Baker v. Ramirez

Decision Date01 April 1987
Citation235 Cal.Rptr. 857,190 Cal.App.3d 1123
PartiesLeland H. BAKER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Phillip D. RAMIREZ et al., Defendants, Cross-complainants and Appellants; Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Cross-defendant and Respondent. F005813.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Kimble, MacMichael & Upton and David D. Doyle, Fresno, for defendants, cross-complainants and appellants
OPINION

FRANSON, Acting Presiding Justice.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff and respondent, Leland H. Baker, filed a complaint against defendants and appellants, Phillip D. Ramirez and Lydia G. Ramirez, to quiet title, for declaratory relief, for an injunction, and for damages based on appellant's removal of two rows of orange trees from a 20-foot wide strip of property over which each claimed ownership. Appellants cross-complained against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (Santa Fe) which had deeded the disputed strip to appellants.

At trial, the court determined that the ownership issue was a question of law and permitted the admission of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of the deeds. The court found, based on the deeds and the subsequent conduct of the parties, that respondent held title to the disputed strip.

A jury tried the damage issue. After the presentation of the evidence, the court directed a verdict in favor of appellants and against Santa Fe for breach of contract in the amount of $1,067.14. The jury awarded a verdict for actual damages in favor of respondent and against appellants for $22,683. A mistrial was declared on the issue of punitive damages. The court then doubled the jury verdict to $45,366 under Civil Code section 3346.

We hold that the trial judge erred in finding that title to the disputed strip vested in respondent under the deeds. We remand for a further trial on the adverse possession issue. We affirm the determination of damages in the event respondent prevails on the adverse possession issue. We also affirm the verdict against Santa Fe for breach of contract.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This dispute concerns a parcel of property comprised of eight lots, numbered 168 through 175, of the Woodlake Tract of Tulare County. This parcel is divided into lots 168 through 171 on the north and lots 172 through 175 on the south, separated by a 40-foot-wide dedicated public road shown on the subdivision map as "Bravo Street." 1

In 1911, John Maddock acquired lots 168 through 175 per the map recorded in the Tulare County Recorder's Office. In 1913, the Tulare County Board of Supervisors abandoned the portion of Bravo Street separating these lots.

In 1914, John Maddock and his wife, Mary E. Maddock, conveyed a 100-foot strip of land to the Minkler Southern Railway Company (Santa Fe's predecessor in interest) described as:

"A tract of land one hundred (100) feet in width across the said South half (S 1/2) of the Northwest quarter (NW 1/4) of the Northeast quarter (NE 1/4) of Section thirty six (36) the same being Lots one hundred seventy two (172), One hundred seventy three (173) one hundred seventy four (174) and one hundred seventy five (175) of Woodlake, as per map recorded in Book ten (10), pages twenty seven (27) and Twenty-eight (28) of Maps, in the office of the County Recorder of Tulare County, California, said tract lying south of and adjacent to the North line of said Lots one hundred seventy two (172), one hundred seventy three (173), one hundred seventy four (174) and one hundred seventy five (175).

"Excepting the southerly twenty eight (28) feet of the easterly two hundred (200) feet of the above described one hundred (100) foot strip.

"Containing two and nine-tenths (2.9) acres, more or less."

At about the same time as this parcel was conveyed to the railroad, Mr. Maddock planted an orange grove on parts of his property, including substantially all of the abandoned portion of Bravo Street.

By a series of conveyances, lots 168 through 171 were transferred first to Mr. Maddock's wife, and then to their son John R. Maddock, Jr. At the same time, lots 172 through 175 were transferred through Mrs. Maddock to their other son, Norris Maddock. These deeds described the lots per the subdivision map.

Santa Fe was not using the entire 100-foot strip for its tracks, and in 1947 John R. Maddock, Jr., obtained a license to cultivate the portion of the 100-foot strip lying north of the tracks. A map attached to the agreement designates the property subject to the license as lying south of Bravo Street.

Respondent acquired lots 168 through 171 by a deed from John R. Maddock, Jr., and Dorothy May Maddock in 1972. The deed describes the lots per the subdivision map and specifically notes the existence of the abandonment order pertaining to Bravo Street. John R. Maddock, Jr., also assigned the license to cultivate the Santa Fe right-of-way to respondent.

