HernÁndez–miranda v. Empresas DÍaz MassÓ Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–1639.,10–1639.
• Citation: 94 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44202,112 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1113,651 F.3d 167
• Parties: Edna M. HERNÁNDEZ–MIRANDA, Plaintiff, Appellant,v.EMPRESAS DÍAZ MASSÓ, INC., Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

651 F.3d 167

112 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1113

94 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,202

Edna M. HERNÁNDEZ–MIRANDA, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.EMPRESAS DÍAZ MASSÓ, INC., Defendant, Appellee.

No. 10–1639.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard March 8, 2011.Decided June 29, 2011.

Francisco M. López–Romo, for appellant.Anne Noel Occhialino, Attorney, with whom P. David Lopez, General Counsel, Carolyn L. Wheeler, Acting Associate General Counsel, and Lorraine C. Davis, Assistant General Counsel, were on brief, for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae.Miguel Simonet Sierra, for appellee.Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and SILER,^* Circuit Judges.LYNCH, Chief Judge.

This appeal raises questions of first impression for this circuit as to the proper interpretation of the caps on compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) in a Title VII employment discrimination action.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102–166, authorized the recovery of previously unavailable types of damages in Title VII actions involving intentional discrimination. Pub.L. No. 102–166, § 102; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b). These additional types of damages, which can be awarded by verdict once a violation of Title VII has been established, were made available subject to the proviso that they be capped. The caps range from $50,000 to $300,000, and turn on how many employees a defendant “has ... in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The question presented on appeal is whether the “current” calendar year refers to the calendar year(s) in which the discrimination occurred or the calendar year in which the damage award is made.

A jury awarded the plaintiff, Edna Hernández–Miranda, $300,000 in damages in this Title VII suit alleging intentional discrimination by her former employer, Empresas Díaz Massó (DM). Hernández–Miranda testified that during her employment as a construction worker, she was forced to perform oral sex on a supervisor multiple times and was subjected to extreme, continuing sexual abuse by coworkers and supervisors. She testified that her job with DM was her sole means to support herself and her children, and that as a result of the mistreatment she sought psychiatric help. Hernández–Miranda testified as well that DM ignored her repeated complaints of sexual harassment.

The district court reduced the jury award to $50,000 under § 1981a(b)(3)(A), using the year of the award to measure the number of DM's employees and thereby determine the size of the applicable statutory cap. Miranda v. Empresas Díaz Massó, Inc., 699 F.Supp.2d 413, 438 (D.P.R.2010). Hernández–Miranda appeals this reduction with amicus support from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and we reverse. We interpret the statutory phrase “current” calendar year in § 1981a(b)(3) to refer to the time period of the discrimination. Because DM has not shown that it had less than 200 employees during the years of discrimination, we hold that the statutory cap in § 1981a(b)(3)(C) applies. We remand with instructions to vacate the judgment of $50,000 and to enter a compensatory damages award of $200,000.

I.

Based on more than adequate evidence, the ugly details of which we do not describe further, the jury issued its award of $300,000 on August 18, 2008, “to compensate for past, present and future emotional pain and mental anguish caused by [DM's] conduct, actions, or omissions.” Hernández–Miranda worked for DM, first as a laborer and then as a Safety Officer at labor sites, from August 2003 until her termination in March 2005. The evidence at trial established that the clearest incidents of harassment, discrimination, and abuse occurred in 2004.

DM filed several motions after the jury's verdict, including an August 26, 2008 motion under Rule 59(e) to reduce the verdict based on § 1981a(b)(3). This motion asserted that the current calendar year, for purposes of the damage cap provision, is the calendar year of judgment. DM accompanied the motion with an affidavit signed by its vice-president, which stated that in 2007 DM employed 98 employees and in 2008, the year of the award, DM employed only 25 employees. The affidavit made clear that DM's workforce had shrunk since the period of discrimination, from 241 employees in 2003 and 247 employees in 2004.

Hernández–Miranda filed a garbled opposition to the motion to reduce the award. She argued that DM had failed to offer evidence at trial concerning how many employees it had, and that the court had prevented her from doing so. Hernández–Miranda further asserted that DM had recently merged with another company and that the resulting company had 1,300 employees. She also noted that there had been testimony at trial that DM at one time had 250 to 300 employers. Hernández–Miranda did not address which of these numbers should guide the damage cap analysis.¹

Without discussion, the district court assumed the relevant time period for determining the damage cap was the time of the entry of the verdict and reduced the award to $50,000. Miranda, 699 F.Supp.2d at 437–38.

II.

We review a district court's ruling on a motion to alter or amend the judgment for abuse of discretion, Negrón–Almeda v. Santiago, 528 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir.2008), reviewing questions of law de novo and questions of fact for clear error, Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir.2010). Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and are reviewed de novo. United States v. Troy, 618 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.2010).

Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, successful Title VII litigants could receive damages for back pay, limited to the pay for the two years prior to the filing of a charge of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1). The 1991 Act newly made punitive damages available under the statute, as well as additional forms of compensatory damages: non-pecuniary damages and future pecuniary damages. Id. § 1981a(a)(1) & (b). These new remedies were made available to Title VII litigants who proved intentional discrimination, but not Title VII litigants who proved that an employment practice was unlawful only because of its disparate impact. Id. § 1981a(a)(1). The remedies were made available subject to statutory damage caps.²

Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has addressed the meaning of “current” calendar year under § 1981a(b)(3). We are only aware of three circuits that have done so. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits, and, by implication, the Seventh Circuit have concluded that the “current” calendar year under § 1981a(b)(3) is the year of discrimination. Depaoli v. Vacation Sales Assocs., LLC, 489 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir.2007); Vance v. Union Planters Corp., 209 F.3d 438, 446 (5th Cir.2000); Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1354–55 (7th Cir.1995).

In so holding, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits relied in part on language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). That provision limits the definition of “employer” under Title VII to a person with fifteen or more employees “in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The two courts held that the current year under § 2000e(b) is the year of the discrimination, and that consistent usage dictates that the current year under § 1981a(b)(3) also be the year of the discrimination. See Depaoli, 489 F.3d at 622; Vance, 209 F.3d at 446.

The Supreme Court has implicitly reached the same conclusion about the meaning of “current” calendar year under § 2000e(b). In Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 117 S.Ct. 660, 136 L.Ed.2d 644 (1997), the Court applied that provision such that the “current” calendar year is the year of the discrimination. Walters, 519 U.S. at 205 & n. *, 117 S.Ct. 660. This court interpreted § 2000e(b) in this fashion in Vera–Lozano v. International Broadcasting, 50 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.1995). There, we held that “the ‘current year’ ... as defined by the statute” under § 2000e(b) was the year of the discrimination. Id. at 69 (citing Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, Ala., 612 F.2d 974, 979 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980)).

III.

Under settled principles of statutory construction, we first look to whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 1063, 172 L.Ed.2d 791 (2009). If it is, “we must apply the statute according to its terms.” Id. at 1063–64. In conducting this analysis, we begin with the ordinary meaning of the terms as of the time when the statutory provision was enacted. See id. at 1064. To determine ordinary meaning, we may consult dictionary definitions, interpretations given to the same terms by judicial construction, and the statutory context in which the words are used. See id.

The language of § 1981a(b)(3) provides:

The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section ... and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party—

(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $50,000;

(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $100,000; and

(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and

(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).

The sparse legislative history of the 1991 amendments reflect that this provision arose from a political compromise between those who wanted to broaden the availability of damages under Title VII ³...