Nadeau v. State

• Decision Date: 01 December 1978
• Citation: 395 A.2d 107
• Parties: Louis NADEAU v. STATE of Maine.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 107

395 A.2d 107

Louis NADEAU v. STATE of Maine.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 1, 1978.

Seymour Nathanson, Portland, Andrews B. Campbell (orally), Portland, for plaintiff.

John W. Benoit (orally), Deputy Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.

Before DUFRENSE, C.J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD and DELAHANTY, JJ.

DELAHANTY, Justice.

Pursuant to a Private Resolve, 1969 Me.Acts, ch. 32, ¹ Louis Nadeau (Nadeau), the plaintiff, instituted suit against the State of Maine before a three-justice panel of the Superior Court. Finding that Nadeau's complaint did not state a cause of action, the panel converted the State's motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) into an order granting summary judgment to the State. We conclude that the panel erred in granting summary judgment but that such error was essentially harmless because it should have granted the State's motion to dismiss.

As a backdrop for considering whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action, some elaboration on the underlying facts is in order. Although Nadeau's complaint offers little direct assistance, we have made reference to a legislative "Statement of Facts" accompanying the Resolve but not enacted by the Legislature which the plaintiff apparently attempted to incorporate into his complaint. Further guidance is provided by our prior decisions in Nadeau v. State, Me., 247 A.2d 113 (1968); Nadeau v. State, Me., 232 A.2d 82 (1967); Nadeau v. State, 159 Me. 260, 191 A.2d 261 (1963).

Accused of murder, Nadeau signed a confession at the Biddeford Police Department admitting to the crime. At the subsequent probable cause hearing in the Municipal Court, Biddeford, Maine, held in October of 1949, Nadeau entered a plea of guilty without the benefit of counsel. Because of an alleged inability to speak or write English fluently, Nadeau avers that he knew neither that he was signing a murder confession nor that he was entering a guilty plea to the charged crime. Following indictment, Nadeau pled not guilty. At trial in the Superior Court, the judge who presided at the probable cause hearing testified that Nadeau had previously entered a guilty plea. Convicted of murder, Nadeau was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In 1963, the United States Supreme Court decided in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963), that the right to counsel attached at a probable cause hearing because it was a critical stage in the proceedings against the accused. In 1968, White v. Maryland was given retroactive application, Arsenault v Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S.Ct. 35, 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968). Our Court, upon the State's motion for rehearing, ² concluded that Nadeau's conviction could not stand in light of the controlling principles of White and Arsenault. Nadeau v. State, Me., 247 A.2d 113 (1968). Stipulating that it would not retry him, the State released Nadeau.

In 1969, a Private Resolve was introduced in the Legislature which sought to appropriate to Nadeau $83,000 "as a full and final settlement against the State for violation of his constitutional rights." Referred to the Judiciary Committee, the present bill emerged and was enacted by the Legislature. The Resolve authorized Nadeau to sue the State while deleting all references to a direct appropriation.

I.

In arguing that his complaint alleges a cause of action, Nadeau proceeds upon the theory that the Resolve creates a new action based on unjust conviction and imprisonment. The State responds that the plaintiff's interpretation of the Resolve renders the bill unconstitutional under art. I, § 6-A (equal protection clause) and art. IV, pt. 3, § 13 (special legislation clause) of the Maine Constitution.

We need not here decide whether consistent with the above-mentioned constitutional principles the State could create a cause of action for Nadeau alone because the Legislature clearly intended no such result. The Resolve's sole purpose was to waive sovereign immunity and to permit the plaintiff to proceed on any cause of action cognizable in this jurisdiction. The Resolve unambiguously states:

Nadeau . . . is authorized to bring an action . . . against the State of Maine for damages, if any, . . . and the liabilities of the parties and elements of damage, if any, shall be the same as the liabilities and elements of damage between individuals . . . .

Although the Resolve is not unconstitutional for creating a new cause of action, we deem it necessary to consider the jurisdictional question of whether the Resolve's waiver of sovereign immunity violates either the special legislation or equal protection clauses of our Constitution. If the instant Resolve transgresses either of the constitutional provisions, the plaintiff's suit would be null and void depriving the trial court and this Court of jurisdiction. Look v. State, Me., 267 A.2d 907 (1970). As such, the question may be appropriately raised on our own initiative. Id.

