Bailey v. Bailey
Decision Date | 17 July 2014 |
Docket Number | No. E2013-02195-COA-R3-CV,E2013-02195-COA-R3-CV |
Parties | JEAN MARIE BAILEY v. BILLIE CARSON BAILEY |
Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hawkins County
Douglas T. Jenkins, Chancellor
In this post-divorce action, the petitioner sought to terminate or modify his spousal and child support payments. The trial court terminated the petitioner's child support obligation, lowered the monthly spousal support amount, and reduced the spousal support arrearage owed. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
Affirmed; Case Remanded
Billie Carson Bailey, pro se, appellant.
Jean Marie Bailey, pro se, appellee.
The parties, Jean Marie Bailey ("Wife") and Billie Carson Bailey ("Husband") were divorced in July 2003. Husband commenced this action pro se to terminate or modify spousal support and child support.1 In his petition, he asserted that upon his retirement in June 2010, his income substantially decreased from $82,000-$95,000 down to $43,920 annually. He stated that he was paying out one half of his pension benefit ($1707.72) pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") entered on August 2, 2004.Husband further asserted in his petition that Wife receives each month $1,000 from an annuity payout settlement from 2003 and approximately $2,250 from her job (she was unemployed at the time of the divorce). He contended that she no longer had a need for spousal support. Husband's petition additionally indicated as follows:
Ex-wife was awarded spousal support of $1275 per month. At the time of the divorce I questioned whether that [would] go away when I retire and the QDRO kick in? Both her attorney, Douglas Bier and her and myself agreed that the alimony was only until I retired. She remembered that we had made this agreement also but told me that I couldn't prove it!! . . .
(Emphasis added.).
On January 11, 2013, an order was entered setting forth Husband's child support obligation at $0 per month2 and establishing that Husband owed an arrearage of child support of $1,170. The order further provided that Husband's spousal support obligation was $ 1,275 per month and established that Husband owed an arrearage of spousal support in the amount of $16,000, as of December 31, 2012. He was ordered to pay $225 per month toward this arrearage.
In the trial court proceedings of August 27, 2013, Wife appeared pro se with Husband. The parties agreed that Husband's child support arrearage had been paid in full in the amount of $1,170. The court ordered that Husband's child support obligation was terminated, thus resolving all child support issues. In its memorandum opinion, the trial court provided further as follows:
* * *
(Emphasis added.). Husband filed a timely appeal.
The issue raised by Husband is as follows:
Whether the trial court erred in not allowing [Husband]'s testimony of an oral agreement under the parol evidence rule of contract law.
In this non-jury case, our review is de novo upon the record of the proceedings below; but the record comes to us with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's factual determinations which we must honor unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Wright v. City of Knoxville, 898 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are accorded no such presumption. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996); Presley v. Bennett, 860 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993).
In Tennessee, a marital dissolution agreement ("MDA") incorporated into a final decree of divorce "is a contract which is binding on the parties and as such it is 'subject to the rules governing construction of contracts.'" Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 896 (Tenn. 2001); Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 152 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Because "the interpretation of a contract is a matter of law, our review is de novo on the record with no presumption of correctness in the trial court's conclusions of law." Honeycutt, 152 S.W.3d at 561.
In this state, an MDA incorporated into a final decree of divorce "is a contract whichis binding on the parties." Stiel v. Stiel, 348 S.W.3d 879, 885 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). Because a MDA is, in essence, a contract between husband and wife in contemplation of a pending divorce, we seek to ascertain their intention from the contract as a whole and to give effect to it. When reference to the provisions of the MDA itself will resolve the issue at bar, courts should defer to them, unless doing so would be unconscionable. See Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 730 (Tenn. 2001).
In Honeycutt, this court discussed the general rules and principles guiding the construction of a contract, stating as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial