Brooks v. Chevron USA Inc., No. 13-05-029-CV (Tex. App. 5/25/2006)
| Decision Date | 25 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-05-029-CV.,13-05-029-CV. |
| Parties | JOHN A. BROOKS, ET AL., Appellants, v. CHEVRON USA INC., AND AMERADA HESS CORPORATION, Appellees, |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 234th District Court of Harris County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices RODRIGUEZ and CASTILLO.
Appellants2 ("Brooks") appeal from the trial court's orders granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by Amerada Hess Corporation ("Hess") and the special exceptions and motion to dismiss filed by Chevron USA, Inc., d/b/a ChevronTexaco Corp. ("Chevron"). Following an order severing the actions against Hess and Chevron, these orders became final and appealable. We affirm.
Brooks brought suit in December 2003 against numerous defendants, including Chevron, Hess, several homebuilders, and the developer,3 claiming that the Woodwind Lakes subdivision, located in northwest Houston and in which all appellants had purchased homes, was built on contaminated soils. Several decades earlier the property was owned by Warren Petroleum, Chevron's predecessor in interest, and was the site of oil and gas operations. Warren ceased all its operations on the site in approximately 1966. The property was later leased to Hess, which operated the existing gas processing plant and gathering facility until Hess's lease expired in 1974. The premises were then returned to Chevron, and Hess had no further dealings with this land. Hess never held title to the land. Chevron sold all its interest in the land in 1979 and 1981,"as is," with earnest money contracts disclosing that the property had previously been used for oil and gas activities and that remnants of the facilities remained.4 Chevron made no assignments to its purchasers of any claims that might exist for property damage arising from the oil and gas activities during Chevron's ownership. There is also no evidence of any assignments by those purchasers to any subsequent purchasers.
Some time later, the ultimate developers of the Woodwind Lakes subdivision purchased these properties. Between 1996 and 1998, all of the appellants purchased their homes by general warranty deeds. The record reflects that during the initial development, the developers conducted environmental investigations and were aware of contamination concerns. The record also contains evidence of other investigations and remediation work on the site, both prior to and during the course of the development. However, Brooks alleges that it was not until 2003 that appellants first discovered the earlier oil and gas operations and contamination on their properties.
Brooks's claims against Hess and Chevron include negligence, fraud by concealment or failure to disclose, nuisance, and civil conspiracy.5 Hess responded to Brooks's suit by filing a plea to the jurisdiction asserting that, as subsequent purchasers, the Brooks appellants own no causes of action and therefore have no standing to bring claims against either Hess or Chevron for injury to the land that occurred decades earlier. Chevron raised the same arguments as Hess, but instead utilized the procedure of special exceptions and motion to dismiss. Following exchanges between the parties and hearings held on March 29, 2004, November 8, 2004, and June 21, 2004, the trial court entered the following orders: (1) an order granting Hess's plea to the jurisdiction, dated June 28, 2004, (2) an order sustaining Chevron's amended special exception and granting its amended motion to dismiss, dated June 28, 2004, and (3) an order granting Chevron's and Hess's motion to sever, dated November 9, 2004. Brooks's appeal is taken from the severed cause.
Brooks raises four issues on appeal, contending that the trial court erred in granting Hess's plea to the jurisdiction and Chevron's special exception and motion to dismiss (1) without first permitting an opportunity for adequate discovery and without the procedural safeguards of a summary judgment proceeding, (2) because Brooks does have standing as they are the only ones in the chain of title who have suffered an injury, (3) because fact issues remain relating to possible breaches of implied covenants and express provisions in general warranty deeds and provide standing, and (4) because fact issues relating to Chevron's participation in a civil conspiracy provide standing. Essentially, Brooks argues that (1) he was entitled to more discovery and a summary judgment proceeding, (2) because he suffered injury (by nuisance or otherwise), he has standing, (3) express or implied covenants run with the land to provide standing, and/or the general warranty deeds convey all interests, including the causes of action, and (4) fraudulent concealment or conspiracy made it impossible to know about or raise these claims earlier.
Standing is a question of law which we review de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998); City of Fort Worth v. Tuckness, 165 S.W.3d 425, 427 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); Byrd v. Estate of Nelms, 154 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied). As a component of subject matter jurisdiction, the issue of standing is reviewed by the same standard applicable to subject matter jurisdiction or a plea to the jurisdiction. Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.2d 297, 305 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air. Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex. 1993). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000); Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443. It cannot be presumed and cannot be waived. Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 n.2 (Tex. 1996).
"Standing" is a party's justiciable interest in the suit, Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661-62 (Tex. 1996), and focuses on the question of who may bring an action.M.D. Anderson Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001) (citing In the Interest of B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)). The standing doctrine identifies those suits appropriate for judicial resolution. Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 305. In Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) "a real controversy between the parties" that (2) "will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought." Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005); Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 662 (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446). Without standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443. The petition is construed in favor of the plaintiffs and the entire record is reviewed to determine if any evidence supports standing. Id. at 445-46; Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga, 9 S.W.3d 252, 258 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, having sustained an injury such that it has a personal stake in the litigation. See Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661; see also M.D. Anderson, 52 S.W.3d at 708. The plaintiff must also be "properly situated to be entitled to [a] judicial determination." Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 849 (citing 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3531, at 338-39 (2d ed. 1984)).
Hess and Chevron, using different procedural mechanisms, raised challenges to Brooks's standing. Hess and Chevron each contend that Brooks has no standing because a claim of injury to land is personal and belongs to the owner of the land at the time of injury, absent an express assignment of that claim.6 Brooks asserts that Chevron and Hess should have been required to seek relief through summary judgment proceedings, initiated only after adequate discovery had taken place. Brooks argues that it was error for the trial court to grant Hess's plea to the jurisdiction and Chevron's special exception and motion to dismiss.
Because an objection to standing cannot be waived, the form by which standing is raised is usually not important. Drilltec Techs. v. Remp., 64 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist. ] 2001, no pet.). Several different means have been used, including the following: (1) plea to the jurisdiction, see Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554; (2) motion for summary judgment, see Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); (3) special exception, see Wingate v. Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. 1990); (4) objection to capacity, see El T. Mexican Rests., Inc. v. Bacon, 921 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); and (5) on the court's own motion, see Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443.
A plea to the jurisdiction is a procedural mechanism by which a party defeats a cause of action without regard to whether the claim has merit.Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 343 S.W.3d at 554. The plea challenges the court's power to determine the subject matter of the controversy. In re Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680, 682 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); Axtell v. Univ. of Tex. 69 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); Godley Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woods, 21 S.W.3d 656, 658 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).
The trial court must determine at its earliest opportunity whether it has the constitutional or statutory authority to decide the case before allowing the litigation to proceed. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (citing State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994); Austin & N.W.R. Co. v. Cluck, 77 S.W. 403, 405 (Tex. 1903)). A plea to the jurisdiction is therefore...
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