Bajaj v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 2007 NY Slip Op 50570(U) (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 3/23/2007)
| Decision Date | 23 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | 33512/02. |
| Citation | 2007 NY Slip Op 50570 |
| Parties | DR. DEEPIKA BAJAJ, A/A/O, MALGORZATA GAWAD, Plaintiff, v. STATE-WIDE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | New York District Court |
Harold Solomon, Esq, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Ronald Lemberger, Esq., Attorney for Defendant.
This action was commenced on or about September 12, 2002 seeking to recover no-fault first party benefits, in the sum of $2,625.23, for medical services allegedly provided by the Plaintiff to his Assignor. Issue was joined on or about September 30, 2002.
On February 21, 2006, following the filing of a Notice of Trial by the Plaintiff, the parties participated in a mandatory arbitration pursuant to the Rules of the Chief Judge, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 28. That proceeding resulted in an award in the Plaintiff's favor, against the Defendant, in the sum of $3,150.23, inclusive of attorney's fees, together with interest from September 12, 2002. The arbitration award was signed and dated by the Commissioner of Arbitration and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court on March 3, 2006.
Based thereon, on August 18, 2006, a judgment was entered against the Defendant in the total sum of $6,293.74. On October 30, 2006 the Plaintiff served, by mail, a copy of this judgment upon the Defendant, along with a Notice of Entry and a copy of the arbitration award.
On November 30, 2006 the Defendant attempted to file a demand for a trial de novo. This demand was rejected by the Clerk of the Court on December 1, 2006 as untimely. The Defendant now moves for an order compelling the acceptance of its demand and staying all efforts to enforce the judgment entered herein. The Plaintiff opposes the motion.
The Defendant alleges that the service of the judgment and the arbitration award by the Plaintiff, on October 30, 2006, was "the first and only notice by plaintiff of the award, [and] defendant timely filed its demand for trial de novo." (Meade Affirmation 12/27/06, ¶ 3) The Defendant does not indicate when, if at all, it was served with notice of the filing of the arbitration award by the Commissioner of Arbitration.
The Defendant argues that the Clerk's rejection of its Demand for a Trial De Novo violates its right to a trial by jury. According to the Defendant, measuring its time within which to file a demand for a trial de novo from service of notice of filing of the award by the Commissioner of Arbitration, rather than from service by a party, is in direct conflict with the Civil Practice Law and Rules and inconsistent with the Rules of the Chief Judge themselves, rendering these rules unconstitutional. The Defendant is mistaken.
The Rules of the Chief Judge, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 28, authorized by CPLR § 3405, establish the procedures to be followed for the disposition of civil suits, for a sum of money only, by arbitration.
In pertinent part, these rules provide:
Section 28.11 Award. (a) The award shall be signed by the panel of arbitrators or at least a majority of them. The chairperson shall file a report and the award with the commissioner within 20 days after the hearing, and mail or deliver copies thereof to the parties or their counsel. The commissioner shall mark his files accordingly, file the original with the clerk of the court where the action was commenced or, if the action was transferred, the court to which it was transferred, and notify the parties of such filing.
Section 28.12 Trial de novo.
(a) Demand may be made by any party not in default for a trial de novo in the court where the action was commenced or, if the action was transferred, the court to which it was transferred, with or without a jury. Any party who is not in default, within 30 days after service upon such party of the notice of filing of the award with the appropriate court clerk, or if service is by mail, within 35 days of such service, may file with the clerk of the court where the award was filed and serve upon all adverse parties a demand for a trial de novo.
In challenging the constitutionality of these rules, the Defendant bears a heavy burden and must overcome a strong presumption of constitutionality by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See: Hotel Dorset Company v. Trust for Cultural Resouces of City of New York, 46 NY2d 358, 413 NYS2d 357 (1978); Local Government Assistance Corporation v. Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corporation, 2 NY3d 524, 780 NYS2d 507 (2004).
Contrary to the Defendant's argument, that the Rules of the Chief Judge deprive it of its constitutional right to a trial by jury, the authorizing statute, CPLR § 3405, specifically provides, "Such rules must permit a jury trial de novo upon demand by any party following the determination of the arbitrators ...." It is this very provision which has been determined to save the mandatory arbitration provisions from constitutional infirmity. Nuro Transportation v. Judges of the Civil Court of the City of New York for the County of Queens, 95 AD2d 779, 463 NYS2d 264 (2nd Dept. 1983); Penney v. Elmira Professional Communications, Inc., 131 AD2d 938, 516 NYS2d 533 (3rd Dept. 1987)
The Defendant's argument, that the notice provisions of 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 28.11 and 28.12, which permit the Commissioner of Arbitration to serve the notice of filing of the award, as the trigger for the time within which a demand for a trial de novo must be served, are in contravention of the service and/or notice provisions of the Civil Practice Law and Rules is similarly without merit. A conflict between the CPLR and the Rules of the Chief Judge simply does not exist. The disclosure provisions of CPLR Article 31, which require such demands to be served by a party; or the provisions of CPLR § 2220, which address the filing and service of orders; or the provisions of CPLR §§ 2221 and 5513, which measure the time within which a motion to reargue or renew may be made or a notice of appeal may be filed from the service of the order in question by a party, upon which the Defendant relies, have nothing whatsoever to do with the Rules of the Chief Judge for mandatory arbitration.
Plump v. Harth, 52 Misc 2d 787, 276 NYS2d 929 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 1966), upon which the Defendant relies, provides a good comparison. In Plump, there existed a direct conflict between the provisions of CPLR § 3216 and then Rule 14 of the Rules of the Nassau County District Court. The former required notice be given to a plaintiff, demanding that a note of issue be filed or face dismissal; the later provided for an automatic dismissal, without notice. In contrast, the CPLR provisions upon which the Defendant relies herein are neither in direct nor indirect conflict with the arbitration provisions, which are specifically authorized by CPLR § 3405. Moreover, the CPLR provisions upon which the Defendant relies are statutes of general applicability, whereas CPLR § 3405 is one of limited application, limited to mandatory...
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