Autila v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2022
• Docket Number: 21-cv-11677-DLC
• Parties: FRANCKLIN AUTILA, Plaintiff, v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

FRANCKLIN AUTILA, Plaintiff,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendant.

No. 21-cv-11677-DLC

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

July 22, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE COMPLAINT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

DONALD L. CABELL, U.S.M.J.

The plaintiff Francklin Autila (“the plaintiff”) is a former “MotorPerson” who worked for the defendant Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (“MBTA”) from November 2015 to his termination in August 2019. (D. 1-3, ¶¶ 2, 165). He alleges the MBTA terminated his employment in retaliation for filing a discrimination complaint with the MBTA Office of Diversity and Civil Rights (“MBTA ODCR”) and a dual complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (“MCAD”) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“Title VII”). (D. 1, pp. 3-4, 6). He also brings the following claims: (1) national origin discrimination premised

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on his Haitian national origin in violation of Title VII; and (2) disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate his diabetic diet and medication schedule in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). (D. 1, pp. 3-4, 6).

The MBTA moves to strike the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (“Rule 12(f)”) or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) (“Rule 12(e)”). (D. 12). In opposing the motion, the plaintiff addresses a number of the paragraphs the MBTA seeks to strike. (D. 14). He also asserts, inter alia, that the complexity of the case and a need to rely on circumstantial inferences to establish discrimination justify the length of the complaint. (D. 14). For reasons discussed below, the motion is allowed in part and denied in part. Certain paragraphs in the complaint are stricken; the request for a more definite statement is denied, because the complaint is not “so vague or ambiguous” such that the MBTA “cannot reasonably prepare a response,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e); but plaintiff is required to identify the date or time period applicable to paragraphs 83 to 86 and paragraph 227.

I. BACKGROUND

The complaint consists of a form “Complaint for a Civil Case” (D. 1, pp. 1-5) and a 266-paragraph statement of the claims (D. 13) captioned “Statement of Claim(2)” (“the statement”), which is

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filed as an exhibit.^[1] The complaint also includes a one-page “Statement of Claim[s]” in three paragraphs with each paragraph summarizing the conduct that supports each of the foregoing three claims. (D. 1, p. 6). The more-lengthy statement elaborates the facts supporting the three claims. (D. 1-3).

By way of example relative to the ADA claim, the statement recites that the plaintiff repeatedly informed his immediate supervisors about his diabetes and his need to adhere to a prescribed medication schedule and a recommended diet. (D. 1-3, ¶¶ 16, 18). “Train Starter Boyd,” one of the plaintiff's supervisors, nevertheless routinely required the plaintiff to work beyond the scheduled end of his shift. (D. 1-3, ¶¶ 18-20, 188189). The extended shift negatively impacted the plaintiff's ability to adhere to the medication schedule and recommended diet for his diabetes. (D. 1-3, ¶ 20).

As to the Title VII national origin claim, MBTA supervisors mimicked the plaintiff's Haitian accent and deprived him of assistance afforded to non-Haitian employees. (D. 1, P. 6, ¶ 1) (D. 1-3, ¶ 10). The multiple criticisms of the plaintiff's Haitian accent prompted a union representative to complain to the plaintiff's direct supervisors. (D. 1-3, ¶ 13). Relatedly, Gina

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Westwater (“Westwater”), the MBTA's operations control center supervisor at the time, gave the plaintiff conflicting instructions in contrast to the assistance she gave to non-Haitian employees. (D. 1-3, ¶ 15).

Westwater was also involved in a December 10, 2018 incident on a northbound platform at the MBTA's Downtown Crossing station. (D. 1-3, ¶¶ 63-65, 70-76). The incident led to a noncriminal MBTA transit police department narrative report (“MBTA police report”) involving the plaintiff. (D. 1-4, pp. 10-12). The narrative describes the plaintiff, the operator of a train at the station, as having a mental breakdown and refusing to drive the train as well as patrons describing him as “going crazy.” (D. 1-4, pp. 1011).

