Ayala v. Davis
| Decision Date | 24 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. SA-19-CA-0166-DAE |
| Parties | RAUL AGUERO AYALA, TDCJ No. 02067457, Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court are pro se Petitioner Raul Ayala's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and supplemental Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 1), Respondent Lorie Davis's Answer (ECF No. 12), and Petitioner's Reply (ECF No. 14) thereto. Having reviewed the record and pleadings submitted by both parties, the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is also denied a certificate of appealability.
In February 2016, Petitioner plead guilty to the offense of evading arrest with a motor vehicle, a charge that was enhanced to a second-degree felony due to Petitioner's previous conviction for burglary. (ECF Nos. 13-16, 13-45 at 4-10). Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, Petitioner judicially confessed to committing the offense, acknowledged the range of punishment, and waived his right to a jury trial. Id. Following a separate punishment hearing, Petitioner was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment. State v. Ayala, No. B14-466 ; (ECF Nos. 13-17 at 27, 13-45 at 11-12).
Although he also waived the right to appeal as part of the plea bargain agreement, Petitioner nevertheless appealed his conviction and sentence to the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. Ayala v. State, No. 04-16-00388-CR, 2017 WL 1902588 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, May 10, 2017, pet. ref d); (ECF No. 13-3). The appellate court also modified the trial court's written judgment by deleting the assessment of attorney's fees and altering the sentence imposed from thirteen years to fourteen years to reflect the trial court's orally pronounced sentence. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) then refused his petition for discretionary review. Ayala v. State
, No. 0596-17 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2017).
In June 2018, Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus application challenging the constitutionality of his state court conviction, but the TCCA eventually denied the application without written order on August 22, 2018. Ex parte Ayala, No. 39,925-06 (Tex. Crim. App.); (ECF Nos. 13-38, 13-45 at 10). Petitioner initiated the instant proceedings on February 12, 2019. (ECF No. 1 at 10). In the petition, Petitioner raises the same allegations that were rejected by the TCCA during his state habeas proceedings: (1) the state appellate court erred by modifying the written judgment to reflect the trial court's oral pronouncement of his sentence, (2) the trial court erred by considering his past criminal history at the punishment hearing, (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the improper enhancement of the offense to a second-degree felony and by coercing him into accepting the plea deal, (4) his indictment was defective because the offense was improperly enhanced to a second-degree felony, (5) the evidence was insufficient to support a second-degree felony conviction because he had not been previously convicted of evading arrest, and (6) his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise these allegations on direct appeal.
Petitioner's federal habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review provided by the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. Under § 2254(d), a petitioner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). This intentionally difficult standard stops just short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).
A federal habeas court's inquiry into unreasonableness should always be objective rather than subjective, with a focus on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable" and not whether it was incorrect or erroneous. McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable, regardless of whether the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion itself. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Instead, a petitioner must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, which is a "substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). So long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the correctness of the state court's decision, a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In other words, to obtain federalhabeas relief on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits in state court, Petitioner must show that the state court's ruling "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103; see also Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 24 (2011).
Petitioner's first allegation contends that the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals erred by modifying the trial court's written judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of his sentence. Before the modification, the written judgment stated Petitioner was sentenced to thirteen years of imprisonment, which conflicted with the trial court's oral pronouncement of a fourteen-year sentence. Petitioner argues the modification by the appellate court to the longer sentence violated his right to be present at sentencing. Petitioner fails, however, to demonstrate that the TCCA's rejection of this claim during Petitioner's state habeas proceeding was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
Under Texas law, when the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment vary, the oral pronouncement controls. Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The rationale for this rule is that a sentencing hearing is a critical stage where the parties are physically present and able to hear and respond to the imposition of sentence. Once he leaves the courtroom, the defendant begins serving the sentence imposed. Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Thus, "it is the pronouncement of sentence that is the appealable event, and the written sentence or order simply memorializes [what was orally pronounced] and should comport therewith." Coffey, 979 S.W.2d at 328. In other words, the trial court's written judgment, including the sentence assessed, is merely the written declaration and embodiment of the court's oral pronouncement. Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 135.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that when a written sentence is in conflict with the oral pronouncement, given a defendant's constitutional right to be present at sentencing, the oral pronouncement controls. See United States v. Vasquez-Puente, 922 F.3d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 2019) () (quoting United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)); United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)); United States v. De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d 594, 601 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir. 1991).
Under both federal and state law, the oral pronouncement of a sentence controls when there is conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment. As such, Petitioner fails to demonstrate either that the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals erred in modifying the judgment or that the TCCA's rejection of this claim during Petitioner's state habeas proceedings was unreasonable. Petitioner's first allegation is therefore denied.
During Petitioner's sentencing proceeding, the trial court considered, among other things, Petitioner's lengthy criminal history contained in a pre-sentence investigation report before sentencing Petitioner to fourteen years of confinement. (ECF No. 13-17 at 20-28). Petitioner now contends the trial court erred in relying on his past criminal behavior because the information was inaccurate and irrelevant to the instant proceedings. By considering this information, Petitioner also infers that the trial court harbored a bias against him. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the TCCA's rejection of this claim was unreasonable.
To start, the trial court was well within its rights to consider Petitioner's past criminal behavior in assessing punishment. Indeed, in Texas, the trial court may consider "any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing," including:
the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and . . . any other evidence of...
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