Baer v. Choir
| Decision Date | 16 March 1894 |
| Citation | 7 Wash. 631,36 P. 286 |
| Parties | BAER v. CHOIR. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
On rehearing. Affirmed.
For former report, see 32 P. 776.
Deeming that there was, perhaps, some conflict between the decision in this case and that in Ward v. Huggins, 32 P. 740 we granted rehearings in both cases, and both are now ready for final disposition. 36 P. 285. We adhere to the decision made in this case at the former hearing, but there are matters raised in the later briefs which require notice.
1. We were in error when we stated in the former decision that the record showed that the lots had been assessed to Mrs. Bonnell for the years 1873-74, and that she did not convey until 1889. All that appeared from the record was that the lots were conveyed to her in 1870, and that she conveyed to the appellant's grantor in 1889. The legal presumption is (and it is so conceded to be by counsel) that she did not convey to any other person in the interim; therefore she did not convey to Knight, and therefore he was not the person to whom the property was assessable in 1875. On the other hand two presumptions are claimed for the position that Knight was the owner: (1) That an officer has performed his duty in accordance with law; (2) the presumption declared by the statute to the effect that the deed should be presumptive evidence of the regularity of all former proceedings. But in tax proceedings the presumption in favor of official acts did not prevail, for before the statute the holder of a tax deed was bound to prove the regularity of every essential step to sustain his title. As to the statutory presumption, it is clear that it was enacted merely for the purpose of changing the burden of proof. Before it the purchaser must prove a perfect compliance with the tax laws, but under it the owner must show a substantial defect in the proceedings before he would be entitled to have the deed set aside. Having shown facts which raised the legal presumption that Mrs. Bonnell was the owner from 1870 to 1889, we think the presumption of the statute was neutralized, and the burden of showing that Knight was in fact the owner rested upon the respondent; and this ought to be the law of the case, for if we suppose Mrs. Bonnell not to be alive at the time of the trial it would, in all probability, be impossible to prove that she did not convey to Knight, or to some one who conveyed to him, between 1870 and 1875; but, on the other hand, if she did convey, a resort to the records of the county would almost certainly disclose the fact, and settle the matter beyond controversy.
2. Counsel claim to have been misunderstood as to their concession on the subject of the three-year statute. The former opinion said: ...
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