Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1996
• Citation: 919 S.W.2d 26,67 Empl.Prac.Dec.P 43,64 USLW 2660
• Parties: 70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 509, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,999, 64 USLW 2660 Brenda CAMPBELL, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. FLORIDA STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 26

919 S.W.2d 26

70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 509,

67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,999, 64 USLW 2660

Brenda CAMPBELL, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. FLORIDA STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant/Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Knoxville.

March 11, 1996.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Knox County, Hon. Frederick D. McDonald, Chancellor.

Jim D. Own, Owen, Edwards & Bryant, and Robert S. Olive, Sandra G. Olive, Olive and Olive, P.C., Knoxville, for Appellant.

Gavin S. Appleby, Erin E. Matthews, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer and Murphy, Atlanta, GA, L. Caesar Stair, III, Bernstein, Stair & McAdams, Knoxville, and Regina Alberini, Jacksonville, FL, for Appellee.

W. Ovid Collins, Jr., Charles Hampton White, and Rebecca Wells-Demaree, Cornelius & Collins, Nashville, for Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Association of Business.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Chief Justice.

We granted this appeal to determine whether "cold-shoulder treatment" of an employee, which is neither racially nor sexually explicit, may, if based on race or gender, constitute unlawful harassment in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act and the Federal Civil Rights Act.

Plaintiff, Brenda Campbell, an African-American female, brought this employee discrimination action under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, alleging sexual and racial harassment against her employer, Florida Steel Corporation, based upon the behavior of three of her co-workers.

After a bench trial, the trial court first found that Campbell had been subjected to racial and sexual harassment, but concluded that Florida Steel had, after receiving notice of its existence, promptly eliminated the harassment. The trial court further found that after the harassment was terminated, Campbell's co-employees subjected her to "cold-shoulder treatment," and that Florida Steel was aware of the treatment but failed to promptly eliminate it. As a result, the trial court concluded Campbell was constructively discharged and entitled to damages.

On appeal, the trial court's damage award was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which concluded that neither the federal nor state act require employers "to ensure a pleasant social environment," and that there was, therefore, no constructive discharge. The Court of Appeals also decided that the appellate standard of review should be de novo because the "issue of constructive discharge is, at least partially, a question of law."

We agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, but disagree with the rationale. First, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that conduct must be explicitly sexual or racial in nature to constitute unlawful harassment. We conclude that any disadvantageous treatment of an employee which would not occur but for the employee's race or gender may, if sufficiently pervasive, constitute unlawful harassment in violation of Title VII and the Tennessee Act.

Second, we disagree that the finding of constructive discharge in this case is subject to de novo review. A trial court's conclusions of law are subject to de novo review, while a trial court's findings of fact are afforded a presumption of correctness. We conclude that the trial court correctly applied the law of constructive discharge, and that its factual finding of constructive discharge is to be reviewed in accordance with Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d) and must be afforded a presumption of correctness.

Because, in this case, the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employer failed to respond promptly and effectively to the cold-shoulder treatment and also against its finding of constructive discharge, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment reversing the trial court on the separate grounds stated.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Brenda Campbell, was hired by defendant, Florida Steel, on September 19, 1988, as a yard helper. In this entry level position, Campbell did not work in any particular area of the plant, but received daily work assignments from her supervisor, Stephen Nash. Approximately five weeks after being hired, Campbell fell while on the job and broke her arm. As a result of the accident, she was assigned to light duty work in the "mechanic shop." Ernesto Bosch was the temporary supervisor in the mechanic shop, substituting for Nash, at the time Campbell was assigned to that area.

It is undisputed that prior to her assignment to the mechanic's shop, Campbell had not previously been sexually or racially harassed by anyone at Florida Steel. It is also undisputed that she was subjected to both sexual and racial harassment by three co-workers from the time she was temporarily assigned to the mechanic shop on December 15, 1988, until December 31, 1988. At that time, another co-worker informed Bosch that Campbell was upset by sexual and racial comments being directed towards her by other employees in the mechanic shop. Later that day, Bosch questioned Campbell about the situation and, for the first time, was informed about the specific sexual and racial remarks directed toward Campbell by three of her co-workers. That evening, at a New Year's Eve party, Bosch discussed the situation with Bill Kipp, the Employee Relations Manager for Florida Steel.

January 4, 1989, was Campbell's first day back to work after the New Year's Eve holiday, and coincidentally, Nash resumed his supervision of the mechanic shop that same day. Shortly after the workday began, Campbell and Nash were called to meet with Kipp and Kurt Zetzsche, the Knoxville plant manager, regarding the incidents of harassment Campbell had discussed with Bosch on December 31, 1988. During that meeting, at the urging of Nash, Kipp and Zetzsche, Campbell, for the first time, identified the three harassing co-workers.

Immediately following the meeting with Campbell on January 4, 1989, Nash, Kipp, and Zetzsche met individually with each of the three co-workers Campbell had identified. Each man was reprimanded and warned that if the behavior persisted, it would result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Written documentation of the reprimands were placed in the employees' personnel files.

Following the January 4, 1989, meeting, Campbell was purposefully reassigned to other areas of the plant so that she could avoid contact with the harassing co-workers. From that time, Campbell's contact with those three co-workers was minimal, and it is undisputed that no additional racial or sexual comments were directed toward Campbell after the January 4th meeting.

Thereafter, however, Campbell expressed concern to her supervisor that some of her co-workers were giving her the "cold-shoulder treatment." According to Campbell, her fellow employees would ignore her completely, shun her, and prevent her from sitting down in the lunch and break areas, though previously, they had made room for her to join them. At times, her co-workers would leave the room when she entered.

Nash testified that after the January 4th meeting, he spoke to Campbell on a daily basis, and that she discussed with him, in general terms, the cold-shoulder treatment, but she did not identify the specific individuals involved, despite his repeated attempts to elicit names. At trial, Campbell still did not identify specific individuals involved in the cold-shoulder treatment.

In response to her complaints, Nash assured Campbell that the atmosphere would improve with time, and he said that Campbell acknowledged that the cold-shoulder treatment was improving. Nash admitted that he never specifically advised Campbell's co-workers to talk to her, but said that he did try to involve Campbell in conversations with her co-workers at every opportunity.

In addition to the "cold-shoulder treatment," Campbell testified that on more than one occasion after the January 4th meeting, one of the original harassers privately made threatening comments to her, such as, "shh, here comes the snitch," and on one such occasion said, "you know what we do to a snitch," while hitting the palm of his hand with an object. Campbell conceded that she never related any of these comments to Florida Steel management personnel, and the trial court specifically found that Florida Steel had no actual or constructive knowledge of any of these incidents.

On January 14, 1989, two weeks after Florida Steel took corrective action to eliminate the harassment, Campbell resigned. Several Florida Steel representatives, including Nash, tried to convince Campbell to reconsider her decision. Nash offered Campbell a temporary transfer to the warehouse, which she refused. Following her resignation, Campbell filed this employee discrimination action, alleging that she had been subjected to sexual and racial harassment which created a hostile work environment that resulted in her constructive discharge.

The case was tried without a jury in Chancery Court over a period of four days. The Chancellor concluded that Campbell had been subjected to racial and sexual harassment by three of her co-workers, but that Florida Steel had promptly and properly acted to eliminate the harassment after receiving notice of its existence. The Chancellor also determined that Florida Steel had notice of the cold-shoulder treatment, but chose to take a "wait and see" approach, and, as a result, failed to eliminate it. Accordingly, the Chancellor found that Campbell was constructively discharged and awarded $15,416 in back pay, $10,000 for mental distress, $5,898.40 for fringe benefits lost, $25,416 in attorney's fees, and $2,248 for costs and expenses of litigation.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Campbell had been subjected to a hostile work environment, and held that Florida Steel had promptly and properly dealt with the sexual and racial harassment after receiving notice of its existence. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's finding of constructive discharge and dismissed the action,...