Austin W. Jones Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 09 February 1923
• Citation: 119 A. 577
• Parties: AUSTIN W. JONES CO. v. STATE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

119 A. 577

AUSTIN W. JONES CO.

v. STATE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 9, 1923.

Exceptions and Motion from Superior Court, Penobscot County, at Law.

Action by the Austin W. Jones Company against the State. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions and moves for a new trial. Exceptions overruled. Motion overruled if plaintiff remits $3,000.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, PHILBROOK, DUNN, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.

William R. Pattangall, of Augusta, and Benjamin W. Blanchard, of Bangor, for plaintiff.

Rausford W. Shaw, Atty. Gen., and William H. Fisher, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

PHILBROOK, J. On the 9th day of May, A. D. 1920, certain buildings and personal property owned by the plaintiff corporation were destroyed by fire. It claimed that the fire was kindled by one George Stanchfield, who was formerly a patient at the Bangor State Hospital, an institution operated, maintained and supported as an asylum for the care, custody and treatment of insane persons. According to the record it is admitted that the defendant owns and operates the hospital; that it is an institution for the care of the insane; that Dr. Carl J. Hedin is superintendent of the hospital; that he is employed by the state; and that he has general supervision of the inmates therein. Plaintiff further claimed that on the fifteenth day of February, A. D. 1920, Stanchfield was duly committed to said hospital and accepted into the custody thereof; that at the time of commitment he was suffering from a mental disease known as dementia præcox, paranoid type; that on April twenty-fifth, A. D. 1920, he was temporarily allowed his liberty by Dr. Hedin; that at the time when he was allowed his liberty he was still insane, a fact well known by Dr. Hedin, and was a dangerous man, not safe to be at large or to be allowed temporary liberty; that when allowed liberty he was given into the care and custody of one Bessie M. Stanchfield who was not a suitable and proper person to have the care and custody of said George Stanchfield, a fact which Dr. Hedin knew or by the exercise of ordinary prudence should have known.

The plaintiff alleges, as we have said, that the fire which destroyed its property was kindled by Stanchfield and charges "that said defendant was on the twenty-fifth day of April, A. D. 1920, grossly careless and negligent in permitting said George Stanchfleld to be temporarily at large," and further avers "that by, through and because of the gross carelessness and negligence of the defendant, as aforesaid," it suffered the loss sustained by the destructive fire.

The plaintiff further avers that this action is brought against the defendant in accordance with a legislative resolve authorizing the same.

Trial by jury in the superior court of Penobscot county resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty-three thousand six hundred fifty dollars. The case is before us upon the customary grounds.

It is not necessary to rehearse in full the resolve authorizing this suit. The important provision therein contained, so far as the main contention in the bill of exceptions is concerned, is thus expressed: "The liabilities of the parties shall be the same as the liabilities between individuals."

The Exceptions. The exceptions contained in the bill are six in number, but in argument the state's counsel frankly says that the exception relied upon is to the refusal of the court to give the following instruction:

"The court is requested to instruct the jury that notwithstanding the language of the resolve by authority of which this suit is brought, the state, as a matter of law, is not liable for the negligence or want of care of its officials or employees."

The other five exceptions are not referred to in the brief for the state and we shall consider them as abandoned.

In support of its exceptions the state cites several cases. The first is Ray County v. Bentley et al., 49 Mo. 236. In that case a county court, charged with the duties of administering certain school funds, made an erroneous order growing out of the sale of property which had been mortgaged to the county to secure a loan of a portion of the fund. The court pointed out that the school lands were vested in the state in trust for the benefit of the inhabitants of the townships in which they were respectively situated; that the state vested the management of this trust in the county courts; that those courts were the agents of the state for that purpose; that the state was not affected by the laches of her agents; that, as in the case of a corporation, where the acts or omissions from which injury results, are done or omitted in the exercise of a corporate franchise conferred upon the corporation for the public good, and not for private corporate aid, the corporation is not liable for the consequences of such acts or omissions on the part of its officers and servants; that the county courts were intrusted with the management and care of the school fund for public good, and not for any private gain that would accrue either to them or to the counties. And the court closed its opinion with the following words which are quoted in the brief for the defendant and relied upon by it: "The state can only act through her officers, and great losses would result if it should be maintained that she was liable for the negligence or omissions of those to whom she is compelled to confide the management of her pecuniary concerns." The quotation just made approaches dictum, as to that case, for the essential question which there required determination was whether that county court possessed the power, at public sale, to buy in the land in the name of, and for the use of, a county. The opinion holds that the county court had no power to purchase the land, or hold the same, which power did not exist, and hence where the sale complained of was for an insufficient sum the county had the right to maintain an action to recover the balance due on the mortgage. The liability of the state to a private individual, on either contract or tort, as in the case at bar, did not form an element of that case and we cannot consider it applicable to the present contention.

Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 38 Pac. 457, reported in 43 Am. St. Rep. 158, is a case where the state of California, owning certain public wharves in the city of San Francisco, in consideration of wharfage and dockage charges, paid to the state board of harbor commissioners, received upon one of its public wharves a certain quantity of coal. A portion of the wharf broke and gave way whereby the coal was sunk and became a total loss. In that state a general statute obtains, the first section of which provides: "All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment." St 1893, p. 57. The court there declared the law to be well settled that, in the absence of a statute voluntarily assuming such liability, the state is not liable in damages for the negligent acts of its officers while engaged in discharging ordinary official duties pertaining to the administration of the government, but pointed out the fact that the state had entered into the business of a wharfinger, a business apart from its ordinary official duties pertaining to the administration of government, and that therefore the state was bound by its contract as a wharfinger to the same extent as a private person engaged in a like business would be. Under that situation, and by virtue of the statute just quoted, the demurrer to the declaration was overruled and the case stood for trial. The court was there called upon to determine whether the state was liable for the negligence of its servants engaged in a business other than that of discharging ordinary, official duties pertaining to the administration of government, and while doing so held fast to the doctrine of nonliability of the state for the negligent acts of its officers while they were engaged in discharging ordinary, official duties; but even then pointed out that under an enabling statute the state might be so liable. Here again it should be observed, not only that the broad terms of the enabling act, in the case at bar, distinguishes it from the California case, as to principles of liability, but also agrees with the latter when an enabling act presents a different condition,

Wilson v. Simmons, 89 Me. 242, 36 Atl. 380, is a case where a street commissioner was sued in trespass for removing certain trees, digging up the soil, and other trespasses in front of the plaintiffs house. The court there discussed a large number of legal questions involved in that case, but the learned counsel in his argument has failed to indicate to us any question there discussed which is applicaole to the case at bar and we are unable to discover any.

Clark v. State et al., 7 Cold. (Tenn.) 306, decided in 1809, is a case arising under a statute authorizing the organization of banks under what was known as The Free Banking Law (Laws 1851-52, c. 112). The bank so organized was required to deposit a certain amount of bonds with the State Comptroller, and thereupon the bank received from the Comptroller an equal amount of circulating notes, the bonds being held for the payment of the notes. At no time were the circulating notes to exceed the value of the bonds. "The business of the Comptroller's office was, for a long time, conducted with utter blundering incompetency and carelessness," said the court, and finally, by disappearance of some of the bonds and an increase of issue of circulating notes, the latter far exceeded the amount of the bonds. Suit was brought against the state charging it with...