Bain v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 26 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. WD 58976.,WD 58976.
• Citation: 69 S.W.3d 117
• Parties: Bobby G. BAIN, Respondent, v. Quentin WILSON, Director of Revenue for the Missouri Department of Revenue, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

69 S.W.3d 117

Bobby G. BAIN, Respondent, v. Quentin WILSON, Director of Revenue for the Missouri Department of Revenue, Appellant.

No. WD 58976.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

February 26, 2002.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Mark L. Langworthy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for appellant.

Kenneth M. Hayden, Versailles, for respondent.

Before ULRICH, P.J., BRECKENRIDGE, J. and ELLIS, J.

ROBERT G. ULRICH, Presiding Judge.

The Director of Revenue [hereinafter "Director"] appeals the judgment of the trial court reinstating the driving privileges of Bobby Bain and setting aside the Director's order suspending Mr. Bain's driver's license under section 302.505.1, RSMo 2000, for driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of at least .10 percent by weight. The trial court found that the Director did not have probable cause to believe Mr. Bain was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in his blood was .10 or more by weight. The Director claims that the trial court misinterpreted the law and that its judgment was against the weight of the evidence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I. Facts

Following the Director's suspension of Mr. Bain's driver's license, Mr. Bain filed a petition for trial de novo in the Circuit Court of Morgan County. The following evidence was adduced at trial.

At approximately 10:15 p.m. on the night of November 18, 1999, Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper B.J. McMullin responded to an automobile accident on Missouri Highway 5 in Morgan County. From observing the accident scene, Trooper McMullin determined that a full-size Dodge van had been proceeding north on Highway 5 when it crossed the centerline and struck a southbound Chevy Venture minivan. Trooper McMullin then spoke with Charles Manton, who pointed out to him a man that he had found in the Dodge van when he arrived at the scene. Trooper McMullin asked Mr. Manton if the man was the only person in the van, and Mr. Manton responded, "Yes, as far as I could tell."

Trooper McMullin made contact with the man, who identified himself as Bobby Bain. During his conversation with Mr. Bain, Trooper McMullin noticed that Mr. Bain's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and his breath smelled of alcohol. Trooper McMullin asked Mr. Bain if he had been drinking alcohol, and Mr. Bain responded that he had drunk a few beers. Because the traffic conditions at the scene of the accident were dangerous, Trooper McMullin asked Mr. Bain to accompany him to the Laurie, Missouri, Police Department to conduct field sobriety tests. Mr. Bain agreed.

After arriving at the Laurie Police Department, Trooper McMullin instructed Mr. Bain to perform the one-leg stand field sobriety test. Mr. Bain failed the test, and Trooper McMullin observed nothing about Mr. Bain that indicated he was physically incapable of complying with his instructions. At the conclusion of his observations, Trooper McMullin determined that Mr. Bain was intoxicated and placed him under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Approximately forty-five minutes elapsed between the time Trooper McMullin first encountered Mr. Bain at the accident scene and when Mr. Bain was arrested at the Laurie Police Department. After being advised of his Miranda and Missouri Implied Consent Law rights, Mr. Bain agreed to submit to a breath test. The test was conducted and showed that Mr. Bain's blood alcohol content was .162 percent.

Mr. Manton also testified at trial. He stated that he and a friend were driving northbound on Highway 5 on the night of November 18 when they came upon the accident. Mr. Manton approached the Dodge van, looked inside, and observed a man lying on his back on the floor between the two captain's chairs. The man's head was lying towards the back of the van and his feet towards the front. Mr. Manton saw no one else in the van. Mr. Manton tried to open the doors of the van several times to access the man in the vehicle but was unsuccessful because the doors were locked. While attempting to open the doors of the van, Mr. Manton saw a man come out of a nearby residence. Mr. Manton spoke with the man, and the man told him that he had heard the accident and had called for an ambulance. Shortly thereafter, two ambulances, the fire department, and Trooper McMullin arrived at the scene.

Following the hearing, the trial court ruled that the Director did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. Bain was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in his blood was .10 percent or more by weight. The trial court accordingly set aside the Director's suspension of Mr. Bain's driving privileges. The Director now appeals that decision.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for a judge-tried case, as this one was, is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976), which interprets what is now Rule 84.13(d). As the rule is interpreted, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. When reviewing a judgment in a driver's license revocation case, the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, and all evidence and inferences to the contrary are disregarded. Callendar v. Dir. of Revenue, 44 S.W.3d 866, 868 (Mo.App. W.D.2001).

III. Point Relied On

In his sole point on appeal, the Director contends that the trial court erred in setting aside the Director's suspension of Mr. Bain's driving privileges. The Director insists that the trial court misinterpreted the law and that its judgment was against the weight of the evidence in that the Director proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, an unrebutted prima facie case for suspension of Mr. Bain's license under section 302.505.1.

Section 302.505.1, RSMo 2000, provides in pertinent part:

The department shall suspend or revoke the license of any person upon its determination that the person was arrested upon probable cause to believe such person was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the person's blood, breath, or urine was ten-hundredths of one percent or more by weight....

Under this statute, the Director makes a prima facie case for suspending or revoking a driver's license by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the driver for driving while intoxicated, and (2) the driver's blood alcohol content was at least .10 percent at the time of the arrest. Testerman v. Dir. of Revenue, 31 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000). Once the Director has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the driver to present evidence to rebut it by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 475-476. Preponderance of the evidence "is defined as that degree of evidence that `is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows the fact to be proved to be more probable than...