Ayyadurai v. Walsh

• Decision Date: 03 August 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-cv-11531-ADB
• Parties: DR. SHIVA AYYADURAI, Plaintiff, v. MAYOR MARTIN WALSH, in his official capacity as the Mayor of the City of Boston, and BILL EVANS, in his former official capacity as the Commissioner of the Boston Police Department, [1] Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

DR. SHIVA AYYADURAI, Plaintiff, v. MAYOR MARTIN WALSH, in his official capacity as the Mayor of the City of Boston, and BILL EVANS, in his former official capacity as the Commissioner of the Boston Police Department, ^[1] Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-11531-ADB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

August 3, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Dr Shiva Ayyadurai (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se brings this action against former City of Boston (“City”) Mayor Martin Walsh and former City Police Commissioner Bill Evans (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that his First Amendment rights were violated and that he was defamed. [ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”)]. Currently pending before the Court are Defendants' motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 9], and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint, [ECF No. 13]. For the reasons set forth below Defendants' motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the complaint, [Compl.], the factual allegations of which are assumed to be true when considering a motion to dismiss. Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014). When deciding a motion to dismiss, courts may also consider “a limited array of additional documents such as any that are attached to the complaint, ” Giragosian v. Bettencourt, 614 F.3d 25, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2010), and in some cases “certain facts set out in . . . documents plaintiff[] attached to an opposition [he] filed to the motion to dismiss, ” Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1993) (considering certain documents that were attached to a plaintiff's opposition brief and noting that concerns about extraneous statements are lessened when a plaintiff introduces the documents “in order to bolster their argument against defendants' motions to dismiss”). Therefore, the Court considers the documents attached by Plaintiff to both his original complaint, [Compl.], and his opposition to the motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 12].

1. The Rally

In August 2017, Plaintiff, who is of Indian descent, was running a campaign for U.S. Senate. [Compl. ¶¶ 4, 18]. On August 16, 2017, Plaintiff obtained a permit from the City to hold an event called the “Boston Free Speech Coalition Rally” (the “Rally”) on Boston Common. [Id. ¶¶ 16, 20]; see also [id. at 17 (Ex. 1) (copy of permit)]. The Rally was scheduled from 12PM to 2PM on August 19, 2017, one week after the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, which lead to the death of one woman. [Id. ¶ 21]; see generally [id. at 35-41 (Ex. 5)].

The Rally, which was not associated with the events in Charlottesville, was intended to be a place where people of diverse backgrounds could gather to voice their political concerns in a peaceful manner. [Compl. ¶ 20]; see also [id. at 22 (Ex. 2) (Facebook post by “Boston Free Speech” stating “[t]his Free Speech Movement is dedicated to peaceful rallies and are in no way affiliated with the Charlottesville rally on 8/12/17”)]. Other groups that were not associated with Plaintiff and his campaign, however, also applied for permits for the Rally. [Id. ¶ 22]. In a media interview prior to the Rally, the outreach coordinator of Plaintiff's campaign, John Medlar, [ECF No. 12-1 at 2 ¶ 2], disavowed the violence that took place in Charlottesville, but acknowledged that “there do seem to be legitimate white supremacist groups on social media that are attempting to hijack the [R]ally, ” [Compl. at 38 (Ex. 5)].

On the day of the Rally, City police used temporary fencing to establish two separate areas for people to congregate. [Compl. ¶ 23]. These areas were set up to protect speakers at the Rally. [Id. ¶ 26]. “Area 1” consisted of a fifty-foot radius around the Parkman Bandstand in Boston Common and was intended for permit holders to speak. [Id. ¶ 24]. “Area 2” consisted of a three-hundred-foot radius around the Parkman Bandstand that was meant for supporters of the Rally and the press to gather. [Id. ¶ 25].

Plaintiff and approximately fifty supporters congregated inside of Area 1 for approximately forty-five minutes until unnamed City police officers forced Plaintiff out of Boston Common. [Compl. ¶¶ 27, 30-32]. After Plaintiff was forced out, others were allowed to speak at Parkman Bandstand. [Id. ¶ 31]. Press coverage reported that the crowd outside of Boston Common chanted, “Go home, Nazis, ” [id. ¶ 32], but also reported that no Rally attendees “appeared to display Nazi or Ku Klux Klan symbols, ” [id. ¶ 33].

2. Defendants' Statements About the Rally

Prior to the Rally, ^[2] Walsh stated:

Boston does not welcome you here. Boston does not want you here. Boston rejects your message. We reject racism, we reject white supremacy, we reject anti-Semitism, we reject the KKK, we reject neo-Nazis, we reject domestic terrorism, and reject hatred. We will do every single thing in our power to keep hate out of our city.

[Compl. ¶ 37]. Additionally, Evans said:

Any group that's gonna come and push for hate and divisiveness - that's not what this city is about. I know the Mayor is against them coming. Everybody is against them coming. . . I don't want them to have the march or demonstration at all.

[Id. ¶ 38].

Defendants also made comments after the Rally. At a press conference during the evening of August 19, 2017, Walsh stated:

I want to thank all of the people that came out to there [sic], that message of love, not hate, to fight back on racism, to fight back on anti-Semitism, to fight back on the supremacists that were coming to our city, on the Nazis that were coming to our city.

[Id. ¶ 39]. Evans, in addition, remarked:

You know what, if they didn't get in, that's a good thing, because their message isn't what we want to hear.

[Id. ¶ 41]. On a news program the next day, Walsh said:

I'm not sure what was said in there. There were a mix of people that went into the free speech area. There was a candidate for senate against Elizabeth Warren.

[Id. ¶ 40].

After the Rally, people began writing articles characterizing Plaintiff as a white supremacist, and members of the public still believe Plaintiff to be a white supremacist. [Compl. ¶¶ 42-43].

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, represented by counsel, filed his complaint on August 14, 2020, [Compl.], seeking $50, 000, 000 in damages to compensate him for his loss of liberty and reputational damage, [id. ¶¶ 44-45]. The four-count complaint alleges that (1) Defendants, in their official capacities, violated Plaintiff's First Amendment right to peaceably assemble under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), [id. ¶¶ 46-53]; (2) Defendants, in their official capacities, violated Plaintiff's First Amendment right to free speech or expression under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II), [id. ¶¶ 54-64]; (3) Defendants, in their official capacities, violated Plaintiff's First Amendment right to petition the government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III), [id. ¶¶ 65-72]; and (4) Walsh defamed Plaintiff (Count IV), [id. ¶¶ 73-77].

Plaintiff's counsel withdrew after filing the complaint, [ECF No. 4], and Plaintiff has since proceeded pro se. On November 30, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [ECF No. 9], and Plaintiff opposed on December 14, 2020, [ECF No. 12]. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint on March 1, 2021, [ECF No. 13], which Defendants opposed on March 11, 2021, [ECF No. 17]. Defendants filed a notice of supplemental authority on July 9, 2021, [ECF No. 23], which Plaintiff opposed, [ECF No. 22].

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

The Court first considers Defendants' motion to dismiss before turning to Plaintiff's motion to amend, see infra Section III.

A. Legal Standard

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, analyze those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d 74, 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2019). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but the complaint must set forth “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The alleged facts must be sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

“To cross the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable, but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability.” Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A determination of plausibility is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” Id. at 44 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “[T]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible.” Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011)). “The plausibility standard invites a two-step pavane.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Grajales, 682 F.3d at 45). First, the Court “must separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).” Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). Second, the Court “must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a ‘reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz, 676 F.3d at 224).

Because Plaintif...