Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 26 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. B053308,B053308
• Citation: 228 Cal.App.3d 1128,279 Cal.Rptr. 459
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: AWARD METALS, INC., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent, Luis HERNANDEZ, Real Party in Interest.

Page 459

279 Cal.Rptr. 459

228 Cal.App.3d 1128

AWARD METALS, INC., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent Luis HERNANDEZ, Real Party in Interest.

No. B053308.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

March 26, 1991.

As Modified April 10, 1991.

Tobin, Lucks & Goldman and Thomas J. Rafacz, Sherman Oaks, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Gilbert R. Geilim, Los Angeles and Judith A. Powell, Beverly Hills, for real party in interest.

EPSTEIN, Associate Justice.

This petition for writ of mandate seeks relief from the overruling of an employer's demurrer to four causes of action in a complaint brought by its former employee for injuries sustained while operating a power press. The issue presented is whether an employee who suffers industrial injury under circumstances described in Labor Code section 4558 is permitted to bring "an action at law for damages" against his or her employer on all theories, including those that require a lesser degree of proof than that statute. We conclude that the employee is not permitted to bring an action at law on a cause of action that requires a lesser showing than that prescribed by Labor Code section 4558. For that reason, we conclude that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer as to those causes of action.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

This case arises from an order overruling petitioner's demurrer to all causes of action in the plaintiff's first amended complaint in the trial court proceedings. (Plaintiff is the real party in interest in the proceedings before us.) The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a complaint by raising questions of law. (Buford v. State of California (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 811, 818, 164 Cal.Rptr. 264.) The question to be determined is whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.) A complaint survives a demurrer if it states facts disclosing some right to relief. (Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25 Cal.3d 14, 22, 157 Cal.Rptr. 706, 598 P.2d 866.) A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear and under the applicable substantive law it is plain that there can be no liability. (Moore v. Morhar (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 896, 903, 135 Cal.Rptr. 626.)

Luis M. Hernandez was injured while operating a press brake in the course and scope of his employment as a metal worker for petitioner, Award Metals Company. Hernandez brought a civil action against the machine manufacturer, petitioner and others, alleging causes of action for negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, intentional tort, and violation of Labor Code section 4558. ¹ He sought compensatory damages on all causes of action, and sought punitive damages on the causes of action for strict liability, intentional tort, and violation of section 4558. Petitioner was included in this civil action on the basis of the exception to the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy applicable where an employee sustains injury because of an employer's knowing removal of or knowing failure to install a point of operation guard on a power press. (§ 4558.) Petitioner demurred to the complaint, asserting that the first four causes of action were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of section 3602, and that the fourth and fifth causes of action were uncertain.

The trial court overruled the demurrer, reasoning that if an employee alleges facts demonstrating that the injury occurred as a result of the employer's violation of section 4558, the employee may bring an action at law for damages based not only on violation of that statute, but also on any other common law theory supported by the facts. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate commanding the trial court to sustain its demurrer. As we explain, petitioner is entitled to some of the relief it requests, and we shall issue a writ of mandate restricted to such relief.

DISCUSSION

The basic theory of workers' compensation is that where the conditions of compensation exist, benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act provide the exclusive remedy against an employer for injuries sustained in the course of employment. (Watters Associates v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1322, 1324, 267 Cal.Rptr. 696; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 14, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054; § 3602.) Section 3602, subdivision (a) provides that the only exceptions to this exclusive remedy doctrine are those specifically described in section 3602, subdivision (b), section 3706, and section 4558. The latter is the "power press" exception involved in this case. The trend of recent decisions in workers' compensation law has been to narrow the range of exceptions to the exclusivity principle, thereby benefitting employers and employees by keeping down the cost of compensation insurance and preserving the low cost, efficiency and certainty of recovery which characterize the workers' compensation system. (See Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1095, 265 Cal.Rptr. 294; Continental Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 156, 162, 235 Cal.Rptr. 260.)

Section 4558, subdivision (b), the exception to the exclusive remedy rule applicable to this case, provides: "An employee, or his or her dependents in the event of the employee's death, may bring an action at law for damages against the employer where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by the employer's knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation guard on a power press, and this removal or failure to install is specifically authorized by the employer under conditions known by the employer to create a probability of serious injury or death." Subdivision (c) further defines the exception: "No liability shall arise under this section absent proof that the manufacturer designed, installed, required, or otherwise provided by specification for the attachment of the guards and conveyed knowledge of the same to the employer...."

The purpose of this section, as explained in Ceja v. J.R. Wood, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1377, 242 Cal.Rptr. 531, "is to protect workers from employers who wilfully remove or fail to install appropriate guards on large power tools. Many of these power tools are run by large mechanical motors or hydraulically. (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, § 4188.) These sorts of machines are difficult to stop while they are in their sequence of operation. Without guards, workers are susceptible to extremely serious injuries. For this reason, the Legislature passed section 4558, subdivision (b), which subjects employers to legal liability for removing guards from powerful machinery where the manufacturer has designed the machine to have a protective guard while in operation."

An action under the section 4558 exception requires more than an employee's injury proximately caused by the absence of a point of operation guard on a power press. An employee also must establish that the employer knowingly removed the guard, or knowingly failed to install it, and that the removal or failure to install was specifically authorized by the employer under conditions known by the employer to create a probability of serious injury or death. (§ 4558, subd. (b).) " 'Specifically authorized' means an affirmative instruction issued by the employer prior to the time of the employee's physical injury or death, but shall not mean any subsequent acquiescence in, or ratification of, removal of a point of operation safety guard." (§ 4558, subd. (a)(6).) " 'Failure to install' means omitting to attach a point of operation guard either provided or required by the manufacturer, when the attachment is required by the manufacturer and made known by him or her to the employer at the time of acquisition, installation, or manufacturer-required modification of the power press." (§ 4558, subd. (a)(2).) The employee must therefore prove that the manufacturer made some provision for attachment of the guards and conveyed knowledge of these specifications to the employer. (§ 4558, subd. (c); Swanson v. Matthews Products, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 901, 906, 221 Cal.Rptr. 84.)

From the plain language of section 4558, it is clear that an exception to the exclusivity of workers' compensation only arises for a power press injury where the employer has been expressly informed by the manufacturer that a point of operation guard is required, where the employer then affirmatively removes or fails to install such guard, and where the employer does so under conditions known by the employer to create a probability of serious injury or death. Absent facts which would establish the employer's knowledge or action regarding the absence of a point of operation guard on a power press, the incident would not come within the exception of section 4558, and an employee would not be entitled to bring "an action at law for damages" arising from the power press injury. If such action cannot be brought on its own where the facts fail to establish all the elements of the power press exception under section 4558, it follows that individual causes of action against an employer which do not meet the requirements of section 4558 cannot be bootstrapped onto a civil action for damages...