Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, Inc., 16997

• Decision Date: 09 May 1955
• Docket Number: No. 16997,16997
• Citation: 87 S.E.2d 583,227 S.C. 168
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Mrs. Blanche W. BAGWELL, Respondent, v. ERNEST BURWELL, Inc., Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Insurance Carrier, Appellants.

Page 583

87 S.E.2d 583

227 S.C. 168

Mrs. Blanche W. BAGWELL, Respondent, v. ERNEST BURWELL, Inc., Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Insurance Carrier, Appellants.

No. 16997.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 9, 1955.

Butler & Chapman, Spartanburg, for appellants.

Whiteside & Smith, Spartanburg, Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, GreenvillE for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

This appeal is from an Order of the Circuit Court ordering Appellants to bring up to date weekly payments due under an award of the South Carolina Industrial Commission within the provisions of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, Code 1952, § 72-1 et seq.

On October 12, 1952, one Howard Alton Bagwell died as a result of an injury suffered while employed by appellnat, Ernest Burwell, Inc., and claim was filed by his dependent mother for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Liability was denied and a hearing held on May 8 1953, before the Single Commissioner, resulting in an opinion and award denying compensation. Claimant thereafter applied to the Full Commission for a review, who, by a majority vote, issued its opinion and award reversing the hearing Commissioner, holding the case compensable and ordering Appellants to pay to Mrs. Blanche W. Bagwell, the sum of $25 per week from the date of death, October 12, 1952, for a period of 350 weeks, total payments not to exceed $7,800, and also the payment of $200 funeral expense, and all medical and hospital bills. Notice and grounds of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas were duly served on July 17, 1954, and argued on September 1, 1954, before the resident Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, who took the matter under advisement. Respondent's attorneys agreed to extend the thirty days for which an appeal shall act as a supersedeas under Section 72-356 of the 1952 Code of Laws for South Carolina to sixty days. Thereafter, on September 27, 1954, motion was made before the Honorable E. H. Henderson, presiding Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit for an Order requiring appellants to comply with the provisions of the award. Judge Henderson issued his Order of the same date ordering appellants to pay all accrued compensation under the Industrial Commission's award from the date of death to the date of said Order.

Appellants shortly thereafter served notice of intention to appeal and applied to a member of this Court on September 30, for an Order superseding the Order of Judge Henderson, resulting in an Order of the same date superseding the Order of Judge Henderson and requiring respondent to show cause before the Supreme Court on October 13, 1954, why the Order of Judge Henderson should not be superseded and stayed pending a decision by this Court of the appeal from Judge Henderson's Order. The Order also provided for the filing of a bond by appellant in the amount of $5,000 with corporate surety. The rule to show cause was heard by this Court on October 14, 1954, and an Order staying and superseding the Order of Judge Henderson pending the hearing and final decision by this Court on the appeal from Judge Henderson's Order was issued.

There are a number of exceptions listed but this appeal will be decided upon determining the question of whether or not Judge Henderson committed error in requiring appellants to bring up to date the weekly payments set forth in the award of the Industrial Commission.

Section 72-356 of the 1952 Code of Laws for South Carolina appears in part as follows:

'* * * In case of an appeal from the decision of the Commission on questions of law, such appeal shall operate as a supersedeas for thirty days only and thereafter the employer shall be required to make payment of the award involved in the appeal or certification until the questions at issue therein shall have been fully determined in accordance with the provisions of this Title.' (Emphasis ours.)

This question has been before this Court on three different occasions in one form or another, Bannister v. Shepherd, 191 S.C. 165, 4 S.E.2d 7; McDonald v. Palmetto Theaters, 196 S.C. 38, 11 S.E.2d 444; and in the more recent case which resulted in a 2-2 decision by this Court, Miller v. Springs Cotton Mills, 225 S.C. 326, 82 S.E.2d 458. The question was discussed but the Order under appeal did not construe Section 72-356 of the 1952 Code or pass upon its effect in that case. Therefore, the Opinions while interesting in that they discuss the issue at hand cannot be considered as authority either way.

At the outset it might be stated that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a form of social legislation wherein and whereby the employer and employee surrender benefits previously enjoyed under the common law in exchange for other benefits provided under the Act. Both employers and employees assume their obligations under the Act as written, and it is to be presumed that the Legislature in passing the Act was aware of the import of its language. In discussing this Section of the Act in McDonald v Palmetto Theaters, supra [196 S.C. 38, 11 S.E.2d 446], this Court used the following language:

'And there can be no doubt whatever, under the plain and explicit language of Section 60, that the claimant was entitled after the lapse of thirty days to have the award paid which had been made to him on July 7, 1938, of a weekly sum extending back to September 2, 1937, notwithstanding the appeal to the Court of Common Pleas.'

And in Bannister v. Shepherd, supra [191 S.C. 165, 4 S.E.2d 11], the following language is used:

'The Legislature has in clear and convincing language provided that an appeal shall only act as a supersedeas for a period of thirty days, whether or not this was a wise decision on the part of the General Assembly, it is not the province of this Court to say. This Court can only carry out the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the Act. * * * so it is apparent that the legislative purpose was to allow a supersedeas for only thirty days, which was neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional, * * *. It must also be borne in mind that the Workmen's Compenation Act is a form of social legislation passed primarily for the benefit of the employee, and to prevent the burden of injured employees...