Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz

• Decision Date: 22 March 1956
• Citation: 151 N.Y.S.2d 221
• Parties: BABYLON MILK AND CREAM CO., Inc., Plaintiff, v. Aaron HORVITZ, Abraham Fishbein, John J. Kelly, as President of Local 584, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, A. F. of L. and Cornelius J. O'Connell, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 221

151 N.Y.S.2d 221

BABYLON MILK AND CREAM CO., Inc., Plaintiff, v. Aaron HORVITZ, Abraham Fishbein, John J. Kelly, as President of Local 584, International Brotherhood of Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, A. F. of L and Cornelius J. O'Connell, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County.

March 22, 1956.

Harry Rosenberg, West Hempstead, for plaintiff.

Joseph C. Zavatt, Cedarhurst, for defendant Aaron Horvitz.

Jerome Y. Sturm, New York City, for defendants, Abraham Fishbein and John J. Kelly.

RITCHIE, Justice.

Three motions are made by three of the four defendants in this action to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 107 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The motion by the defendants Abraham Fishbein and John J. Kelly are made pursuant to Rule 107(4) on the ground that there are final orders and a judgment determining the same issues between the parties, while the motion of Aaron Horvitz is predicated not only upon that ground but also on the further ground that an arbitrator may not be sued for alleged misconduct in arriving at an award. In order properly to understand the basis of these motions, the background of this litigation must be set forth.

On or about September 28, 1948, the defendant Horvitz was selected to arbitrate a dispute between the plaintiff in this action and Local 584 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Hearings were held at which the defendant Abraham Fishbein represented the union. Defendant John J. Kelly is the president of the union. An award in favor of the union was made by the arbitrator. The Supreme Court confirmed the award, but plaintiff made a motion to vacate the award on the ground that the arbitrator had colluded with the attorney for the union to the end that a fraudulent award was made by the arbitrator. This motion was denied by the court, at which time the court stated in its opinion that 'the unsuccessful party, in a desperate attempt to defeat the purpose of the arbitration, has resorted to specious invention to accomplish the desired result.' The Appellate Division, 1 A.D.2d 808, 149 N.Y.S.2d 85, although sending the case back for further action due to the omission in naming certain employees entitled to share in the award, had this to say in connection with the charges of misconduct on the part of the arbitrator: 'We find the attack upon the Arbitrator for alleged misconduct entirely unfounded.' On the basis of that decision the arbitrator reconvened the hearings and made a second award. The union again moved to confirm and again the plaintiff here submitted affidavits alleging that the award was the result of a 'nefarious scheme of Mr. Fishbein and Mr. Aaron Horvitz.' The award was confirmed, nevertheless, and the judgment of the court was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

Since that time numerous attempts have been made by the plaintiff to vacate the award, all of which have been denied. The award was finally paid and subsequent thereto the plaintiff commenced an action in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to recover the money paid, which was dismissed for res judicata and judgment of dismissal was entered on April 28, 1955. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment but has not perfected the appeal. Plaintiff then commenced a proceeding in New York County, which application was dismissed by Mr. Justice Cox. An appeal was taken, but again plaintiff failed to perfect its appeal.

This action was then brought in Suffolk County against the above defendants for damages based on the same contention that the award was the result of collusion among the defendants. As stated above all three defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the issues herein have been determined adversely to plaintiff and that that decision is res judicata. The first named defendant, Aaron Horvitz, in addition, contends that he may not be sued for his acts as arbitrator. We shall discuss these propositions in inverse order.

It is well established that judicial officers cannot be subjected to civil liability by an unsuccessful litigant. Gans v. Callaghan, 135 Misc. 881, 238 N.Y.S. 599, affirmed 231 App.Div. 735, 245 N.Y.S. 744, citing cases. Whether an arbitrator is similarly protected appears to be a case of first impression in New York, although respectable authority for so holding is found in other jurisdictions.

Arbitrators exercise judicial functions and while not eo nomine judges they are judicial officers and bound by the same rules as govern those officers. Matter of Friedman, 215 App.Div. 130, 213 N.Y.S. 369; Matter of American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 240 N.Y. 398, 148 N.E. 562. Considerations of public policy are the reasons for the rule and like other judicial officers, arbitrators must be free from the fear of reprisals by an unsuccessful litigant. They must of necessity be uninfluenced by any fear of consequences for their acts.

In the case of Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424, the court said: 'An arbitrator is a quasi-judicial officer, * * * exercising judicial functions. There is as much reason in his case for protecting and insuring his impartiality, independence, and freedom from undue influences, as in the case of a judge or juror.'

In that case a demurrer to the complaint was sustained. To the same effect see Anderson v. Bishop, 304 Mass. 396, 23 N.E.2d 1003, Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 74, 6 N.W. 140.

I see no reason to distinguish between a judge and an arbitrator in deciding the issue herein. The analogy is clear, and considering the favor in which arbitration is held by the courts of this state, the same rule of immunity should...