Appellants acquired lots 172 through 175 by a deed from Bertha L. Maddock in 1976. The deed describes the lots per the subdivision map "excepting therefrom that portion thereof conveyed to the Minkler Southern Railway Company, a corporation, in that certain deed recorded June 1, 1914...." This deed also specifically notes the existence of the Bravo Street abandonment order.

In 1979, appellants purchased the right-of-way from Santa Fe. The deed conveyed two parcels. Parcel one was described as the 2.9 acre parcel of land described in the deed to the Minkler Southern Railway Company from John Maddock and Mary E. Maddock recorded June 1, 1914, and parcel two was described as the south half of the abandoned portion of Bravo Street.

After appellants acquired the deed from Santa Fe, both appellants and respondent claimed the south two trees in each row of the orange grove. A survey was performed, and the centerline of Bravo Street was found to bisect the second line of trees in the grove.

In January 1981, appellants removed 84 orange trees located on the south half of Bravo Street. Crops were still on the trees. The land was left unlevel and full of holes, and an irrigation pipeline was damaged.

DISCUSSION
I. The trial court erred in finding that respondent owned the south half of Bravo Street.

Appellants contend that, as a matter of law, they have title to the south half of Bravo Street and that extrinsic evidence on the intent of the parties should have been excluded. Appellants postulate that the south half of Bravo Street either attached to their lots when Bravo Street was abandoned or attached to the 100-foot strip conveyed to Santa Fe's predecessor.

Civil Code section 1112 provides that "[a] transfer of land, bounded by a highway, passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the soil of the highway in front to the center thereof, unless a different intent appears from the grant." Where property is sold by reference to a recorded map, the grantee generally takes to the center of the street shown on the map as bounding the property. (Neff v. Ernst (1957) 48 Cal.2d 628, 635, 311 P.2d 849.) Thus, each lot deeded to John Maddock in 1911 carried with it the half of Bravo Street abutting that lot.

Although an owner of a parcel of land holds fee title to the center of an adjoining street subject to the public easement, he has no right to the possession or occupancy of any portion of the street. However, when the strip set apart has never been accepted, used or improved as a street and is thereafter formally abandoned as such, the contiguous owner acquires such a right of possession and occupancy. (Machado v. Title Guarantee and T. Co. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 180, 185, 99 P.2d 245.) Thus, when the portion of Bravo Street bisecting the lots owned by John Maddock was abandoned in 1913, Mr. Maddock became entitled to possess and occupy that strip. The north half of Bravo Street became part of lots 168 through 171, and the south half of Bravo Street became part of lots 172 through 175 even though the entire parcel had a common owner. (Pilkington v. Fausone (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 349, 90 Cal.Rptr. 38.)

When John Maddock conveyed the 100-foot right-of-way to Santa Fe's predecessor in 1914, the tract was described as lying "south of and adjacent to the north line " of lots 172 through 175 (emphasis added). Since at the time of the conveyance John Maddock owned and enjoyed the right to the possession of Bravo Street which adjoined the north line of said lots, the presumption of Civil Code section 1112 applied to make the centerline of Bravo Street the north line of said lots. (Civ.Code, § 1112; cf. Earl v. Dutour (1919) 181 Cal. 58, 60, 183 P. 438.) However, due to the reference in the deed to the subdivision map which shows the north line to be the south edge of Bravo Street, it is uncertain whether the parties intended the 100-foot right-of-way to begin at the centerline of Bravo Street or at the south edge of Bravo Street.

The trial court admitted extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of the deed to Santa Fe's predecessor. Although extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, detract from, or vary the terms of a deed (Pinsky v. Sloat (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 579, 588, 279 P.2d 584), it is admissible to determine the issue involved when an ambiguity appears on the face of the deed. (City of Redlands v. Nickerson (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 118, 125, 10 Cal.Rptr. 431.) Since the deed was ambiguous with respect to where the 100-foot right-of-way began, the trial court properly admitted extrinsic evidence to determine this issue. (See Tomity Corp. v. Sovkueff (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 685, 53 Cal.Rptr. 328.)

The trial court concluded that John Maddock did not intend to convey any portion of Bravo Street to Santa Fe's predecessor based on Mr. Maddock's planting the orange grove to the south line...

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