Shortly thereafter on December 13, 2018, the plaintiff's district supervisors placed him on unpaid leave, “which is a disciplinary action” that prevents the plaintiff from reporting to work. (D. 1-3, ¶¶ 164-166, 180, 196). On January 30, 2019, the plaintiff received a “five-day suspension for violations allegedly committed” on December 10, 2018. (D. 1-3, ¶ 175). A series of disciplinary hearings and resulting suspensions followed, “all based on a single alleged violation,” i.e., “Absence.” (D. 1-3, ¶ 176). Because the plaintiff was on unpaid leave throughout this time, however, he “was not allowed to report to work.” (D. 1-3, ¶¶ 165, 176, 196). In fact, the plaintiff remained on unpaid leave

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until August 13, 2019, at which time the MBTA terminated his employment. (D. 1-3, ¶¶ 165, 180). The proffered reasons in the termination letter are the plaintiff's “previous record” and, notably, “Absence.” (D. 103, ¶ 195). By virtue of the “definition of absence” in the MBTA's attendance policy, the plaintiff is not considered absent while on unpaid leave, according to the complaint. (D. 1-3, ¶ 196).

More than two months before the plaintiff's termination, he filed a dual complaint with the MCAD and EEOC (“MCAD complaint”). The June 3, 2019 MCAD complaint provides a basis for the Title VII retaliation claim. (D. 1-3, ¶¶ 180, 192-193).

II. DISCUSSION

As noted, the MBTA moves to strike the complaint under both Rule 12(f) and, alternatively, requests a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Addressing these requests seriatim, this court turns to the Rule 12(f) motion.

A. Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f)

1. Request to Strike Affidavit

The MBTA initially moves to strike an affidavit attached to the complaint in exhibit four (D. 1-4, pp. 1-8).^[2]

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(D. 13, pp. 7-8). According to the MBTA, the affidavit is unnecessary and includes baseless and scandalous allegations that the MBTA transit police department “‘falsified' the Police Report.” (D. 13, pp. 78). The resulting damage to the MBTA's reputation is purportedly prejudicial. (D. 13, pp. 7-8). The 35-paragraph affidavit also purportedly contravenes Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)'s requirement that a complaint “contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim.'” (D. 13, p. 8) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Lastly, the MBTA submits that the affidavit “is not a ‘pleading'” within the meaning of Rule 12(f) and asks this court to strike it under this court's “inherent authority” as opposed to under Rule 12(f). (D. 13, p. 8).

Turning to the last argument, Rule 12(f) states that “[t]he court may strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (emphasis added). Hence, by its terms “Rule 12(f) applies only to pleadings” as opposed to, for example, motions made in pursuit of, or in opposition to, summary judgment. Pilgrim v. Trustees of Tufts College, 118 F.3d 864, 868 (1st Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387 (1st Cir. 2002). A “pleading” includes a complaint.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). By virtue of Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (“Rule 10(c)”), “[a] copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (emphasis added).

Examining whether an affidavit constitutes a “written instrument” under Rule 10(c) begins with the language of the statute embodying the rule. See Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[A]s with any act of Congress, ‘“our analysis begins with the language of the statute.”'”). To avoid rendering the phrase “written instrument” superfluous, not all exhibits attached to a complaint are part of a complaint. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant”) (citation omitted); id. (characterizing “duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute'” as “cardinal principle of statutory construction”) (citations omitted).

At the outset, the analysis determines if “the statutory text is plain and unambiguous.” Hernandez-Miranda v. Empresas Diaz Masso, Inc., 651 F.3d 167, 171 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)). “If it is,” the statute is applied “according to its terms.” Id. (quoting Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387). Determining if the term is plain and unambiguous “begin[s] with the ordinary meaning of the term[] . . .” Id. In

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order to determine that “ordinary meaning,” it is permissible to “consult dictionary definitions, interpretations given to the same terms by judicial construction, and the statutory context in which the words are used.” Id.

Turning to the task, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines the term “instrument” as “[a] written legal document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities, such as a contract, will, promissory note, or share certificate.” Instrument Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see, e.g., Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting definition of “instrument” in Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), to elucidate meaning of “written instrument” in Rule 10(c)). Hence, the dictionary definition of “written instrument” is a “legal document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities.” Instrument Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

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