Badger v. Hill
Decision Date | 27 July 1979 |
Citation | 404 A.2d 222 |
Parties | Charles W. BADGER and Edith M. Badger v. George H. HILL. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Erwin, Austin & Lucas, P. A. by Ralph W. Austin (orally), James S. Erwin, York, for plaintiff.
Bruce A. Whitney, South Berwick (orally), Cole & Daughan by Francis P. Daughan, Wells, for defendant.
Before POMEROY, WERNICK, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.
Defendant George H. Hill is the owner of land situated in the Town of York, Maine, adjacent to the York River. Plaintiffs Charles W. Badger and Edith M. Badger have a right of way over defendant's land which affords plaintiffs access from land owned by them to the York River. Defendant has appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court (York County) (1) requiring defendant to dismantle a dock he had constructed on his land because, as found by the presiding Justice, it was so situated relative to plaintiffs' right of way as to interfere with a dock plaintiffs, in the full enjoyment of their right of way, might want to erect where the right of way meets the river; and (2) enjoining defendant from maintaining a dock that would impair the usefulness of any such dock plaintiffs would construct.
Defendant contends that the presiding Justice committed error in three particulars: (1) in admitting extrinsic evidence on the issue of the scope and purpose of plaintiffs' easement; (2) in ruling that it was within the scope of plaintiffs' easement interest that plaintiffs have a right to build a dock at the end of their right of way, where it meets the river; and (3) in concluding that plaintiffs should be given relief relative to defendant's existing dock, and enjoined as to his future conduct in maintaining a dock, on the ground that as presently situated, defendant's dock would interfere with any dock plaintiffs might want to construct where their right of way meets the York River.
We disagree with defendant's first and second contentions but find sufficient merit in his third claim of error to require that the case be remanded to the Superior Court. Accordingly, we sustain the appeal, set aside the judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Defendant and plaintiffs trace their titles to a common owner, the Scotland Shores Corporation, which had sold off its York River property in four lots. One lot had been purchased by Verdi and Evelyn Leighton, who later conveyed it to plaintiffs. Another of the lots had been sold to John Goodwin, who in turn had conveyed it to River Wood Shores, Inc., and River Wood Shores then conveyed it to defendant Hill.
Plaintiffs instituted the instant civil action against defendant on April 27, 1977, seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent him from building a dock which, though it would not be an encroachment upon defendant's right of way, would interfere, plaintiffs alleged, with a dock that they, in the exercise of rights conferred by their easement, might wish to build upon their right of way where it terminates at the river. On May 27, 1977 plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint which asserted that defendant had already built the dock and asked that he be ordered to dismantle it. After a hearing, the Justice presiding in the Superior Court found that (1) defendant's dock was located three to five feet south of the edge of plaintiffs' right of way; and (2) although the dock was thus not an encroachment upon plaintiffs' right of way, it nevertheless was so situated that it would impair the effective use by plaintiffs of a dock that they might later want to construct where their right of way meets the river. On the basis of these findings the Justice ordered entry of the final judgment from which defendant has appealed.
The scope of an interest in land conveyed by a deed is properly to be determined solely from the language of the conveyance, provided that the language has plain meaning. Where the language is ambiguous, resort may be had to evidence of extrinsic circumstances as an aid to interpretation. See Gillespie v. Worcester, Me., 322 A.2d 93, 95 (1974). Defendant contends that in all the deeds pertaining to plaintiffs' right of way the language used is plain in meaning, and therefore the presiding Justice committed error in admitting evidence of extrinsic circumstances and in relying on such circumstances to reach his ultimate determinations.
We disagree with defendant. We conclude that the presiding Justice correctly viewed the language of the deeds as ambiguous in critical respects. True, the deeds plainly describe the width of the right of way as six feet, the mode of passage as "pedestrian" and the terminus of the right of way as the low water mark of the York River. Yet, the full scope of the use to be made of the right of way requires evaluation of the purpose it was to serve. As to this, the only plain indication in the deeds is that access was being provided to the York River. The achieving of access to a river, however, is generally not the entire purpose for which a right of way providing such access is created. Also involved is why it was necessary, or desirable, to be able to reach the river. As to this aspect of purpose, the language of the deeds provides no answer. Thus, the language of the deeds may be unambiguous so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough in respects that are critical to the evaluation of the full scope, contemplated by the parties, of the use to be made of the right of way. In such context a court may properly resort to extrinsic evidence of purpose. As one scholar has observed:
2 American Law of Property § 8.65 (A. J. Casner, ed. 1952).
Here, the presiding Justice carefully explained that he would admit extrinsic evidence to permit a thorough evaluation of the purpose, within the intendment of the persons who established the right of way, that was being served by affording access to the York River. Addressing counsel for the defendant, the Justice said:
In ruling as he did, the presiding Justice relied on the decisions in Farnes v. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 161 N.W.2d 297 (1968) and Hudson v. Lee, Okl., 393 P.2d 515 (1964). He correctly interpreted each of these cases as authorizing resort to extrinsic evidence to assist in the determination of the scope of an easement constituted by a right of way to a lake. Plainly, neither of these cases held that the fact alone that a right of way runs to a body of water Per se establishes a right to construct and maintain a dock at the injunction of the right of way and the water, and we reject defendant's contention that the presiding Justice gave the cases this erroneous interpretation. Rather, the presiding Justice correctly viewed the Farnes And Hudson decisions as holding only that, generally, access to a body of water is sought for particular purposes beyond merely reaching the water, and where such purposes are not plainly indicated, a court may resort to extrinsic evidence to assist the court in ascertaining what they may have been. 1
Defendant erroneously relies on Edwards v. Fugere, 130 Vt. 157, 287 A.2d 582 (1972), another case involving a right of way to a lake. The actual decision in Edwards was that the extrinsic evidence adduced failed to support the claim that in creating the right of passage to the water, the parties contemplated a purpose for reaching the water that would justify a right to construct a dock. For present purposes, the significance of Edwards is not what the extrinsic evidence admitted may, or may not, have proved in that particular situation, but rather that the court unquestionably sustained the principle of resorting to extrinsic evidence to assist in the determination of the purpose for which access to a body of water was sought.
In the instant case, then, the presiding Justice did not err in admitting extrinsic evidence, and in relying on it, to assist him in discerning for what purposes the persons who created the right of way to the York River wanted such access to water.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kinderhaus N. v. Nicolas
...in respects that are critical to the evaluation of the full scope, contemplated by the parties, of the use to be made of the right of way." Id.; see Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, ¶ 56, 17 A.3d 640. Here, the location, length, and width of the ROW is clearly defined in the deeds and depict......
-
Flaherty v. Muther
...extrinsic evidence to ascertain the purpose from the presumed intent of the parties. See Fine Line, 677 A.2d at 1064; Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222, 225 (Me.1979). [¶ 57] Competent evidence in the record supports the court's determination that the purpose of the easement was to allow access ......
-
Rose v. Parsons
...the question of the easements' purpose is not fully answered. See Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, ¶ 55, 17 A.3d 640; Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222, 225 (Me. 1979). One of the purposes of the easements in the roads can be determined from the expressPage 33 language of the deeds—that is, to de......
-
Flaherty v. Muther
... ... determine the intent of the parties' to the original ... conveyance. See Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222 (Me ... 1979) (holding where a reference to "pedestrian right of ... way or foot path" in the easement was ... ...