Austintown Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Tracy, 95-1175

• Decision Date: 21 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-1175,95-1175
• Citation: 667 N.E.2d 1174,76 Ohio St.3d 353
• Parties: AUSTINTOWN TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Appellees, v. TRACY, Tax Commr., et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 353

76 Ohio St.3d 353

667 N.E.2d 1174

AUSTINTOWN TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Appellees, v. TRACY, Tax Commr., et al., Appellants.

No. 95-1175.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 21, 1996.

Decided Aug. 21, 1996.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

R.C. 5735.23(C) and 5735.27, which establish formulas by which motor vehicle tax revenues are allocated and distributed to municipalities, counties, and townships, do not violate the Uniformity Clause of Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

R.C. 5735.05 establishes an excise tax on the use, distribution, or sale of motor vehicle fuel in Ohio ("gasoline tax"). Pursuant to complicated statutory formulas, revenues raised from the tax are distributed to the state itself, its various municipalities, its eighty-eight counties, and approximately fourteen hundred townships.

This declaratory judgment action was brought by eight Ohio township boards of trustees located throughout the state, and five individual citizens, all of whom allegedly served as township trustees at the time the complaint was filed. The plaintiffs challenged various sections of R.C. Chapter 5735, and most directly, R.C. 5735.23(C) and 5735.27, which mandate allocation and distribution of gasoline tax revenues to municipalities, counties, and townships for road repair purposes.

According to the challenged statutory formulas, gasoline tax funds distributed to counties are divided in equal proportion among all eighty-eight counties in the state, and funds distributed to townships are likewise divided in equal proportion among all the state's townships. Funds distributed to municipalities are, however, allocated in proportion to the number of motor vehicles registered in each city as compared to the number of motor vehicles registered in all cities in the state. R.C. 5735.23(C)(2)(a), (b) and (c); 5735.27(A). Application of these formulas results in "small" townships (in terms of population or road mileage) receiving funds equal in amount to that received by "large" townships. Similarly, Ohio's municipal corporations may receive greater amounts of gasoline tax funds than do townships of similar populations, or road mileage, which have never incorporated.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that R.C. 5735.27 violates Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution (the "Uniformity Clause"), which provides, "All laws of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the state." They further alleged that application of R.C. 5735.27 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs sought relief in the form of a declaration that R.C. 5735.27 is unconstitutional, and an order enjoining the State Treasurer from distributing any funds raised by the gasoline tax under the current statutory formulas. The plaintiffs further sought a court order directing the defendants to distribute gasoline tax revenues "in conformity to constitutional requirements."

Following submission of stipulated evidence, briefs and oral arguments, the trial court concluded that the challenged sections of R.C. Chapter 5735 "violate Article II, Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution, because the distribution and allocation of taxes to repair roads solely on the basis of political subdivision boundaries is an artificial and unreasonable classification and distinction." The trial court also enjoined the State Treasurer from distributing gasoline taxes according to the statutory formulas, although it stayed enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. The trial court expressly found it unnecessary to reach the issues whether the statute violated due process and equal protection protections, in that the Uniformity Clause was dispositive.

The court of appeals affirmed. It accepted the trial court's conclusion that the statutes bear no relationship to the number of road miles each political subdivision is required to maintain, and held that their application creates disparate results. In that the court of appeals found R.C. 5735.27 to violate Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, it further determined that the appellants' "arguments as to the standing of plaintiffs to assert equal protection and due process arguments ha[ve] become moot and need not be addressed."

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Henderson, Covington, Messenger, Newman & Thomas Co., L.P.A., James L. Messenger, Jerry M. Bryan, Joseph R. Bryan, Youngstown; Muldoon & Ferris and James W. Muldoon, Columbus, for appellees.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, James C. Sauer and Andrew S. Bergman, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.

Taft, Stettinius & Hollister and William J. Seitz, Cincinnati, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Hamilton County Township Association.

Keith McNamara and Frederick A. Vierow, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae, County Engineers Association of Ohio.

