Avalonbay v. Zoning Com'n of Stratford, No. 17461.

• Decision Date: 31 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 17460.,No. 17461.
• Citation: 908 A.2d 1033,280 Conn. 405
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC. v. ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF STRATFORD AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the Town of Stratford.

Page 1033

908 A.2d 1033

280 Conn. 405

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC. v. ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF STRATFORD

AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the Town of Stratford.

No. 17461.

No. 17460.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 10, 2006.

Decided October 31, 2006.

Timothy S. Hollister, with whom was Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff in both cases).

Kevin C. Kelley, with whom were Timothy A. Bishop, Stratford, Brian M. Stone Timothy D. Bates, New london and, on the brief, Michael S. Casey, Shelton, for the appellees (proposed intervenor and defendant in each case).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The issue presented in these certified appeals is whether a municipality, acting through its town council, can intervene in appeals to the Superior Court from decisions of the municipality's inland wetlands and watercourses agency and its zoning commission pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-19,¹ the citizen intervention provision of the Environmental Protection Act of 1971, General Statutes § 22a-14 et seq. The plaintiff, AvalonBay Communities, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court's decisions granting the plaintiff's motions to strike petitions for intervention in both appeals filed by the town of Stratford (town) through its town council.² The plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial court's decisions on the basis of its conclusion that § 22a-19 allows for the town's intervention. The plaintiff claims that such intervention is impermissible because it would conflict with the town's delegation of municipal authority to the two defendant agencies, the zoning commission of the town of Stratford (zoning commission) and the inland wetlands and watercourses agency of the town of Stratford (wetlands agency) pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-1³ and 22a-42.⁴ We disagree, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court's decision sets forth the following undisputed facts and procedural history. "The plaintiff in both of these matters . . . sought to construct an apartment complex in the [town]. One fourth of the units in the complex were to be set aside for low and moderate income housing in accordance with Connecticut's affordable housing statute, General Statutes § 8-30g.⁵ To that end, the plaintiff applied to the [zoning commission] for an amendment to the zoning regulations,⁶ a zone change for the proposed development site⁷ and approval of a site development plan. Because the proposed development site included a brook and adjacent wetlands, the plaintiff also applied to the [wetlands agency] for a permit to conduct a regulated activity.⁸ The zoning commission and the wetlands agency denied the plaintiff's applications, both initially and after the applications had been revised.⁹

"The plaintiff thereafter appealed from each entity's decision to the Superior Court. In the appeal from the zoning commission's decision . . . only the zoning commission was named as a defendant; in the appeal from the wetlands agency's decision . . . only the wetlands agency was named as a defendant. After the appeals had been pending for more than one year, settlements appeared imminent. At that time, the [town] through its legislative body, the town council . . . filed in each case a verified pleading pursuant to . . . § 22a-19(a) . . . claiming, in essence, that the plaintiff's proposed development would have a negative impact on the environment. The plaintiff filed motions to strike those pleadings, and the [trial] court, in separate memoranda of decision filed May 9, 2003, granted the plaintiff's motions.

"In the case involving the zoning commission, the [trial] court, relying on § 8-1 et seq. and decisions interpreting those statutes, concluded that the town's intervention pleading `must be stricken because the town council is seeking to interfere in a matter committed exclusively to the [zoning] commission and, therefore, is not entitled to the relief it seeks, viz., to become a party to the appeal.' In the case involving the wetlands agency, the court held similarly, analogizing to cases concerning zoning commissions. The [trial] court did not analyze the scope or effect of § 22a-19 in either decision, but mentioned it only in passing as the authority pursuant to which the town sought intervention." AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 87 Conn.App. 537, 539-41, 867 A.2d 37 (2005). Accordingly, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motions to strike the town's petitions to intervene.

The town subsequently appealed to the Appellate Court from both decisions of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motions to strike, claiming that the trial court improperly had struck its intervention petitions because § 22a-19 permits the town's intervention in both appeals and that such intervention is not an improper intrusion into the delegated authority of the zoning commission and the wetlands agency. In a divided opinion, the majority of the Appellate Court reversed the decisions of the trial court, concluding that § 22a-19 gives the town the right to intervene in both appeals. See id., at 541, 867 A.2d 37.

While the town's appeals were pending before the Appellate Court, the appeal to the Superior Court from the decision of the zoning commission proceeded to judgment on the merits.¹⁰ On July 23, 2004, the Superior Court, Bryant, J., rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on four of the five issues and remanded the case back to the zoning commission for further consideration of the remaining issue. The zoning commission then appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1. That appeal from the judgment on the merits has been stayed pending the disposition of this appeal. Subsequently, on January 11, 2005, the appeal to the Superior Court from the decision of the wetlands agency, also proceeded to judgment on the merits. The trial court, Shortall, J., rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The wetlands agency then appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court. That appeal also has been stayed pending disposition of this appeal.

We granted the plaintiff's petitions for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, limited to the following issues: (1) "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the Stratford town council was entitled to intervene in this appeal to the trial court from the [wetlands agency]?" AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 274 Conn. 911, 912, 876 A.2d 1203 (2005); and (2) "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the Stratford town council was entitled to intervene in this appeal to the trial court from the [zoning commission]?" AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 274 Conn. 911, 876 A.2d 1203 (2005). Subsequently, we consolidated the appeals pursuant to Practice Book § 61-7.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that although the plain language of § 22a-19 allows a municipality to intervene in any administrative proceeding or judicial review thereof to assert a claim of unreasonable pollution, such an interpretation would conflict with other statutes. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that reading § 22a-19 together with §§ 8-1 and 22a-42 requires us to conclude that the town cannot intervene in the judicial review of decisions of its wetlands agency and zoning commission. In response, the town claims that § 22a-19 is plain and unambiguous and allows for the intervention of the town in the judicial review of decisions of its wetlands agency and zoning commission. We agree with the town.

At the outset, we set forth the applicable standard of review. "The standard of review in an appeal challenging a trial court's granting of a motion to strike is well established. A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court. As a result, our review of the court's ruling is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the [pleading] that has been stricken and we construe the [pleading] in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 117-18, 889 A.2d 810 (2006).

The question of whether § 22a-19 entitles the town to intervene in the judicial review of decisions of the wetlands agency and the zoning commission presents a question of statutory interpretation. "The issue before this court involves a question of statutory interpretation that . . . requires our plenary review. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7, 882 A.2d 597 (2005). With these principles in mind, we turn to the text of the statute in question.

Section 22a-19 (a) provides in relevant part that "[i]n any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, and in any judicial review thereof made...