Hoosac Tunnel Dock and Elevator Company v. O'Brien

• Decision Date: 03 July 1884
• Citation: 137 Mass. 424
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Hoosac Tunnel Dock and Elevator Company v. James W. O'Brien & another

137 Mass. 424

Hoosac Tunnel Dock and Elevator Company v. James W. O'Brien & another

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

July 3, 1884

Suffolk. Tort against James W. O'Brien and Rufus W. Sprague. The declaration alleged that the plaintiff was a corporation duly established by the laws of this Commonwealth, and doing business in the city of Boston; that it owned and used in its business certain wharves, and the buildings and machinery thereon; that on or about November 4, 1882, one Thomas Hogan received an injury at or near one of its wharves, in consequence of the negligence of some of the plaintiff's servants, for which Hogan instituted an action against the plaintiff, in which the defendant O'Brien appeared as his counsel, on December 13, 1882, returnable at January term 1883 of the Superior Court; that, immediately upon being notified of the accident, the plaintiff employed the defendant Sprague as a physician to take care of and restore Hogan to health, and to cure such injuries as he had received; that Sprague reported to this plaintiff that Hogan was doing well and would ultimately recover; that the defendants Sprague and O'Brien, then and there combining confederating, and conspiring for their own lucre, benefit and gain to injure and defraud the plaintiff, and so to arrange matters that the plaintiff could be compelled to pay a mach larger sum to Hogan for said injuries than he was honestly entitled to recover therefor, fraudulently persuaded and induced Hogan to pretend that he was much more severely injured than in truth he was, and to simulate injuries and sufferings which in truth he had not sustained, and to refuse to receive good and suitable nursing and food, which the plaintiff offered freely to supply him with, all of which was done by said conspirators and Hogan in order to prevent his rapid recovery, and to enable him to procure unjust damages all of which Hogan, acting under the advice of said conspirators, did; that subsequently said case was, by order of court and consent of parties, referred, under a rule of court, to said Sprague and two others, the decree of a majority of whom was to be final; that after the appointment of said referees, Sprague continued, at the request and charge of the plaintiff, to attend and act as the physician of Hogan up to the time of the hearing hereinafter mentioned during which time, in pursuance of said conspiracy, said conspirators continued fraudulently to induce and advise Hogan to persist in his simulation of injuries and his refusal of suitable nourishment and nursing, which the plaintiff freely offered him and solicited him to receive; that the referees met and heard said parties at a session held by them in Boston, at which time the only evidence produced was on the part of the plaintiff in the present action, and which tended to show only that Hogan was not seriously injured, and that he would in a short time be as well as ever; that Sprague, in pursuance of said conspiracy, and well knowing that Hogan was not seriously injured, and for the sake of serving his own purposes and those of O'Brien, and confederating with him, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, fraudulently induced and persuaded said referees to unite in an award against the plaintiff of $ 3600, on the ground that Hogan was permanently injured, which was not true, and was well known by Sprague and O'Brien not to be true, and was much larger than Hogan was entitled to by reason of said carelessness, as said conspirators well knew, the amount of which award was subsequently paid to O'Brien as attorney for Hogan, together with the cost of reference and expenses, and out of which sum of $ 3600 O'Brien and Sprague retained to themselves $ 1600; and that a cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff to recover of the defendants the money wrongfully paid by reason of the fraudulent acts of the defendants, and by reason of their confederating and conspiring together to defraud the plaintiff.

The defendants severally demurred to the declaration, on the ground that it did not set forth a legal cause of action.

The Superior Court sustained the demurrers, and ordered judgment for the defendants; and the...