Bailey v. DAS North America, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-732-RAH-WC
Decision Date | 17 July 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:17-cv-732-RAH-WC |
Citation | 473 F.Supp.3d 1310 |
Parties | Janice BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. DAS NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Ashley Nicole Smith, Miller Smith, LLC, Montgomery, AL, George B. Bulls, II, George B. Bulls, II, PC, Tuskegee, AL, for Plaintiff.
Barbara Jean Wells, Carla Cole Gilmore, Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Janice Bailey ("Bailey" or "Plaintiff") claims she suffered race and national origin discrimination and retaliation during her short, three-week employment with Defendant DAS North America, Inc. ("DAS"), an automotive parts supplier located in Montgomery, Alabama. Bailey brings federal claims against DAS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. , and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and a separate state law claim for negligent and wanton hiring, training and supervision.
On September 7, 2018, DAS moved for summary judgment, (Doc. 30), on all counts in the Complaint, (Doc. 1), claiming that Bailey, an African American female, was not the victim of racial or national origin discrimination or retaliation. DAS also argued that Bailey had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her race discrimination claim, that she did not suffer any adverse employment actions with respect to her race and national origin, and that she was not retaliated against when she was terminated by her supervisor, also an African American female.
Bailey has filed a response, (Doc. 36), and DAS has filed a reply, (Doc. 37). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of DAS on all claims in the Complaint.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 as to Bailey's federal causes of action. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction as to Bailey's state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support both. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Under Rule 56, the Court must award summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and upon which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to "go beyond the pleadings" to establish that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
At the summary judgment stage, the Court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Factual disputes are resolved in the non-moving party's favor when there is sufficient competent evidence supporting the non-moving party's version of the disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco , 283 F.3d 1275, 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002). However, "mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England , 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver , 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989) ). Further, "[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby , 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, the non-movant must present "affirmative evidence" of material factual conflicts to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the non-movant's response consists of nothing more than conclusory allegations, the court must enter summary judgment for the party seeking it. See Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1565, n. 6 (11th Cir. 1997) ; Harris v. Ostrout , 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995).
On the other hand, if there is a conflict in the evidence, "the [plaintiff's] evidence is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency , 207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000). Once the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the Court must grant summary judgment if there remains no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
DAS is an automobile parts manufacturer located in Montgomery, Alabama. (Doc. 32-1, pp. 11-12.) In January 2017, Bailey, an African American female, was contacted by Tyiesha Wooten, the head of the Human Resources Division (HR) at DAS, about an open position in HR. (Doc. 32-1, pp. 10-11.) Like Bailey, Wooten is African American. (Doc. 32-1, p. 12.)
Bailey participated in two interviews in late January for the job, the first with Wooten and LaBrittany Hill (the employee she was replacing) on January 24, 2017. (Doc. 32-1, p. 9.) During the interview process, Bailey was told that the position's (HR Specialist) job duties included clerical tasks and "catering" to the Korean employees of DAS. (Doc. 32-1, pp. 9-11.) Specifically, Wooten allegedly stated that "we are here to cater to the Koreans only; to include running to Walmart, the Korean store, and for whatever they need." (Doc. 32-12, p. 4.)
Bailey later discovered that "catering" also entailed purchasing food items for a separate breakroom that Korean employees utilized, (Doc. 32-1, pp. 11, 13-14), and assisting newly-arrived employees from South Korea with securing their accommodations, (Doc. 32-1, p. 14).
Bailey also learned from Hill that "Koreans are number one" at DAS and that since Bailey was not Korean, Bailey should not "expect to get any good treatment or any special treatment or anything." (Doc. 32-1, pp. 28-29.) Hill also warned Bailey that, among other things, Wooten was "not so kind" to human resources employees. (Doc. 32-1, p. 28.)
Three days later on January 27, 2017, Bailey interviewed with Wooten again and then was hired into the HR Specialist position. (Doc. 32-1, p. 14.)
Not long into her employment, Bailey observed several things of concern to her. For example, Bailey was a smoker and, to access the designated smoking area at the DAS facility, she like other employees used a door in the main breakroom to enter the outside smoking area. (Doc. 32-1, p. 15.) While a key card was not required to exit the building, a key card was required to re-enter. (Docs. 32-1, p. 15; 32-2, p. 19.) To re-enter the building, employees without key cards had to enter through the front entrance. (Doc. 32-1, p. 15.) Most employees, including Bailey, did not have a key card, but most managers and maintenance workers did. (Doc. 32-2, p. 19.) Bailey claims that two non-manager Korean employees had cards. (Doc. 32-1, pp. 16, 50.) Bailey requested a key card for herself, but Wooten told her that such key cards were reserved for managers. (Doc 32-1, p. 16.)
Also, under the terms of the DAS dress code policy, employees were prohibited from wearing jeans at work. (Doc. 32-6, p. 2.) While Bailey never wore jeans to work, she observed a Korean employee wearing jeans almost daily. (Doc. 32-1, pp. 18-19.) Bailey never alerted any of her supervisors to the dress code violation. (Doc. 32-1, p. 19.)
But this lawsuit is not about perceived unfairness; instead, it is about Bailey's relationship with Wooten, which was problematic at the outset. For example, at an off-site lunch during Bailey's first week on the job, Wooten remarked that "plenty of b—s want my job but they know not to f--- with me ‘cause I am crazy.’ " (Docs. 32-1, p. 19; 32-12, p. 4.) Bailey thought the statement was unprofessional and concerning because she did not know to whom the statement was directed, whether to her or anyone else. (Docs. 32-1, p. 20; 32-12, p. 4.)
Wooten also required Bailey to perform menial tasks that Bailey thought Wooten could have performed herself. This included for example a demand by Wooten that Bailey come into Wooten's office, open the file cabinet, look for a folder, and read aloud a social security number contained in the folder. (Docs. 32-1, p. 24; 32-9, p. 7.) On another occasion, Wooten told Bailey to come into her office to shred a document. (Doc. 32-9, p. 7.)
Bailey and Wooten's relationship turned sour when, during week two, Wooten tasked Bailey with making flyers for a company meeting. (Docs. 32-1, p. 20; 32-3, p. 15.) Wooten made Bailey revise the flyers on at least two occasions because the flyers were not completed to Wooten's satisfaction. (Docs. 32-1, pp. 20-21; 32-3, pp. 13, 15.)
Bailey's next assignment—to put together display boards for a...
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