John E. Gotherman, Columbus, and Malcolm C. Douglas, Cleveland, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Municipal League, and the cities of Columbus, Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Dayton, Toledo, Athens, Cleveland, Lakewood and Youngstown.

Ronald J. O'Brien, City Attorney, and Daniel W. Drake, Assistant City Attorney, for city of Columbus.

Max Rothal, Director of Law, and David A. Muntean, Assistant Director of Law, for city of Akron.

Thomas M. Bernabei, Director of Law, for city of Canton.

Mark S. Schmollinger, Director of Law, for city of Toledo.

Sharon Sobel Jordan, Director of Law, for city of Cleveland.

Robert P. Milch, Director of Law, for city of Youngstown.

Fay D. Dupuis, City Solicitor, for city of Cincinnati.

Garry E. Hunter, Director of Law, for city of Athens.

Sara J. Fagnilli, Director of Law, for city of Lakewood.

J. Anthony Sawyer, Director of Law, for city of Dayton.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the statutory scheme of distribution of gasoline tax funds to municipalities, counties, and townships violates Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Appellees argue that the allocative and distributive schemes created by R.C. Chapter 5735 violate the Uniformity Clause in that those schemes bear no rational relation to the stated purposes of the gasoline tax. The state officials who are the appellants contend that application of these formulas does not result in a violation of Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. We agree with appellants.

We begin our analysis in light of the well-established principle that it is not the function of a reviewing court to assess the wisdom or policy of a statute but, rather, to determine whether the General Assembly acted within its legislative power. State ex rel. Bishop v. Mt. Orab Village Bd. of Edn. (1942), 139 Ohio St. 427, 438, 22 O.O. 494, 498, 40 N.E.2d 913, 919; Primes v. Tyler (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 195, 72 O.O.2d 112, 331 N.E.2d 723. Similarly, we presume legislation enacted by the General Assembly to be constitutional, and will not declare it to be unconstitutional unless it "appear[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible." State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 161, 38 O.O.2d 404, 405, 224 N.E.2d 906, 908-909 ("[W]hen an enactment of the General Assembly is challenged, the challenger must overcome a strong presumption of constitutionality.").

From soon after adoption of the Uniformity Clause in the 1851 Constitution, this court has recognized that its purpose is to prohibit the enactment of special or local legislation. Thus, in State v. Nelson (1894), 52 Ohio St. 88, 39 N.E. 22, this court looked to the language of the clause itself, the debates of the constitutional convention, and prior uniform judicial construction placed upon the clause, and concluded that the purpose of Section 26, Article II was to ensure that general laws "cannot operate upon the named subject matter in one part of the state differently from what it operates upon it in other parts of the state. That is, the law must operate uniformly on the named subject matter in every part of the state, and when it does that it complies with this section of the Constitution." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 98, 39 N.E. at 23.

Similarly, in State ex rel. Wirsch v. Spellmire (1902), 67 Ohio St. 77, 86, 65 N.E. 619, 622, we concluded that " '[u]niform operation throughout the state' means universal operation as to territory; it takes in the whole state. And, as to persons and things, it means universal operation as to all persons and things in the same condition or category. When a law is available in every part of the state as to all persons and things in the same condition or category, it is of uniform operation throughout the state." (Emphasis added.)

In Hixson v. Burson (1896), 54 Ohio St. 470, 43 N.E. 1000, we recognized that laws applying to road construction and maintenance are laws whose subject matter is of a general nature. That being the case, our analysis for purposes of Section 26, Article II is confined to determining whether the statutory gasoline revenue distribution formulas apply uniformly throughout the state.

The answer to this inquiry is undoubtedly in the affirmative. Appellees themselves have characterized the gasoline tax allocative and distributive schemes of R.C. Chapter 5735 as "statewide" in application. Indeed, no other conclusion can be reached in view of the fact that every municipality, every county, and every township in the state of Ohio receives gasoline tax funds according to the formulas established in R.C. Chapter 5735, irrespective of the geographical part of the state in which those political...