Baker v. Schwarb

• Citation: 40 F.Supp.3d 881
• Decision Date: 19 August 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 14–10784.
• Parties: James BAKER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Officer Randall SCHWARB, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

40 F.Supp.3d 881

James BAKER, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
Officer Randall SCHWARB, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 14–10784.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed Aug. 19, 2014.

40 F.Supp.3d 884

Melissa M. Pearce, Law Office of Melissa M. Pearce, PLC, Milford, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Marc D. Kaszubski, O'Reilly, Rancilio, Sterling Heights, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROBERT H. CLELAND, District Judge.

Out on the forested frontier, it was commonplace—and never worrisome—to see buckskin-wearing men setting off toting their flintlocks and hunting knives, fixin' to bring home vittles for the family. But, in the contemporary reality of a settled, peaceful suburban environment, where most of the hunting is done between aisle three and the frozen food section, the sight of commandos with AK–47s marching along the highway predictably grabs the attention of citizens and law enforcement alike.

Around 6:00 p.m. on Thursday July 18, 2013, a flood of 911 calls from concerned citizens reached the City of Sterling Heights Police Department, and it dispatched officers to investigate reports of what looked like two young, heavily armed men walking on a city street. Indeed, when officers arrived on scene near the Henry Ford Medical Center, they encountered Plaintiffs James Baker and Shyama Nixon, one of them dressed all in black and sporting sunglasses, and both carrying impressive looking rifles and handguns in full view. The officers approached and, after an initial discussion, peacefully disarmed the men. They were then briefly detained, their I.D.s were retrieved and verified, and they were questioned. After establishing that the firearms were lawfully possessed, the officers returned Plaintiffs' weapons and released them. The entire encounter lasted about twenty minutes.

About six months after the incident, Plaintiffs Baker and Nixon sued the City of Sterling Heights, its police department, Chief of Police Michael Reese, Sergeant Jeffrey Bonner, and City of Sterling Heights police officers Randall Schwarb, Thomas Phillips, and Todd Langenderfer. The court dismissed Plaintiffs' state-law claims, leaving Plaintiffs with their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging violation of the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments.

40 F.Supp.3d 885

Plaintiffs have since filed an amended complaint that reflects the court's dismissal of their state-law claims and omits the City of Sterling Heights, its police department, and the city's chief of police, as Defendants. The remaining Defendants–Sergeant Bonner, Officer Schwarb, Officer Phillips, and Officer Langderfer—now move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claims. The matter is fully briefed, and no hearing is needed. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiffs Baker and Nixon were walking on a public sidewalk on 15 Mile Road in Sterling Heights, Michigan while carrying pistols in holsters and long guns slung over their shoulders. After receiving several 911 calls² from concerned citizens, the City of Sterling Heights Police Department dispatched Officer Schwarb to investigate. By this time, Plaintiffs had walked past a public park and a hospital.

After arriving at the scene near the Henry Ford Medical Center, Officer Schwarb directed Baker to place his weapons—a handgun and an AK–47 rifle, hanging by a “speed sling”—on the ground. Baker initially refused but informed Officer Schwarb that he would not touch his weapons. Officer Schwarb approached Baker with his firearm pointed towards the ground and asked Baker what he was doing. Baker responded that he was “walking.” Next, Officer Schwarb directed Baker to turn around and place his hands on his head. When Officer Schwarb disarmed and handcuffed Baker, Baker stated, “I do not consent to a seizure of my property.”

While Officer Schwarb engaged Baker, Nixon backed away and recorded the encounter on his cell phone. When Officer Phillips arrived at the scene he approached Nixon from behind and told Nixon to place his hands on his head. Nixon complied and his cell phone fell to the ground. In similar fashion to Baker, Nixon stated that he did not consent to a search of his property. Officer Phillips secured Nixon's weapons—a rifle and a handgun—and handcuffed him. Although Officer Phillips looked in Nixon's pocket, he did not find any identification and consequently radioed dispatch to check the registration on Nixon's handgun.

With both Baker and Nixon safely restrained, Officers Schwarb and Phillips continued asking questions. Baker stated that he and Nixon were “exercising [their] constitutional rights.” Further, Baker inquired if he was being detained, to which Officer Schwarb replied that Baker was not under arrest.³ Next, as Baker protested,

40 F.Supp.3d 886

Officer Schwarb located Baker's wallet and took out Baker's identification. Before invoking his right to remain silent, Nixon stated, “I do not consent to any searches of my property” and “I'm not breaking any laws, I'm just exercising my First Amendment rights or my Second Amendment rights.” During this time, Officers Schwarb and Phillips verified that Plaintiffs were over the age of 18, did not have any criminal convictions or outstanding personal protection orders against them, and were properly licensed to carry their weapons. Approximately ten minutes after the officers placed Nixon and Baker in handcuffs, the pair were un-handcuffed and the officers returned their weapons. Sergeant Bonner, who had arrived after Baker and Nixon had been un-handcuffed, informed Plaintiffs that they were free to go because they were legally carrying their weapons. Baker refused to “[pick] up his gun up in front of police officers, [because] that's asking to get shot.” Sergeant Bonner responded that he would “not deal in absurdities,” and the officers entered their vehicles and departed.⁴

Baker and Nixon later posted an edited version of their videos on YouTube.com. Thereafter, on February 20, 2014, they filed this suit. Defendants Sergeant Bonner, Officer Schwarb, Officer Phillips, and Officer Langderfer now move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for violation of the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments.

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir.2003).

The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must put forth enough evidence to show that there exists “a genuine issue for trial.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). Summary judgment, therefore, is not appropriate when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The existence of a factual dispute alone does not, however, defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment—the disputed factual issue must be material. A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity and thus may not be held liable for damages under § 1983. Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability when actions performed in their official

40 F.Supp.3d 887

capacity “[do] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity attaches unless “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The court employs a two-step inquiry in determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity: (1) whether the official's conduct violated a constitutional right when considering the facts in a light most favorable to the injured party; and (2) whether the constitutional right was “clearly established.” Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The determination of whether the right is “clearly established” must be made “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id.

...