B.I.V., In Interest of
| Decision Date | 12 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-0519,95-0519 |
| Citation | 923 S.W.2d 573 |
| Parties | 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 479 In the Interest of B.I.V., a Minor Child. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Dolores E. Valadez, Mission and John F. Campbell, Austin, for appellants.
Michael Steven Deck, John Robert King, McAllen, Charles G. Childress, and George Barnes, Austin, for appellees.
ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
In this paternity action, the trial court held that the child's mother did not have standing to participate in the proceedings. The court of appeals affirmed. 897 S.W.2d 395. Because the suit affected her parental rights, we hold that the child's mother did have standing to participate in the proceedings and we accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Pursuant to section 76.004 of the Texas Human Resources Code, the Attorney General of Texas initiated this suit by filing a Petition to Establish the Parent-Child Relationship in the interest of B.I.V., a minor child. The petition alleged that Raul L. Longoria was B.I.V.'s biological father and named Dolores E. Valadez as B.I.V.'s biological mother. Both Longoria and Valadez were served with citation and filed answers. In addition, Valadez asked for affirmative relief, including current and retroactive child support. The Attorney General requested that the court: establish Longoria's paternity; appoint a managing conservator and possessory conservator; determine whether good cause existed to change the child's surname; order Longoria to pay prospective and retroactive child support, medical expenses and health insurance, and attorney's fees and costs.
On August 9, 1993, Longoria's attorney announced to the trial court that he and the Attorney General had reached a settlement, which did not include Valadez. When Valadez's attorney objected to the proposed settlement, Longoria's attorney challenged her standing to participate in the proceedings. The trial court took the proposed settlement under advisement, ordering the parties to submit briefs on the legal issues involved.
On November 8, 1993, the trial court, without hearing evidence on any issue, signed a final judgment. In that judgment the trial court: denied Valadez's "motion to intervene," although she never filed such a motion; declared Longoria to be B.I.V.'s father; appointed Valadez B.I.V.'s sole managing conservator and appointed Longoria his possessory conservator; ordered Longoria to pay lump sums of $37,200 in future child support and $75,000 in retroactive child support to a trust for B.I.V.; and ordered Longoria to provide health insurance for the child.
The court of appeals dismissed Valadez's appeal, holding that she did not have standing to appeal because she was not a party to the suit. Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that Valadez's interests were not affected by the trial court's judgment. We do not agree.
To establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the controversy. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex.1984); Precision Sheet Metal Mfg. v. Yates, 794 S.W.2d 545, 551 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1990, writ denied). As B.I.V.'s mother, Valadez could have filed this paternity suit in her own name. Instead, she asked the Attorney General to represent her pursuant to section 76.004 of the Human Resources Code. All relief sought in the suit was either for Valadez's benefit or B.I.V.'s. Although much of the relief sought was for the benefit of the child, the suit also purported to litigate Valadez's legal rights as B.I.V.'s mother.
In section 151.003 of the Texas Family Code, the Legislature has specified the legal rights and duties of a parent. By its judgment, the trial court modified Valadez's parental rights, for example, by subjecting her right to physical possession of the child to Longoria's visitation rights, and by denying her the right to receive child support...
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