At the outset, we recognize that private bills which either directly appropriate money or authorize suits against the State serve a significant ameliorative function since sovereign immunity was an absolute bar to a suit against the State prior to our decision in Davies v. City of Bath, Me., 364 A.2d 1269 (1976). Moreover, all legislative acts are clothed with an armor of constitutionality particularly resilient where such acts follow a long-settled and well-established practice of the Legislature. State v. Longley, 119 Me. 535, 112 A. 260 (1921). It is equally true that although we have had the opportunity, we have not heretofore inquired into the constitutionality of such legislation. Drake v. Smith, Me., 390 A.2d 541 (1978); Turner v. Collins, Me., 368 A.2d 1160 (1977); Hilton v. State, Me.,348 A.2d 242 (1975); Kerr v. State, 127 Me. 142, 142 A. 197 (1928); Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 A. 577 (1923); Marshall v. State,105 Me. 103, 72 A. 873 (1909).

Nevertheless, where some individuals are appropriated money or permitted to sue the State while others are not, the equal protection clause of the Maine Constitution is necessarily implicated. Art. I, § 6-A states:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, Nor be denied the equal protection of the laws . . . . (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, the vehicle by which the Legislature authorizes payment or suit is a private bill, thereby activating the special legislation clause, art. IV, pt. 3, § 13, which provides:

The Legislature shall, from time to time, provide, as far as practicable, by general laws, for all matters usually appertaining to special or private legislation.

Both constitutional provisions have been used to invalidate private resolves attempting to grant a privilege to an individual or individuals not enjoyed by other similarly situated persons. Concerning the equal protection clause, the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Mellen ³ in the early leading case of Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 336 (1825), stated:

On principle then It can never be within the bounds of legitimate legislation, to enact a special law, or pass a resolve dispensing with the general law, in a particular case, and granting a privilege and indulgence to one man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of such general law, leaving all other persons under its operation. Such a law is neither just or reasonable in its consequences. It is our boast that we live under a government of laws and not of men. But this can hardly be deemed a blessing unless those laws have for their immoveable basis the great principle of constitutional equality. (emphasis supplied).

In Lewis v. Webb, supra, the Court voided a private resolve which attempted to dispense in a particular instance with the general procedures governing appeals from decrees of probate court judges. On similar grounds, the Court one year later in Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140 (1826), invalidated a private resolve which granted to a particular party an appellate review not enjoyed by others. Relying on Lewis and Durham, Milton v. Bangor Railway & Electric Co., 103 Me. 218, 68 A. 826 (1907), struck down a private act which limited an injured party's right to sue a specific railroad by granting to that corporation an exemption from the general requirements of the common law.

Turning to the special legislation clause, although it may appear at first blush to be directory, merely advising the Legislature on how it ought to draft legislation, we have consistently viewed it as Mandatory. As such, if a general law is practicable, viz., where general legislation has been enacted or could have been made applicable, passage of special legislation violates art. IV, pt. 3, § 13. Thus, in Opinion of the Justices, 157 Me. 104, 170 A.2d 647 (1961), the Court effectively relied upon the special legislation clause in indicating that a proposed private bill which sought to compensate a corporation for loss of business during construction of a bridge would be unconstitutional if it merely sought to provide additional damages to that already available under the general law. Resting its decision on the special legislation clause and the State and Federal equal protection guarantees, Maine Pharmaceutical Association v. Board of Commissioners, Me., 245 A.2d 271 (1968), the Court voided a private bill giving a named individual special permission to sit for a pharmacy examination when he was not qualified to do so under the controlling statutory provisions. Similarly, in Look v. State, supra, we voided a private resolve on equal protection and special legislation grounds where the Legislature attempted to exempt certain property owners from the statutory six-month period for bringing suit to recover damages resulting from changing the grade of State highways.

These cases reveal a judicial vigilance, dating back to the first days of statehood and continuing to the present, against ad hoc legislative attempts to...