Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation B'nai Jacob

• Decision Date: 16 October 1997
• Citation: 664 N.Y.S.2d 236,686 N.E.2d 1330,90 N.Y.2d 517
• Parties: , 686 N.E.2d 1330, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 8584 PARK SLOPE JEWISH CENTER, Appellant, v. CONGREGATION B'NAI JACOB, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 236

664 N.Y.S.2d 236

90 N.Y.2d 517, 686 N.E.2d 1330, 1997

N.Y. Slip Op. 8584

PARK SLOPE JEWISH CENTER, Appellant, v. CONGREGATION B'NAI JACOB, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 16, 1997.

Arnold Davis, New York City, for appellant.

Anthony Motta and Joel Z. Robinson, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WESLEY, Judge.

Plaintiff Park Slope Jewish Center appeals from the dismissal of its complaint seeking compensation for use and occupancy of its premises by defendant Congregation B'nai Jacob and ejectment of defendant from the premises. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that it presents a controversy over religious doctrine that the courts cannot resolve, and the Appellate Division affirmed. We disagree and reverse.

This dispute has had a vigorous and litigious life since its genesis in May 1983. The dispute began when a majority of the members of plaintiff's congregation voted to grant women equal rights of worship. The members of the congregation who could not abide by that decision formed their own congregation, which has since been incorporated as defendant.

In the same year that the vote took place, plaintiff commenced an action sounding in trespass against defendant's members. In May 1984, the action was resolved by a stipulation in Supreme Court. Under the terms of the stipulation, plaintiff retained ownership of the premises; plaintiff would conduct its services in the main sanctuary, while defendant would have the right to use the lower sanctuary for its services; defendant would pay plaintiff $460 per month for use and occupancy of the lower sanctuary; defendant's members could become members of plaintiff on the same terms as plaintiff's members, but plaintiff had the right to determine its membership criteria without limitation; any membership dues paid by defendant's members to plaintiff would be credited against the payments for use and occupancy; neither party would interfere with the other party's services, programs, membership enrollments, visitors or individual members; and, should the building be sold or demolished, net proceeds would be distributed 70% to plaintiff and 30% to defendant.

After several of defendant's members submitted membership applications to plaintiff, plaintiff amended its bylaws to require that its members support the equality of women in religious services. Thereafter, defendant's members moved in the prior action to have the amended bylaws declared void. Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that the parties' stipulation barred the amendment (Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v. Stern, 128 Misc.2d 909, 491 N.Y.S.2d 958). On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that judicial resolution of the membership dispute would violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (128 A.D.2d 847, 513 N.Y.S.2d 767). We dismissed an appeal from that order for nonfinality (70 N.Y.2d 746, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1032, 514 N.E.2d 390).

On remittal, despite the determination by the Appellate Division that the dispute was not justiciable, Supreme Court issued an order purporting to permit defendant to take a credit against its use and occupancy payments for its members who had applied for membership with plaintiff but had been denied. We dismissed an appeal from that order for lack of finality (72 N.Y.2d 873, 532 N.Y.S.2d 365, 528 N.E.2d 517). From the time of that Supreme Court order, defendant has not tendered any payments to plaintiff for use and occupancy of the premises.

After plaintiff commenced three eviction actions against defendant in Kings County Civil Court (all eventually dismissed), defendant commenced an action to declare the rights and obligations of the parties to the stipulation. In January 1991, a different Justice of Supreme Court, Kings County, noted his disagreement with the prior order purporting to allow defendant to offset its use and occupancy payments, but nevertheless granted a motion by Park Slope Jewish Center for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the complaint did not allege any cause of action that was ripe for judicial review (B'Nai Jacob v. Park Slope Jewish Ctr., 199 A.D.2d 296, 604 N.Y.S.2d 255).

In the meantime, plaintiff commenced the present action seeking payment for 72 months' use and occupancy and for ejectment of defendant from the premises. Plaintiff moved and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion and defendant's cross motion, dismissing the complaint based upon the prior holding of the Appellate Division that the courts could not resolve this "religious" dispute. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that "judicial resolution of the dispute would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution" (230 A.D.2d 779, 646 N.Y.S.2d 624 [citations omitted] ). Plaintiff appealed, and defendant cross-appealed. We dismissed defendant's cross appeal because defendant was not a party aggrieved by the court's order (89 N.Y.2d 964, 655 N.Y.S.2d 883, 678 N.E.2d 495). We now reverse.

In First Presbyt. Church v. United Presbyt. Church, 62 N.Y.2d 110, 476 N.Y.S.2d 86, 464 N.E.2d 454, cert. denied 469 U.S. 1037, 105 S.Ct. 514, 83 L.Ed.2d 404, we were faced with a dispute between a local church (the plaintiff) and its denominational church organization (one of several defendants) that involved, among other things, the power to control the property of the local church. We recognized that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevented the courts from addressing issues such as the right of the local church to withdraw from the regional church, because any such ruling would ...