B'nai Jacob v. Park Slope Jewish Center
| Decision Date | 13 December 1993 |
| Citation | 604 N.Y.S.2d 255,199 A.D.2d 296 |
| Parties | B'NAI JACOB, Appellant, v. PARK SLOPE JEWISH CENTER, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Joel Z. Robinson, New York City (Bruce R. Gitlin, Amy R. Fier and Anthony Motta, of counsel), for appellant.
Arnold Davis, New York City, for respondent.
Before SULLIVAN, J.P., and LAWRENCE, O'BRIEN and SANTUCCI, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to a stipulation, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Huttner, J.), entered May 2, 1991, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
This appeal has its genesis in a dispute between two factions of a Jewish synagogue. In 1983 a majority of the members of the defendant Park Slope Jewish Center (hereinafter Park Slope) voted to grant females full participation in all religious activities. A minority faction of the congregation, opposed to this change, began holding separate services in the lower sanctuary of the synagogue. Thereafter, Park Slope commenced an action to enjoin this minority faction from using the building and interfering in Park Slope's activities.
In May 1984 the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement, which provided, inter alia, that the minority faction would incorporate as B'nai Jacob, a religious corporation, and that B'nai Jacob could continue to use the lower sanctuary for a monthly rent of $450. The stipulation also provided that Park Slope "will grant a right" to members of B'nai Jacob to become members of Park Slope and B'nai Jacob would be given a rent credit for its members who were also members of Park Slope. The majority of the remaining provisions in the stipulation governed B'nai Jacob's use of the lower sanctuary and other synagogue facilities.
In December 1984 Park Slope amended its by-laws so that prospective members were required to affirm that they supported and would continue to support equal participation of females in religious services. As a result, Park Slope rejected membership applications from B'nai Jacob congregants because they would not affirm their support for equal participation.
In January 1985 B'nai Jacob moved to set aside the by-law change as being violative of the stipulation. Park Slope cross-moved to set aside the stipulation. The Supreme...
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