Washington AFDC plan has opted for the second age requirement, and thus provides benefits for those "children" who are between eighteen and nineteen years of age and who are expected to finish secondary school (or a votech program) before their nineteenth birthday.

In this case, Aughe contends that Loghry could not finish his secondary school program by age nineteen because of a learning disability, and thus could not meet the age requirement. She asserts that that requirement is not essential or necessary to the AFDC program and that application of the requirement in this case violates both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Even if the requirement is essential or necessary to the program, asserts Aughe, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act still require reasonable modification. She asserts that waiving completion before nineteen would be a reasonable modification. Aughe also contends that the completion before nineteen creates an impermissible classification that does not serve a legitimate governmental interest, thereby violating equal protection guarantees.

The federal government contends that Loghry was not denied benefits because he was handicapped, but rather because he was not expected to finish his secondary education by age nineteen. Because he is not "otherwise qualified" for benefits, asserts the federal government, denial of such benefits does not violate the Rehabilitation Act. In addition, the federal government contends that the same result should obtain under the ADA because regulations governing that act are consistent with those governing the Rehabilitation Act. The federal government also asserts that even if the completion by age nineteen has a disparate impact on the handicapped, that fact alone does not establish a violation of the ADA. Finally, the federal government asserts that the age requirement is rationally related to a legitimate government interest — saving money and preserving AFDC funds for children and their families — and thus does not violate equal protection guarantees.

The state government argues that it must follow federal law defining "dependant child" or risk losing federal funding. The state government also contends that nothing in the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act is meant to repeal the AFDC's completion by age nineteen requirement. Finally, the state government asserts that the completion by age nineteen is rationally related to the government's interest in allocating finite resources and to the state government's interest in obtaining matching federal funds.

A

The first question presented is whether the AFDC as interpreted violated the Rehabilitation Act. The relevant portion of the Rehabilitation Act reads as follows:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....

29 U.S.C. § 794. To obtain relief under this section, "a plaintiff must show (1) that he is handicapped within the meaning of the act, (2) that he is `otherwise qualified' for the services sought, (3) that he was excluded from the services sought `solely by reason of his handicap,' and (4) that the program in question receives federal financial assistance." Dempsey ex rel. Dempsey v. Ladd, 840 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir.1987).

While Aughe concedes that Loghry cannot meet the AFDC's "completion by age nineteen" requirement, she asserts that that requirement is not an essential one. Accordingly, she asserts that the requirement can be waived as a reasonable modification. She cites two cases to support this position: University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.Ct.App.1993); and Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n, 857 F.Supp. 654 (E.D.Mo.1994). In each of those cases, the trial court found that an athletic association's rule barring participation of student athletes over nineteen violated the Rehabilitation Act when the athletes had been held back from school...