Autozone v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 29 March 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 05-0476 (RMU).
• Citation: 484 F.Supp.2d 24
• Parties: AUTOZONE DEVELOPMENT CORP., and Autozone Stores, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. The DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

484 F.Supp.2d 24

AUTOZONE DEVELOPMENT CORP., and Autozone Stores, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. The DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 05-0476 (RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 29, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Emil Hirsch, O'Connor & Hannan, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Richard Gaspare Amato, Aaron M. Levine & Associates, Paul J. Kiernan, Holland & Knight LLP, Ronald M. Jacobs, Jerry Alexander Moore, III, Venable, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS¹

URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs, Autozone Development Corporation and Autozone Stores, Inc., bring suit against the District of Columbia, the National Capital Revitalization Corporation ("NCRC"), and Naylor Road, LLC ("Naylor Road") (collectively, "the defendants") for allegedly violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The defendants² move to dismiss, contending that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit because they can show no injury in fact. In response, the plaintiffs argue that they suffered an injury because the National Capital Revitalization Corporation Eminent Domain Clarification and Skyland Eminent Domain Approval Act of 2004 ("the Skyland Act"), D.C.Code § 2-1219.19, placed a "cloud" over the plaintiffs' property and made the plaintiffs' rights unassignable. In addition, the plaintiffs claim that they suffered an injury because they were deprived of a portion of the net proceeds recovered in the sale of the property. Because the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that they suffered an injury in fact, the court grants the defendants' motion.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Defendant Naylor Road formerly owned the parcel of land situated at 2626 Naylor Road, S.E. ("the property"). Third Am. Compl. ("Compl.") ¶ 5. On June 16, 1995, defendant Naylor Road leased the property to a non-party lessee who assigned the leasehold to the plaintiffs on October 21, 1998. Compl. ¶ 5; Defs.' Mot. for Sum. J. ("Defs.' Mot.") at 6. The plaintiffs have continuously occupied and conducted business on the property since 1998. Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pls.' Opp'n") at 3.

The terms of the plaintiffs' lease grant them the right to assign the lease. Pls.' Opp'n at 9. The plaintiffs' lease also contains a clause which provides that if after a condemnation, the plaintiffs determine that the property is not fit for its existing use, the plaintiffs may terminate the lease. Pls.' Opp'n at 20; Defs.' Mot. at 6. This clause also applies to purchases that are arranged in lieu of a traditional condemnation. Pls.' Opp'n at 20; Defs.' Mot. at 6.

In 1998, D.C. created NCRC as an independent instrumentality to encourage economic development and remove blight. D.C.Code § 2-1219.02; see also Compl. ¶ 4; Defs.' Mot. at 2-3. To achieve these purposes, the Skyland Act authorized NCRC to exercise eminent domain powers subject to approval by the D.C. City Council. D.C.Code § 2-1219.19. In 2001, according to the defendant, a neighborhood commission encouraged the government to take action in the Skyland area due to its "abandoned feel" combined with drug and alcohol-related crime.³ Defs.' Mot. at 4. As a result, NCRC began to work with private developers on a plan to rejuvenate the Skyland area in September, 2002. Compl. ¶ 17; Defs.' Mot. at 4-5. NCRC was able to begin its work with the private developers without exercising its eminent domain powers because, on December 9, 2005, Naylor Road sold the property to NCRC. Pls.' Opp'n at 2-3; Defs.' Mot. at 6. The sale of the property by its terms did not affect the plaintiffs' lease. Pls.' Opp'n at 3 (stating that the subject property remains encumbered by the plaintiffs' lease); Defs.' Mot. at 10.

B. Procedural History

The plaintiffs brought this suit on March 8, 2005, seeking to enjoin defendant NCRC's exercise of eminent domain over the property. Autozone Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 522437, *1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11731, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2006). When NCRC purchased the property from Naylor Road in December 2005, the plaintiffs, with permission of the court, filed a Third Amended Complaint, arguing that the sale materially altered their complaint.⁴ Id. The defendants now argue that none of their actions have harmed the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs consequently lack the standing to bring this action.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C.Cir.2004) (noting that "[a]s a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction").

Because "subject-matter jurisdiction is an `Art. III as well as a statutory requirement[,] no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.'" Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982)). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 343 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

Because subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the court's power to hear the claim, however, the court must give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.2003); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001). Moreover, the court is not limited to the allegations contained in the complaint. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Instead, to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the claim, the court may consider materials outside the pleadings. Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir. 1992).

B. Legal Standard for Standing

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases or controversies. U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1. These prerequisites reflect the "common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Consequently, "a showing of standing is an essential and unchanging predicate to any exercise of a court's jurisdiction." Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)).

As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. 1003; City of Waukesha v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 320 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C.Cir.2003) (per curiam). The extent of the plaintiff's burden varies according to the procedural posture of the case. Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 292 F.3d 895, 898-99 (D.C.Cir.2002). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct will suffice. Id. On a motion for summary judgment, however, the "plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true." Id. at 899 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56); accord Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666.

To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-pronged test. Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 898 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130). First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, defined as a harm that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Byrd v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 174 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C.Cir.1999) (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1856, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). Finally, it must be likely that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. Byrd, 174 F.3d at 243. Our court of appeals has made clear that no standing exists if the plaintiff's allegations are "purely speculative[, which is] the ultimate label for injuries too implausible to support standing." Tozzi v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 307 (D.C.Cir. 2001). Nor is there standing where the court "would have to accept a number of very speculative inferences and assumptions in any endeavor to connect the alleged injury with [the challenged conduct]." Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133, 139 (D.C.Cir.1980).

C. The Court Grants the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The defendants assert that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs have not suffered an injury in fact. Defs.' Mot. at 8. Specifically, the defendants argue...