Baker v. Commissioner of Correction

Citation914 A.2d 1034,281 Conn. 241
Decision Date13 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. 17575.,17575.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesTroy BAKER v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellants (respondents).

Chris Young, certified legal intern, with whom was Timothy H. Everett, and, on the brief, Douglas Heim, certified legal intern, for the appellee (petitioner).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

KATZ, J.

The respondents,1 the commissioner of correction and the board of pardons and paroles (board), appeal, following our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus of the petitioner, Troy Baker. The sole issue presented on appeal to this court is whether an inmate has a cognizable liberty interest in his parole eligibility status sufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the habeas court. We conclude that our statutory scheme affords no cognizable liberty interest in parole eligibility status. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The petitioner was convicted of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-217, as amended by Public Acts 1999, No. 99-212, § 1,2 carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 29-35(a), as amended by Public Acts 1999, No. 99-212, § 2,3 sale of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a),4 and forgery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-139 (a)(3).5 The offenses were committed on February 19, 2000, and he was sentenced, on July 13, 2001, to a total effective sentence of fifteen years, execution suspended after seven years, and three years of probation.6 Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the respondents improperly had classified him as a violent offender under General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 54-125a (b)(2) and (c), as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2001, No. 01-9, § 74,7 thus rendering him ineligible for parole until he had served 85 percent of his sentence.8 According to his petition, the board should have classified the petitioner as a nonviolent offender under § 54-125a (a), which he claims would have required the board to consider his eligibility for parole after he had served 50 percent of his sentence. See footnote 7 of this opinion. In addition, the petitioner claimed that the respondents had violated the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution by classifying him as a violent offender based on robbery convictions from 1991 and 1995, as those convictions predated the enactment of subsection (2) of § 54-125a (b), prescribing the 85 percent parole eligibility restriction for persons convicted of offenses involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force, and subsection (c), requiring the board to enact regulations regarding the classification and release of these violent offenders. See Public Acts 1995 No. 95-255, § 1(prescribing effective dates of July 1, 1996, for what is now § 54-125a [b][2], and July 1, 1995, for what is now § 54-125a [c]).

The respondents claimed that the petitioner accurately had been classified as a violent offender and that the board properly had exercised its statutory discretion in so classifying him. The respondents further claimed that the habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because the petitioner's parole eligibility, his demand for a parole hearing and his interest in parole consideration did not implicate a recognized liberty interest sufficient to invoke habeas jurisdiction under the laws of this state.

The habeas court, Fuger, J., agreed with the respondents that it lacked jurisdiction over the habeas petition because, unlike the liberty interest at stake when a petitioner alleges that his detention is illegal, the petitioner in the present case did not have a cognizable liberty interest in his parole eligibility status. Despite its determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the habeas court discussed the merits of the petitioner's claims. Although the court recognized that narcotics violations generally are nonviolent offenses, it noted that, in classifying the petitioner under § 54-125a, the board was not limited to considering only the offenses underlying the sentence the petitioner currently was serving. The court noted that, under § 54-125a, the board could consider any information it deemed relevant in making this assessment. The habeas court also rejected the claimed ex post facto violation in the application of § 54-125a (b)(2) on the ground that the offense for which the petitioner had been classified as a violent offender and the attendant imposition of his sentence occurred after the enactment of that provision. Accordingly, the habeas court dismissed the habeas petition.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal to the Appellate Court, which the habeas court granted, raising the jurisdiction and ex post facto issues. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that "although an inmate has no right to parole release, he has a liberty interest in parole eligible status." Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, 91 Conn.App. 855, 862, 882 A.2d 1238 (2005). The court concluded that prior case law implicitly had recognized such a liberty interest. Id., at 862-63, 882 A.2d 1238, citing Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 818-19, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002). The court reasoned that this conclusion was supported by the statutory scheme because, "[r]ead together, subsections (a) and (b) [of § 54-125a] clearly vest a liberty interest in parole eligible status to all persons described in subsection (a), subject to the exclusion for the enumerated offenses and the 85 percent limitation embodied in subsection (b)." Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 863-64, 882 A.2d 1238. In light of the Appellate Court's conclusion that the habeas court improperly had dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the court did not reach the petitioner's ex post facto claim. The Appellate Court thus remanded the case for further proceedings. The certified appeal to this court followed.9

We conclude that, contrary to the Appellate Court's reading of the statutory scheme and case law regarding this issue, the petitioner does not have a cognizable liberty interest in parole eligibility status. Thus, the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the habeas court had jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's claim.

Initially, we set forth the appropriate standard of review. "We have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.... Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction.... [W]here the court rendering the judgment lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter the judgment itself is void.... Indeed, [i]t is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514, 532-33, 911 A.2d 712 (2006).

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, "[i]t is clear ... that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), overruled in part on other grounds by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). "The original view of a habeas corpus attack upon detention under a judicial order was a limited one. The relevant inquiry was confined to determining simply whether or not the committing court had been possessed of jurisdiction.... But, over the years, the writ of habeas corpus evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge from any confinement contrary to the [c]onstitution or fundamental law, even though imposed pursuant to conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction.... Thus, whether the petitioner's challenge to his custody is that the statute under which he stands convicted is unconstitutional ... that he has been imprisoned prior to trial on account of a defective indictment against him ... that he is unlawfully confined in the wrong institution ... that he was denied his constitutional rights at trial ... that he is being unlawfully detained by the [e]xecutive or the military ... or that his parole was unlawfully revoked, causing him to be reincarcerated in prison ... in each case his grievance is that he is being unlawfully subjected to physical restraint, and in each case habeas corpus has been accepted as the specific instrument to obtain release from such confinement." (Citations omitted.) Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, at 485-86, 93 S.Ct. 1827.

The Preiser court went on to explain the expansion of the utilization of habeas corpus to challenge illegal confinement, even when the remedy would not be immediate release. "[R]ecent cases have established that habeas corpus relief is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody, but that the writ is available as well to attack future confinement and obtain future releases. In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 [66-67, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426] (1968), the [c]ourt held that a prisoner may attack on habeas the second...

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