Shoemaker v. Myers

• Citation: 801 P.2d 1054,52 Cal.3d 1,276 Cal.Rptr. 303
• Decision Date: 20 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. S001726,S001726
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 801 P.2d 1054, 59 USLW 2447, 6 IER Cases 1, 20 A.L.R.5th 1016 Jack SHOEMAKER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Beverlee A. MYERS, as Director, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 303

276 Cal.Rptr. 303

52 Cal.3d 1, 801 P.2d 1054, 59 USLW 2447, 6 IER Cases 1,

20 A.L.R.5th 1016

Jack SHOEMAKER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Beverlee A. MYERS, as Director, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S001726.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 20, 1990.

Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, Cathleen A. Williams, San Francisco, Rockne A. Lucia, Jr., Walnut Creek, and Gary M. Messing, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.

Joseph Posner, McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky, Cliff Palefsky, Gerrit Jan Buddingh, Elise S. Rose, Shawn P. Cloughesy, Siegel, Friedman & Yee, Eric Weaver, Joan M. Graff, William C. Quackenbush, John True and Christopher Ho, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Elisabeth C. Brandt, Joseph O. Egan and Eileen Ceranowski, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and respondents.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, James E. Ludlam, Charles F. Forbes, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Alan G. Martin, Paul De Marco, Brenda S. Reid, O'Melveny & Myers, Stephen P. Pepe, Tom A. Jerman and Craig A. Horowitz, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.

ARABIAN, Justice.

This case presents the question whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law bar other civil claims for damages arising from wrongful employment termination, where the complaint includes allegations of physical disability resulting from the termination. We conclude that disabling injuries, whether physical or mental, arising from termination of employment are generally within the coverage of workers' compensation and subject to the exclusive remedy provisions, unless the discharge comes within an express or implied statutory exception or the discharge results from risks reasonably deemed not to be within the compensation bargain.

I. Facts

This case comes to us after the sustaining of a general demurrer; accordingly, the rule is that we accept as true all the material allegations of the complaint. (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216.) The facts as disclosed by plaintiff's pleadings are as follows.

Plaintiff Jack Shoemaker (plaintiff) had been an investigator for the Department of Health Services (Department) for nine years, and had an exemplary record in civil service for twenty-two years up to the time of his termination.

In 1979, a letter to the Attorney General from the Office of the Lieutenant Governor asserted that certain family planning health care centers (health centers) were operating illegally because lay workers were performing services required to be performed by licensed medical professionals. The health centers were receiving funds from the Office of Family Planning (OFP) division of the Department. In 1980, plaintiff was assigned to investigate the allegations of illegal operations, and plaintiff ultimately filed a report concluding not only that the health centers had indeed utilized unlicensed personnel to perform medical functions, but that Beverlee A. Myers, director of the Department, and other high Department officials improperly approved funding for the health centers with knowledge that the health centers were engaging in such illegal practices. After plaintiff made his report outlining possible illegal practices by Department officials, his supervisors in the Division of Audits and Investigations, particularly Charles Shuttleworth, who was chief of the division, improperly interfered with plaintiff's investigation by forbidding him to make contacts in furtherance of the investigation or to report his findings or share with appropriate law enforcement agencies the information he had uncovered. In December 1980, plaintiff complained of the interference and asked to be relieved of his assignment to the health centers investigation. Because of his complaint plaintiff received a disciplinary counseling. His supervisors further threatened, intimidated and harassed him on account of his complaints between December 1980 and May 1981.

In May 1981, a magazine article about the health centers appeared, criticizing the health centers' use of lay health workers and calling into question Beverlee Myers's role in continuing funding for the health centers. After the article appeared, Shuttleworth interrogated plaintiff and other investigators, and threatened to fire any investigator who had "leaked" information to the press unless he or she "confessed."

The events immediately precipitating plaintiff's termination began in November 1981, when a psychiatrist complained to the Department that Department investigators, in the course of another investigation unrelated to the health centers matter, had harassed two of the psychiatrist's patients. Although plaintiff was not in fact involved in that investigation, the psychiatrist mistakenly identified plaintiff as one of the investigators. Plaintiff's supervisors thereafter orally interrogated him at least two times, on or about December 4 and December 16, 1981, about the misconduct charges. Shuttleworth then demanded that plaintiff provide written answers and explanations to the same questions he had already answered orally. Plaintiff, by a letter memorandum dated December 21, 1981, stated he would not answer further questions on the matter without legal representation in accordance with the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov.Code, § 3300 et seq.). Upon plaintiff's assertion of his right to representation, he was fired for insubordination by Shuttleworth and, on an intradepartmental appeal, senior Department officials upheld the termination, which became effective January 11, 1982.

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal to the State Personnel Board. On January 26, 1982, the State Personnel Board ordered plaintiff reinstated. After plaintiff won reinstatement, Shuttleworth and other senior officers made statements to the effect that, even though they knew the termination was not proper, they wanted to cause plaintiff as much trouble as possible, or to the effect that, if it had been anyone other than plaintiff, he would not have been fired.

II. Procedural History in the Trial Court

On December 9, 1982, plaintiff filed the instant action ¹ against the defendants enumerated in the margin, ² alleging both that the termination was actually in retaliation for the health centers investigation and report, and that the pretextual reason given by the Department, that he was fired for "insubordination" for invoking his right to representation under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov.Code, § 3300 et seq.), was also improper.

By stipulation, plaintiff filed a verified first amended complaint on June 8, 1983. The first amended complaint set forth causes of action for (1) "wrongful termination," (2) wrongful termination in violation of former Government Code section 19683 (hereafter referred to as section 19683; see fn. 11, post ), (3) wrongful termination in violation of fundamental public policy (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330), (4) breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (citing Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 443, 168 Cal.Rptr. 722), (5) wrongful interference with a business relationship and wrongful inducement of breach of contract, (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (7) fraud and deceit, (8) violation of civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983), (9) injunctive relief, and (10 and 11) attorney fees and attorney fees on behalf of the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC) legal defense fund.

Defendants demurred to the first amended complaint. Plaintiff had included allegations of physical illness and disability resulting from the acts of defendants. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, as to the first ("wrongful termination"), second (§ 19683), third (Tameny [fundamental public policy] ) and sixth (emotional distress) causes of action, on the ground that those causes of action were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law. The demurrer to the seventh cause of action (fraud and deceit) was sustained as to all defendants for plaintiff's failure to set forth sufficient facts, and as to the State of California because of immunity under Government Code section 818.8. The court held the eighth cause of action (civil rights) did not allege deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, the ninth cause of action (injunction) did not allege sufficient facts to warrant injunctive relief, and the eleventh cause of action on behalf of PORAC was improper because PORAC appeared to lack standing to sue. Plaintiff was granted 30 days to amend his complaint.

In his verified second amended complaint, plaintiff realleged all the same causes of action, but essentially omitted reference to physical injury, except in his cause of action for violation of civil rights. Defendants again demurred, asserting the bar of the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions against the first, second, third, sixth and seventh causes of action. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer with leave to amend, but indicated to plaintiff he could not amend by simply deleting allegations of physical injury from a verified complaint without adequate explanation. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend as to the causes of action for violation of civil rights, injunction, and attorney fees.

Plaintiff's third amended complaint realleged the causes of action for (1) "wrongful termination," (2) unlawful retaliatory termination in violation of section 19683, (3) wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental public policy (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330), (4) breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair...