Austin v. Director, Patuxent Institution

• Decision Date: 16 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 441,441
• Citation: 225 A.2d 466,245 Md. 206
• Parties: Charles A. AUSTIN v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 206

245 Md. 206

225 A.2d 466

Charles A. AUSTIN v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION.

No. 441.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 16, 1967.

Thomas F. Comber, 3rd, Baltimore, for appellant.

Alfred J. O'Ferrall, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert C. Murphy, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Walter

M. Baker, State's Atty., for Cecil County, Elkton, on the brief), for appellee.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, BARNES and McWILLIAMS, JJ.

HORNEY, Judge.

The question presented by this appeal-whether or not the lower court had power and authority to grant a new trial at the request of the State after the jury had found and determined that the defendant was not a defective delinquent-is one of first impression.

At a trial on January 7, 1964, in the Circuit Court for Cecil County (Keating, J.) sitting without a jury, on charges of assault with intent to rape and simple assault, Charles A. Austin was found guilty of the lesser charge and was sentenced to ten years in the Maryland Penitentiary, dating from August 16, 1961.

Subsequently, the defendant was transferred to Patuxent Institution for an examination as to whether or not he was a defective delinquent within the meaning of § 5 of Article 31B of the Code of 1957 as amended. In its written report to the court of its findings, the institution stated that the defendant was a defective delinquent and recommended that he be committed to Patuxent for treatment.

At the defective delinquent hearing before Chief Judge J. DeWeese Carter, on September 23, 1964, the jury, after hearing the version of the defendant as well as that of the State with respect to the incident resulting in his conviction of simple assault rather than assault with intent to rape; the reasons why the persons (a medical physician, a psychiatrist and a psychologist) who examined the defendant on behalf of the institution were of the opinion that the was a defective delinquent; and the instructions of the court as to the law, found that the defendant was not a defective delinquent.

The State, contending that the verdict of the jury was against the evidence, the weight of the evidence, the instructions of the court and against the law, filed a motion for a new trial. The defendant replying filed a motion ne recipiatur. And the court, at the hearing on the motions, granted the motion for a new trial. Whereupon the defendant sought leave to appeal to this Court and the application therefor was granted.

While the courts which hear defective delinquency proceedings are courts of general jurisdiction, they become courts of special or limited jurisdiction whenever they proceed to determine (with or without the aid of a jury) the status of persons alleged to be defective delinquents. In such cases, the courts instead of exercising their inherent powers are limited to the power and authority conferred on them by the provisions of Article 31B. A court can be a court of general jurisdiction for some purposes and a court of limited jurisdiction for other purposes. When therefore a court of general jurisdiction proceeds under a special statute it becomes a court of limited jurisdiction for the purpose of such proceeding. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 2. Accordingly, where a court of general jurisdiction undertakes to carry out a special power, a decision made in the exercise of such power is treated as a ruling of a court of limited jurisdiction and the presumption, applicable to a court of general jurisdiction, that it acted within the scope of its jurisdiction does not apply. See 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts § 103.

This Court has often had occasion to consider cases on appeal from lower courts involving the distinction between their special or limited jurisdiction and their general authority. In Scherr v. Braun, 211 Md. 553, 128 A.2d 388 (1957), where we were concerned with the right of appeal to the courts from liquor license boards, it was said at p. 563, 128 A.2d at p. 392:

'It is apparent that in giving the right of appeal to courts, the Legislature conferred a special statutory jurisdiction on the courts and made the exercise of that jurisdiction the only right of the court to review the local board, to the exclusion of any common-law remedy. No principle is better established than that in exercising a statutory power, a court is without jurisdiction unless it complies with the statute.'

The same principle was stated much earlier in Taylor v. Bruscup, 27 Md. 219 (1867), with respect to the jurisdiction of probate courts over matters of trust and confidence; in Kinnear v. Lee, 28 Md. 488 (1868), with regard to the exercise of special statutory authority on appeal to a superior court; in Cox v. Bryan, 81 Md. 287, 31 A. 447, 852 (1895), in connection with the jurisdiction of a circuit court to entertain an appeal from voter registration officers; in Travers v. Dean, 98 Md. 72, 56 A. 388 (1903), with reference to the decision by the circuit court of a question not within its jurisdiction; in United States Express Co. v. Hurlock, 120 Md. 107, 87 A. 834 (1913), with relation to a court acting without jurisdiction in an attachment proceeding when the requirements of the statute had not been complied with; and in Close v. Southern Maryland Agricultural Asso., 134 Md. 629, 108 A. 209 (1919), in connection with the power of the circuit court in respect to the granting of licenses for the racing of horses. In the Kinnear case, it was said (28 Md. at p. 488) that '(i)n exercising the power of confirming or vacating the sales of real estate, on executions upon magistrates' judgments conferred by the Act of 1831, ch. 290, the courts do not proceed according to the forms of the common law or under their usual and general jurisdiction, but in the exercise of a special statutory authority, to be strictly followed.' (Emphasis supplied.) In the Close case it was held (134 Md. at p. 643, 108 A. 209) that a circuit court in the exercise of a special jurisdiction must follow the modes of procedure prescribed by the statute.

Recently we held in Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 196 Md. 400, 76 A.2d 736 (1950), that there was no appeal to us from a decision of the circuit court (for Baltimore County) in the absence of statutory authority permitting it. And in Switkes v. McShain, 202 Md. 340, 96 A.2d 617 (1953), after therein pointing out that the right to appeal in compensation cases under § 57 of Article 101 in the Code of 1951 extended only to an 'employer, employee, beneficiary or person feeling aggrieved,' we held that neither the dead employee nor his attorneys came within the category of persons given the right to appeal.

The precedents in other jurisdictions are analogous to those in this state. See, for example, Wadhams & Co. v. State Tax Commission, 202 Or. 132, 273 P.2d 440 (1954) and Osage Oil & Refining Co. v. Interstate Pipe Co., 124 Okl. 7, 253 P. 66 (1927), where the holdings were to the effect that the exercise of special statutory power by a court of general jurisdiction is limited by the terms of the statute conferring the power. And see State ex rel. Landis v. Simmons, 104 Fla. 487, 140 So. 187 (1932) and Wyatt v. Rambo, 29 Ala. 510 (1857) for the proposition that the rulings of courts of limited jurisdiction are...