Baker v. Richmond City Mill Works

• Decision Date: 25 July 1898
• Citation: 31 S.E. 426,105 Ga. 225
• Parties: BAKER . v. RICHMOND CITY MILL WORKS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

31 S.E. 426

105 Ga. 225

BAKER .

v.RICHMOND CITY MILL WORKS.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 25, 1898.

Expert Evidence — Conclusiveness — Services op Attorney.

1. Jurors, in passing upon the testimony of an expert witness as to the value of professional services, are not absolutely bound by his opinion, but may exercise their own judgment on the subject, taking into consideration the nature of the services, the time required to perform them, and all the attending circumstances.

2. Accordingly, where an attorney at law was the only witness as to the value of certain services rendered by himself, and testified that they were, in his opinion, worth a stated amount, the jury, had the matter been submitted to them, would not have been constrained to accept this opinion as absolutely correct, but might have found that the services in question were of a different value. This being so, it was error for the court to direct a finding to the effect that these services were worth the amount stated by the witness.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Bartow county; A. W. Fite, Judge.

Action by the Richmond City Mill Works against Thomas H. Baker. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

R. W. Murphy and J. M. Neel, for plaintiff in error.

John W. Akin, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN, P. J. In the present case, which was an action upon a promissory note stipulating for the payment of "reasonable attorney's fees, " the court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for stated sums, as principal, interest, and attorney's fees. As the maker of the note contracted to pay reasonable attorney's fees, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show by evidence what was a proper amount to be allowed for the same. This it undertook to do by introducing as a witness its own attorney, who testified that his services in the case were worth $250, the amount which the court directed the jury to find for the same. The defendant moved for a new trial. Some of the grounds of the motion relate to the refusal of the court to grant a continuance. These need not be considered, as a new trial is ordered because, in our opinion, the trial court erred in directing a verdict.

The theory of the defendant in error is that, inasmuch as the only evidence bearing upon the question of attorney's fees was the sworn opinion of an expert that they were worth so much, the jury would have been bound to find this amount, and could not lawfully have found that the services were of a different value. In this view we can not concur. After stating, in general terms, that a witness acquainted with the value of a thing, the value of which is in dispute, may give an opinion upon that subject, Judge Thompson says: "This rule is subject to the qualification that the opinions of witnesses as to value are not binding upon the jury, but persuasive merely. If they are of a different opinion, they may find according to their own opinion." 1 Thomp. Trials, p. 342, § 380. "Lawyers, physicians, nurses, artists, and authors, as well as persons in other walks of life, have been allowed to testify as experts as to the value of services rendered by those of their own profession or occupation. Such testimony is, however, not conclusive upon the jury,...