Abell v. Bell, 17118
| Decision Date | 15 February 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 17118,17118 |
| Citation | 91 S.E.2d 548,229 S.C. 1 |
| Parties | J. L. ABELL et al., Respondents, v. S. L. BELL et al., as the Chester County School Board of Trustees, et al., Appellants. Hattie H. FUDGE et al., Respondents, v. S. L. BELL et al., as the Chester County School Board of Trustees, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Charles W. McTeer, Chester, for appellants.
E. K. Hardin, Chester, for respondents.
These two cases were argued together in the circuit court, and involve the same issue, to wit: Is the provision of the Act of February 25, 1954, XLVIII Stat. at L. p. 1468, for the conveyance of an abandoned school building by the trustees of a consolidated school district to the 'community trustees' of the area constituting the former school district in which such building is located, mandatory or permissive?
In its preamble, the Act recites that 'in the program of consolidation of the schools within the counties of this state, a number of school buildings will not be needed for school purposes', and that 'it is desirable to allow any such abandoned school building to be conveyed by deed to the community constituting the area of the old school district in which it was located, so that any such community will not be entirely deprived of a community building within which to hold community meetings and entertainments'. Section 1 reads:
.
Section 2 provides for the election, by the qualified electors of the area constituting the former school district, of three 'community trustees'. Section 3 provides that the trustees so elected 'shall hold, manage and direct the use of the premises as a community center for the use and benefit of the residents of the community or area', fixed their term of office at two years, and makes provision for election of successors. Section 4 authorizes the community trustees to remodel and repair any such building, at the expense of the community, exempts them from financial responsibility for injury to the property, and directs that they maintain such property in reasonable repair and insure the building against fire. Section 5 provides for reversion if the premises should cease to be used as a community center, and for reconveyance to the trustees of the consolidated district, at their option, should the building again be needed for school purposes.
The complaint in each of the cases at bar alleges that the plaintiffs are the community trustees of the area constituting a former school district in Chester County, having been duly elected in accordance with the 1954 Act before mentioned; that in the process of the consolidation of many schools in that county, the defendants have abandoned a certain school building in that area; that this building has for many years been the educational and cultural center of the community, and its abandonment has left the community without any suitable building for use as a community center; that the plaintiffs have requested the defendants to convey this property to them in accordance with the Act; but that the defendants have refused to do so and have advertised the property for sale at public auction. The prayer is for an order requiring the conveyance to plaintiffs as community trustees, and for injunction, pendente lite, against the proposed sale. Demurrer, upon the ground that the 1954 Act is permissive only, was overruled, and conveyance of the property to the plaintiffs ordered, by decree of the circuit court dated May 7, 1955, from which this appeal is taken. We are concerned only with the single issue before stated.
A statute must be construed in the light of its intended purpose; and if such purpose can be reasonably discovered in its language, the purpose will prevail over the literal import of the statute, for the dominant factor in the rule of construction is the intent, not the language, of the legislature. Beaufort County v. Jasper County, 220 S.C. 469, 68 S.E.2d 421; Cain v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 222 S.C. 200, 72 S.E.2d 177.
If the intent of the legislature be clearly apparent from its language, the court may not embark upon a search for it dehors the statute. Town of Forest Acres v. Seigler, 224 S.C. 166, 77 S.E.2d 900; Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, Inc., 227 S.C. 168, 87 S.E.2d 583; State v. Conally, 227 S.C. 507, 88 S.E.2d 591.
But where the language of the statute gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to the legislative intent, the search for that intent may range beyond the borders of the statute itself; for it must be gathered from a reading of the statute as a whole in the light of the circumstances and conditions existing at the time of its enactment. Greenville Baseball, Inc., v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813; City of Spartanburg v. Blalock, 223 S.C. 252, 75 S.E.2d 361.
It is proper, too, in seeking the legislative intent, to consider cognate legislation. Arkwright Mills v. Murph, 219 S.C. 438, 65 S.E.2d 665; Edwards v. State Educational Finance Commission, 222 S.C. 433, 73 S.E.2d 456. Subsequent legislation may be of service as indicating the construction given to the former by the legislature itself. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Section 337, page 328.
With these settled principles to guide us, we turn to the statute under review. Some uncertainty as to the legislative intent would...
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