Bacon v. City of Richmond

Decision Date28 February 2006
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 3:05CV425-HEH.,CIV.A. 3:05CV425-HEH.
Citation419 F.Supp.2d 849
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesChristopher BACON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, et al., Defendants.

David Denman Hopper, Cook Heyward Lee Hopper & Feehan, Richmond, VA, Benjamin M. Stern, Cynthia D. Vreeland, Joseph Justin Mueller, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, Christopher Davies, Christopher J. Herrling, R. Michael Vagnucci, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, Rebecca Marie McCloskey, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, New York City, for Plaintiffs.

Kimberly Friend Smith, Bradford Allen King, Harrell & Chambliss LLP, William Delaney Bayliss, Edward James Dillon, Jr., Williams Mullen, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment)

HUDSON, District Judge.

This suit seeks mandatory injunctive relief requiring the Richmond City Public Schools ("RPS") to be made accessible to persons with disabilities. The matter is presently before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The plaintiffs and Defendants L. Douglas Wilder (the "Mayor"), the City of Richmond, and the Richmond City Council (the "City Council") (collectively the "City Defendants") have submitted memoranda of law in support of their respective positions. The Court will dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Christopher Bacon ("Bacon"); D.B., suing by and through his mother and next friend Vicky Beatty ("Beatty"); Beatty in her individual capacity; and Citizens for Full Access in Richmond ("C-FAIR") (collectively hereinafter "Plaintiffs") filed this suit against the City Defendants and the School Board of the City of Richmond ("School Board") alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34 (the "ADA"); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the "RA"); and the Virginians with Disabilities Act of 1985, Virginia Code § 51.5-1 et seq. (the "VDA"). Each of the plaintiffs is either disabled or has a disabled child and is a member of FAIR, an organization comprised of citizens of Richmond who are concerned with the rights of persons with disabilities.

Currently, fifty-six (56) of sixty (60) Richmond City Public Schools do not comply with the ADA and other federal and state disability laws. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking redress for the alleged architectural barriers to handicap accessibility to school facilities. Plaintiffs request that the Court issue a permanent injunction requiring the RPS to make the necessary modifications to accommodate the needs of the disabled.

On September 7, 2005, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on the City Defendants' previous Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bacon v. City of Richmond, 386 F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D.Va.2005). The Court held in part that Plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded causes of action for violations of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA. See id. at 706-8. As to Plaintiffs' allegation of VDA violations, the Court held that the Complaint was deficient as it failed to "reveal any allegations or facts from which a reasonable inference may be drawn, that the City has received any state funding for its educational programs" as is required by Virginia Code § 51.5-40. Id. at 708. Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint to rectify this error. The Court also concluded that each Plaintiff has standing to pursue their ADA, RA and VDA claims.

Since the Court's earlier opinion, the School Board and Plaintiffs have reached a Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement"), which provides for a five (5) year remediation plan. (See Agreement, Ex. A, Ex. B.) In so doing, the School Board conceded that the RPS do not comply with the ADA, RA, and VDA, and that the evidence sufficiently satisfies all required elements of an ADA claim.1 See Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 467-70 (4th Cir.1999). Denying legal responsibility for the RPS, the Mayor and City Council declined to join in the Agreement. However, in their responsive pleadings the City Defendants do not dispute that the vast majority of Richmond City Public Schools are not in structural compliance with the ADA. If non-compliance was genuinely at issue, Local Civil Rule 56(B) would require it to be specifically identified by the City Defendants in their pleadings.2 There was no such designation by the City Defendants.

II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that evidence exists to support its claims and that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court will not assume the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. See ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., Commercial Div., 722 F.2d 42, 45 n. 3 (4th Cir.1983). Rather, where genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court will deny summary judgment for both parties and the case shall proceed to trial. Id.

In the case presently before the Court, there appear to be no contested material facts. None of the City Defendants dispute, nor could they, that the Richmond City Public Schools fail to meet the accessibility requirements imposed by the ADA.3 Indeed, the pleadings and various attachments proffered by both Plaintiffs and City Defendants establish that the RPS have fallen short of the ADA's requirements since at least 1992. What remains is the legal issue of whether City Defendants are public entities responsible for the Richmond City Public Schools' noncompliance with Title II of the ADA.4

B. Purposes of the ADA

Congress specifically outlined the purposes of the ADA; it exists:

(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and

(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). In short, Congress intended for the ADA to "eliminate discrimination against `individuals' with disabilities." PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)). The plain language of § 12101(b), therefore, evinces clear Congressional intent to ensure equal treatment of disabled individuals, including, in appropriate cases, when these rights conflict with the interests of states, local governments, or their various subdivisions.5

Section 12101 also lists Congress's findings with respect to the ADA. One problem facing disabled Americans at the time Congress enacted the ADA was that "unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). Reviewing the purposes of the ADA, it appears that Congress hoped to avoid this unequal result in part by "ensur[ing] that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities." Id. § 12101(b).

The ADA therefore imposes on this Court a legal obligation to ensure that claims alleging ADA violations under Title II, when brought by legitimate plaintiffs, are resolved with an appropriate legal remedy, one which adequately considers the needs and resources of all parties in interest. There is no apparent equivocation in the ADA concerning this mandate, and neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has held otherwise.

C. City Defendants Are Necessary Parties

Unfortunately, the Settlement Agreement in this case resolves only part of this dispute. Even though the School Board has the statutory responsibility to bring the RPS into ADA compliance, that can only be achieved if the City of Richmond maintains an adequate funding stream. The City of Richmond, City Council and Mayor, through the annual appropriation process, exercise varying levels of control over the available funding for capital improvements in the RPS. (See Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 6-12, Dec. 19, 2005; Agreement ¶ 3.) Thus, in order to effectuate the agreement between Plaintiffs and the School Board and to make the Richmond City Public Schools ADA-compliant, the School Board is dependent upon the City Defendants to provide the necessary funding. Consequently, the immediate issue is whether City Defendants, by virtue of their "power of the purse," bear some responsibility for correcting the ADA violations in the...

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  • Bacon v. City of Richmond, Virginia
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 23 Enero 2007
    ...the City to "ensure that the Richmond City Public Schools become ADA-compliant" within five years. Bacon v. City of Richmond, 419 F.Supp.2d 849, 855 (E.D.Va.2006) [hereinafter Bacon II]. In this connection, the district court imposed upon the City a funding obligation, directing the City to......

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