Bader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company

• Decision Date: 20 September 1907
• Docket Number: 15,143 - (99) [2]
• Citation: 112 N.W. 1065,102 Minn. 186
• Parties: LOUISA P. BADER v. NEW AMSTERDAM CASUALTY COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

112 N.W. 1065

102 Minn. 186

LOUISA P. BADER v. NEW AMSTERDAM CASUALTY COMPANY

Nos. 15,143 - (99) ^[2]

Supreme Court of Minnesota

September 20, 1907

Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $2,500 upon an accident insurance policy. The case was tried before Dickinson, J., who found in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $1,275. From an order denying a motion to amend the conclusions of law to correspond with the findings of fact and denying a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Accident Insurance -- Death by Shooting.

A beneficiary in an accident policy sought to recover the full amount of insurance for loss of life by accident after the insured had been shot by a burglar and had died. Under a title "Special Indemnities" the policy provided that it did not exclude indemnity for loss by accident produced by shooting and other enumerated causes. Some of these causes were sports involving conscious participation on the part of the assured. Others excluded such participation. The policy also provided under this title that, in case of loss covered by this title, the company should pay one-half of the ordinary accident indemnity for such loss. It is held that the policy, construed as a whole, as favorably to the insured as reasonably may be without distorting the intended meaning of words, and with due reference to the rule "noscitur a sociis," entitled the beneficiary to recover only one-half, and not the whole amount, of ordinary accident indemnity.

Welch Hayne & Hubachek, for appellant.

Buffington & Buffington, for respondent.

OPINION

JAGGARD, J.

On February 2, 1904, defendant and respondent casualty company in consideration of a premium paid to it by Charles O. Bader, executed to him a policy of accident insurance for the term of one year. The beneficiary named therein was the plaintiff and appellant, the wife of the assured. The policy was subsequently renewed for another year. On December 23, 1905, Bader was shot by robbers at his place of business, was immediately taken to a hospital, and died within an hour from the effects of the wound. Due notice of loss and proofs of death were furnished. On refusal by the company to pay, this action was brought. Plaintiff sought to recover the full amount of insurance for loss of life by accident, $2,500, with interest. The answer of the company denied liability, and asked that the action be dismissed. On trial, the court ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff for one-half the principal sum, $1,275, with interest, in accordance with a contract provision hereinafter set forth in full. This appeal was taken from an order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial and to modify the conclusions of law to correspond with the findings of fact.

The only question presented by this appeal is the construction of the following paragraph in the policy, viz.:

Special Indemnities.

This policy does not exclude indemnity for loss by accident as herein provided, caused or contributed to, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by sunstroke, freezing, anaesthetics, gas, lockjaw, septicaemia, narcotics, poison, somnambulism, racing, shooting, intoxicants, asphyxiation, riot, polo playing, wrestling, strikes, steeplechasing, football playing, hydrophobia, riding to hounds, or by bite of animal; but in any such event the liability of the company shall be one-half of the amount of the ordinary accident indemnity specified for such loss.

A proper construction of the contract involves its examination as a whole. Thereby the defendant company agreed to pay certain indemnities under the following general co-ordinate and conspicuous titles: "Ordinary Accident Indemnities;" "Surgical Indemnities;" "Illness and Disease Indemnities;" "Double Indemnities;" "Optional Indemnities;" "Special Indemnities." Indorsed on the policy also appear various provisions under the titles "Increased Indemnities" and "List of Operations, Amounts Payable in Addition to Weekly Indemnity." Under "Ordinary Accident Indemnities" appears: "(1) For loss of life by accident the full principal sum, $2,500.00." An accident is subsequently defined thus: "'Loss of life by accident,' as used in this policy, shall be deemed to mean death from bodily injuries not intentionally inflicted by the assured, which independently of all other causes are effected solely and exclusively by external, violent, and accidental means, and which shall result in the death of the assured within ninety days of the event causing the injury." This clause, "Special Indemnities," is self-descriptive. The indemnity thereby referred to is "for loss by accident." That loss is caused, not "while," but "by," shooting, among other things. The natural construction of the clause is:

This policy does not exclude indemnity for loss by accident as herein provided, caused or contributed to, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by * * * shooting; * * * but in any such event the liability of the company shall be one-half of the amount of the ordinary accident indemnity specified for such loss.

This apparent and normal construction of the controlling paragraph counsel for plaintiff insists is not the proper one on principle or on authority. The first of the two rules of construction which he invokes is the familiar and undisputed one that the terms of insurance policies should be interpreted in favor of the assured, particularly in cases of forfeiture of his interest. "It is a well-settled rule in the construction of insurance policies of this character which the insured accepts for the purpose of covering all accidents, to construe all the language used to limit the liability of the company strictly against the company. Policies are drawn by the legal advisers of the company, who study with care the decisions of the courts, and with those in mind attempt to limit as narrowly as possible the scope of the insurance. It is only a fair rule, therefore, which courts have adopted, to resolve any doubt or ambiguity in favor of the insured and against the insurer." Per Taft, J., in Manufacturers Acc. Ind. Co. v. Dorgan, 7 C.C.A. 592, 58 F. 945, 956, 22 L.R.A. 620. The decisions of this court are strictly in harmony with this elementary principle. Their unmistakable tendency is to make insurance mean insurance. This does not signify, however, that the terms of an insurance contract should be distorted from their natural meaning, or that the agreed liability of the insurer should be forced into one which only a new contract could have imposed, or that a court should indulge in the subtleties of the schoolmen to extend the plain rights of the insured. A construction as favorable as reasonably may be must be given, but only a natural and logical one, and not a strained or sophistical one. "The spirit of the common law is the instinct of practical sense." Philips, J., in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Finch, 77 C.C.A. 566, 147 F. 388, 397. A court must interpret such an insurance contract as it finds it, and has no power to add to it, or take from it. Language used by parties must be given its natural and ordinary meaning. Their words are to be taken in their popular sense, in the absence of anything showing a contrary intention. White v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 77, 103 N.W. 735; Nelson v. Traders, 181 N.Y. 472, 74 N.E. 421; Dunning v. Massachusetts, 99 Me. 390, 59 A. 535. A valuable collection of authorities on this subject will be found in 6 Current Law, 83, 84. The second rule of construction invoked by plaintiff, "Noscitur a sociis," is sanctioned by reason and...