Austin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 04 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. S-99-1239.,S-99-1239. |
Citation | 261 Neb. 697,625 N.W.2d 213 |
Parties | Vicki AUSTIN, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Tiffany N. Floth and Joseph B. Muller, Omaha, of Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., for appellant.
Mark C. Laughlin, Omaha, and Tracy J. Edgerton, of Fraser, Stryker, Meusey, Olson, Boyer & Bloch, P.C., for appellee.
This is a breach of contract action brought by appellant, Vicki Austin, against appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). Austin filed a claim with State Farm under her uninsured motorist policy for damages incurred after Jennifer C. White, an uninsured motorist, hit Austin with her car. State Farm declined to pay the damages, claiming that White acted intentionally and that intentional acts are not within the policy coverage. Austin brought suit, and after a trial on the merits, a jury found for State Farm. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. We affirm.
On May 5, 1994, Austin was a passenger in a car driven by Sharilyn Ross, who was attempting to exit a parking lot. White, an uninsured motorist, attempted to cut in front of Ross' car, but Ross did not permit her to do so. Austin testified that White yelled an expletive at her, so Austin exited the car and walked over to White's car. Austin said that White slapped her, then drove off and hit a parked car. Austin said that at that point, she thought the confrontation had ended, so she started to walk back to Ross' car. As she was walking, she noticed White's car coming toward her. White's car then struck Austin, pinning her right leg between White's car and Ross' car.
White, on the other hand, denied yelling an expletive and said that Austin came over to her car, cursed at her, and punched her through her open window. White then slapped Austin, and Austin hit White again. White claimed that the next thing she can remember is seeing Austin pinned between her car and Ross' car. White did not remember hitting a parked car, backing up, or driving toward Austin. After she hit Austin, White left the scene, but she was soon apprehended by the police.
As a result of this incident, Austin suffered a fractured right ankle that required surgery. She filed a claim with State Farm for uninsured motorist benefits under her policy. State Farm denied the claim, stating that an intentional tort is not an accident under the policy. Austin brought this action for breach of contract, and the jury returned a verdict for State Farm.
Austin claims the trial court erred in (1) submitting jury instructions Nos. 9 and 10 to the jury, (2) rejecting Austin's proposed jury instruction No. 4, and (3) overruling Austin's motion for a directed verdict.
Austin first alleges that the trial court's instructions to the jury were erroneous and that the trial court instead should have given one of Austin's tendered instructions to the jury. To establish reversible error from a trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction, an appellant must prove that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the tendered instruction. In re Application of SID No. 384, 259 Neb. 351, 609 N.W.2d 679 (2000). The issue in this case is the first requirement, namely, whether Austin's tendered instruction was a correct statement of the law.
The dispute regarding the jury instructions in this case stems from a dispute about the meaning of the term "accident" as it is used in Austin's insurance policy. Austin's policy states: (Emphasis in original.) The term "accident" is not defined in the policy.
Austin claims that the term should be defined from the insured's perspective. In that regard, she claims that the trial court should have used her tendered instruction No. 4, which provides:
The uninsured motorist coverage provides coverage to Plaintiff for bodily injuries caused by an accident. As used in the insurance policy and these Instructions, the term "accident" means an event that Plaintiff did not expect to occur. In determining whether Plaintiff's injuries were the result of an "accident", you may only consider whether, from Plaintiff's point of view, the injuries she sustained were the result of an unusual or unexpected event.
State Farm, on the other hand, argues that the trial court, in instruction No. 9, correctly defined the term according to the ordinary sense of the word without regard to the perspective from which it is viewed. The trial court's instruction No. 9 provides:
The trial court also gave instruction No. 10, which defines the terms in instruction No. 9. Instruction No. 10 states in relevant part:
The question in this case is whether the term "accident," which is undefined in State Farm's policy, is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, or whether the meaning changes because Austin is making a claim under an uninsured motorist policy. If the term is defined according to its plain and ordinary meaning, without regard to the perspective from which it is viewed, then it does not cover intentional torts. As such, the trial court's instruction would be correct, whereas Austin's tendered instruction would not. If, on the other hand, the term's meaning changes in the uninsured motorist context and it is to be defined from Austin's perspective, then the term covers intentional torts. Accordingly, Austin's tendered instruction would be correct and the trial court's instruction would not.
In an appellate review of an insurance policy, the court construes the policy as any other contract to give effect to the parties' intentions at the time the writing was made. Where the terms of a contract are clear, they are to be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning. Callahan v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 145, 608 N.W.2d 592 (2000). In construing insurance policy provisions, a court must determine from the clear language of the policy whether the insurer in fact insured against the risk involved. Columbia Nat. Ins. v. Pacesetter Homes, 248 Neb. 1, 532 N.W.2d 1 (1995). The language of an insurance policy should be read to avoid ambiguities, if possible, and the language should not be tortured to create them. American Family Ins. Group v. Hemenway, 254 Neb. 134, 575 N.W.2d 143 (1998). There is no legal requirement that each word used in an insurance policy must be specifically defined in order to be unambiguous. Id.
While the term "accident" is not defined in the policy, we have previously defined it in the liability insurance context as "an unexpected happening without intention." Sullivan v. Great Plains Ins. Co., 210 Neb. 846, 851, 317 N.W.2d 375, 379 (1982). In its ordinary sense, "accident" means "a happening that is not expected, foreseen, or intended." Webster's New World...
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