Bailey v. Lawrence, A98A1656.
Decision Date | 02 November 1998 |
Docket Number | No. A98A1656.,A98A1656. |
Parties | BAILEY v. LAWRENCE et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bryan M. Pulliam, Covington, Raymond T. Brooks, Jr., Madison, for appellant.
Shivers & Associates, Alpharetta, Charles E. Johnson III, Atlanta, for appellees.
The following chronology is relevant to the disposition of this appeal: Seeking to recover for personal injuries sustained in a March 11, 1995 motor vehicle collision, plaintiff Thomas Herbert Bailey filed this tort action in the Superior Court of DeKalb County on March 6, 1997. Named as defendants subject to venue and jurisdiction in DeKalb County were the driver, defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr., and, ostensibly under the family purpose doctrine, the vehicle's owner, defendant Gwendolyn E. Moore. Personal service on defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. was attempted on March 8, 1997, by leaving the summons and complaint with defendant Gwendolyn E. Moore at her residence, 5346 Windfern Court, Stone Mountain, Georgia 30088. Gwendolyn E. Moore answered, denying the applicability of the "family purpose" doctrine, and the case against her was subsequently voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. "Travelers Insurance" was served on March 10, 1997, while Phoenix Insurance Company answered in its capacity as an uninsured motorist insurance carrier.
On April 1, 1997, defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. made a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction and raised insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and the statute of limitation as defenses. On July 20, 1997, personal service was attempted on Frank Lawrence, Jr. at 4835 Fenbrook Drive, Stone Mountain, Georgia 30088. On October 20, 1997, plaintiff moved for an appointment of "Michael Edge, or any agent of Confidential Detective and Support Group, as agent of the Court authorized to serve the Defendant FRANK LAWRENCE, JR. with a copy of the Complaint," and this motion was immediately granted.
On January 8, 1998, defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. made a special appearance without subjecting himself to the jurisdiction and venue of the court and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitation had run and he had not yet been served with the summons and complaint. The motion is supported by defendant's affidavit, wherein he deposed that "[w]hen Plaintiff's lawsuit was filed ... on March 6, 1997, [he] was neither domiciled at nor a resident of Defendant Gwendolyn E. Moore's residence located at 5346 Windfern Court, Stone Mountain, DeKalb County, Georgia 30088[, and has] neither been domiciled nor resided at said residence since January 6, 1997." Further, defendant is "a different individual than the Frank W. Lawrence, Jr. that apparently resides at 4835 Fenbrook Drive, Stone Mountain, Georgia, who was served ... on or about July 20, 1997[; that he] never lived at, resided at, or [had] been domiciled at 4835 Fenbrook Drive[; and that he] was never served with the ... Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons by the sheriff's department on July 20, 1997...." Defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. has never been married to defendant Gwendolyn E. Moore, and she was not authorized to accept service of process for him at her residence on March 8, 1997. Finally, defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. "has never been served ... by the Sheriff's Department, Mr. Michael Edge [the special process server] or anyone else appointed by the Court to effect service of process." On January 13, 1998, plaintiff moved for "SERVICE BY PUBLICATION UPON DEFENDANT FRANK LAWRENCE, JR," under the authority of OCGA § 33-7-11(e), based upon the claim that plaintiff "has made a diligent effort to locate Defendant [Frank Lawrence, Jr.] and cannot find Defendant within this state and has no knowledge as to the present residence or whereabouts." In support of this motion and in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel, who deposed that, after receiving the defenses raised in defendant's special appearance, he contacted counsel for defendants Moore and Lawrence The Fulton County service was attempted on July 23, 1997, but was returned unserved due to lack of an apartment number. No apartment number could be determined.
On January 13, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion for service on defendant Frank Lawrence by publication, as authorized by OCGA § 33-7-11(e).
At her deposition, defendant Gwendolyn E. Moore described defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. as She thought Frank Lawrence, Jr.'s "driver's license has [her] address on it." He still received "junk mail every once in a while...." But he "hasn't gotten any recently." Frank Lawrence, Jr.
Phoenix Insurance Company also moved for summary judgment, arguing that, if summary judgment were granted to defendant Frank Lawrence, then plaintiff would be unable to fulfill a condition precedent to any judgment against Phoenix as the ostensible uninsured motorist carrier, namely, a judgment against the uninsured driver, whether known or unknown. See Moss v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 154 Ga.App. 165, 166, 268 S.E.2d 676. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for service by publication, concluding that plaintiff is "guilty of laches in failing to exercise due diligence in attempting to perfect service on defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. subsequent to the expiration of the two year statute of limitation for personal injuries." The trial court further granted summary judgment to both defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. and Phoenix Insurance Company. This appeal followed. Held:
In two related enumerations, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to serve defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. by publication as authorized by OCGA § 33-7-11(e) and in granting summary judgment to defendant Frank Lawrence, Jr. on the basis of the statute of limitation, and then granting summary judgment to Phoenix. In arguing that the trial court committed reversible error, plaintiff has relied primarily on this Court's decision in Wentworth v. Fireman's Fund &c. Ins. Cos., 147 Ga.App. 854, 250 S.E.2d 543. We find that authority distinguishable in material respects and affirm.
1. Pickens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Ga.App. 550, 551, 398 S.E.2d 792. "In cases where the owner or operator of any vehicle causing injury or damage is known and either or both are named as defendants in any action for such injury or damages but the person resides out of state, has departed from the state, cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself to avoid the service of summons, and...
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