Azteca v. Ruiz

• Decision Date: 26 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–0186,14–0186
• Parties: TV Azteca, S.A.B. De C.V., Patricia Chapoy, and Publimax, S.A. De C.V., Petitioners, v. Gloria De Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz, Individually and on Behalf of A Minor Child, A.G.J.T, and Armando Ismael Gomez Martinez, Respondents
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

490 S.W.3d 29

TV Azteca, S.A.B. De C.V., Patricia Chapoy, and Publimax, S.A. De C.V., Petitioners,

v.Gloria De Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz, Individually and on Behalf of A Minor Child, A.G.J.T, and Armando Ismael Gomez Martinez, Respondents

No. 14–0186

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued October 12, 2015

Opinion delivered: February 26, 2016

Rehearing Denied June 10, 2016

Christopher C. Franz, Gil P. Peralez, Peralez & Franz LLP, McAllen TX, David F. Johnson, Winstead PC, Fort Worth TX, Holly Dobbs Arnold, Thomas J. Forestier, Winstead PC, Houston TX, Merritt M. Clements, Strasburger & Price LLP, San Antonio TX, Jorge A. Padilla, Jackson Walker LLP, Austin TX, Kurt Schwarz, Paul C. Watler, Jackson Walker L.L.P., Dallas TX, for Petitioners.

David H. Jones, Law Office of David H. Jones, McAllen TX, Raymond L. Thomas, Ricardo Pumarejo Jr., Kittleman Thomas PLLC, Rebecca Vela, Yzaguirre & Vela, PLLC, McAllen TX, for Respondents.

Thomas S. Leatherbury,Vinson & Elkins LLP, Dallas TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Broadcasters.

JUSTICE BOYD

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of Petitioners' special appearances. Petitioners are Mexican citizens who broadcast television programs on over-the-air signals that originate in Mexico but travel into parts of Texas. Respondents are Texas residents who allege Petitioners defamed them in some of those programs. We hold that the allegations and evidence that Petitioners harmed Texas residents in Texas, Petitioners' broadcasts were viewable in Texas, and Petitioners knew Texans could watch the programs in Texas are insufficient to establish that Petitioners purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of conducting activities in Texas. However, that evidence, taken together with evidence that Petitioners exploited the Texas market to capitalize on the broadcasts that traveled into Texas, does establish purposeful availment and provides a constitutional basis for exercising jurisdiction over Petitioners in this case. Because Respondents' claims arise from and relate to those broadcasts, and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment.

I.Background

Mexican recording artist Gloria de Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz, popularly known as Gloria Trevi (and sometimes referred to as “Mexico's Madonna”), now lives in Texas. Near the height of Trevino's fame in the late 1990s, she was accused of luring underage girls into sexual relationships with her manager. Authorities arrested Trevino and her manager in Brazil on charges of sexual assault and kidnapping. Trevino spent nearly five years in prisons in Brazil and Mexico, but a Mexican judge ultimately found her not guilty and dismissed all charges in 2004.

After her acquittal, Trevino moved to McAllen, Texas, and later married Armando Gomez, a Mexican attorney who had defended her in the criminal proceedings. In the late 2000s, as the ten-year anniversary of the scandal approached, various Mexican media outlets ran stories discussing the events and Trevino's activities following her acquittal. In 2009, Trevino, acting individually and on behalf of her minor son, and Gomez (collectively, Trevino)¹ filed this lawsuit in Hidalgo County, alleging that several media defendants defamed them in their broadcasts.² Trevino asserts that she and others viewed the defamatory programs on their televisions in Texas.

The relevant defendants are two Mexican television broadcasting companies, TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V., and Publimax, S.A.B. de C.V., and a Mexican citizen, Patricia Chapoy, a news anchor and producer for TV Azteca. Trevino alleges that TV Azteca, Publimax, and Chapoy (collectively, Petitioners) defamed her on several occasions, primarily in stories on a television program called Ventaneando, a Spanish-language entertainment news program that TV Azteca produced, Chapoy hosted, and Publimax aired on television stations affiliated with TV Azteca. Petitioners filed special appearances challenging the trial court's jurisdiction over them. The trial court denied the special appearances, and this interlocutory appeal followed.³ The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the special appearances, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2014 WL 346031

, and we granted review to consider, as a matter of first impression in this Court, whether a television broadcast that originates outside Texas but travels into the state can support personal jurisdiction over the broadcaster in Texas.

II.Jurisdictional Requirements

We begin by summarizing the well-established limits on a trial court's jurisdiction. A court has power to decide a case only if it has “both subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the parties.” Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex.2010)

. Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court's “power to hear a particular type of suit,” while personal jurisdiction “concerns the court's power to bind a particular person or party.” CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.1996). Petitioners argue that Texas courts lack personal jurisdiction over them.

Courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the state's long-arm statute permits such jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state due-process guarantees. Moncrief Oil Int'l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 149 (Tex.2013)

. The Texas long-arm statute broadly allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who “commits a tort in whole or in part in this state.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042(2). Because this statute reaches “as far as the federal constitutional requirements for due process will allow,” Texas courts may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident so long as doing so “comports with federal due process limitations.” Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 872 (quoting Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex.2002) ).

Consistent with federal due process protections, a state court can exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if (1) the defendant has established “minimum contacts” with the state and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)

; see

Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 150. We will address both requirements in turn, in light of the allegations and evidence in this case.⁴

III.Minimum Contacts

The minimum-contacts requirement protects due-process rights by permitting a state to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the defendant “could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 152

. Minimum contacts may create either general or specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 150. A court has general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler v. Bauman , –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 754, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ). This test requires “substantial activities within the forum” and presents “a more demanding minimum contacts analysis than for specific jurisdiction.” BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 797. When a court has general jurisdiction over a nonresident, it may exercise jurisdiction “even if the cause of action did not arise from activities performed in the forum state.” Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 872.

By contrast, courts may exercise specific jurisdiction when the defendant's forum contacts are “isolated or sporadic,” as opposed to “continuous and systematic,” but only if the plaintiff's cause of action arises from or relates to those contacts. Id. at 872–73

(quoting 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067.5 (3d ed.2002) ); see also

Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 150 (“[S]pecific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises from or is related to purposeful activities in the state.”). For specific jurisdiction, we must analyze the defendant's contacts “on a claim-by-claim basis” to determine whether each claim arises out of or is related to the defendant's minimum contacts. Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 150.

Trevino alleged that the trial court has both general and specific personal jurisdiction over Petitioners. The trial court denied Petitioners' special appearances without specifying which type of jurisdiction it found. Affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals found that the trial court has specific jurisdiction, and it did not reach the general-jurisdiction issue. ––– S.W.3d at ––––, 2014 WL 346031, at *26

. We therefore also address specific jurisdiction. Because we conclude the evidence establishes that Petitioners purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of conducting activities in Texas and that Trevino's claims arise from or relate to those purposeful contacts, we do not reach the general-jurisdiction issue.

A. Purposeful Availment

To establish minimum contacts for both general and specific jurisdiction, the defendant must have “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' ” Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 150

(quoting Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex.2009) ). Due process requires purposeful availment because personal jurisdiction “is premised on notions of implied consent—that by invoking the benefits and protections of a forum's laws, a nonresident consents to suit there.” Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex.2005). Three principles guide our analysis of whether a nonresident has purposefully availed itself of the...