Augusta Evening News v. Radford

• Decision Date: 10 April 1893
• Citation: 17 S.E. 612,91 Ga. 494
• Parties: AUGUSTA EVENING NEWS v. RADFORD.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

17 S.E. 612

91 Ga. 494

AUGUSTA EVENING NEWS v. RADFORD.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 10, 1893

Syllabus by the Court.

An article in a newspaper charging a public officer with unbecoming and improper conduct merely to get fees tends to expose him to public contempt, and is therefore libelous. Accordingly, there was no error in overruling a demurrer to a declaration which, in effect, alleged the willful and malicious publication of an article charging, in substance that the plaintiff, who was a constable, solicited business for the magistrates' courts by attending the daily sessions of the recorder's court, and inducing persons tried therein to sue out unnecessary warrants against other persons; the declaration further alleging that by such publication it was intended to charge that the plaintiff did the acts mentioned for the evil and corrupt motive of increasing his fees as a constable.

Error from city court of Richmond: W. F. Eve, Judge.

Action by W. W. Radford against the Agusta Evening News for libel. A demurrer to the declaration was overruled. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

J. S. & W. T. Davidson and W. T. Gary, for plaintiff in error.

M. P Foster, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN J.

At common law it was not necessary that written or printed defamatory words should charge a crime, in order to make them actionable, but it was sufficient if they tended to bring a man into public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. McGregor v. Thwaites, 3 Barn. & C. 33. "Scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel. It is enough if the defendant induces an ill opinion to be had of the plaintiff, or to make him contemptible and ridiculous." Cropp v. Tilney, 3 Salk. 226. And it has, with great reason and justice been said that "written slander is necessarily attended with such deliberation, and its publication is so well calculated to produce permanent mischief that an action may be maintained for the publication of written words when it could not be maintained for the publication of the same words by mere oral discourse." See 13 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law 289-300, where the subject is discussed at length. The definition of "libel" recognized at common law has been adopted by statute in this state. "A libel is a false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in print or writing or pictures or signs, tending to injure the reputation of an individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." Code, § 2974. To one holding public office there is especial reason for affording protection against the malicious and insidious thrusts of the traducer. As a servant of the people, it is essential that he should enjoy their fullest confidence, respect, and esteem. Those intrusted with the performance of official duties should be pure, upright, conscientious, and painstaking, and public policy demands that they should be unembarrassed by false and unfounded expressions of distrust and contempt on the part of those they serve. An upright and faithful public servant sustains special damage by reason of a defamatory publication which attacks his official character. And this is said to be true "whether the office be merely confidential and honorary, or be productive of emolument." Folk. Starkie, Sland. § 89. "As regards language concerning one in office, the same general principles apply as to language concerning one in trade. Language concerning one in office, which imputes to him a want of integrity or misfeasance in his office, or a want of capacity generally to fulfill the duties of his office, or which is calculated to diminish public confidence in him, or charges him with the breach of some public trust, is actionable." Townsh. Sland. & L. § 196. "It is libelous to impute to any one holding an office that he has been guilty of improper conduct in that office, or has been actuated by wicked, corrupt, or selfish motives, or is incompetent for the post." Newell, Defam. 69. The American & English Encyclopedia of Law (volume 13, p. 309) also employs the identical language just quoted, and cites numerous decisions. See, specially, Gove v. Blethen, 21 Minn. 80. Illustrations of the application of the doctrine are numerous. It is libelous to denominate a magistrate as "a damned fool of a justice," (Spiering v. Andreæ, 45 Wis. 330;) or to say he perjured himself in deciding a suit, "and it is the G ___d d___d erroneous decision I ever saw any justice give, and it was a d___d outrage, and it was done for spite," (Gove v. Blethen, supra;) or to say a judge lacked capacity, "had abandoned the common principles of truth," and "had made the office of clerk a subject of private negotiation between men to whom he was under personal obligations, and endeavored to cancel those debts by a barter of office," (Robbins v. Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540;) or to otherwise charge a judicial officer with gross impropriety, misconduct, or corruption, (In re Moore, 63 N.C. 397; Royce v. Maloney, 58 Vt. 437, 5 A. Rep 395.) The same is true as to a state senator. Wilson v. Noonan, 23 Wis. 105. And it is actionable to speak of a member of congress as "a fawning sycophant, a misrepresentative in congress, and a groveling office-seeker" who had "abandoned his post in congress in pursuit of an office." Thomas v. Croswell, 7 Johns. 265. "It is libelous to publish of one, in his capacity of a juror, that he agreed with another juror to stake the decision of the amount of damages to be given in a cause then under their consideration upon a game of draughts," ( Com. v. Wright, 1 Cush. 46;) or to denounce a verdict as infamous, and express contempt for the men who served as...