Baker v. Speaks

• Decision Date: 18 September 2014
• Docket Number: S–13–0266.,Nos. S–13–0245,s. S–13–0245
• Citation: 2014 WY 117,334 P.3d 1215
• Parties: Nathan R. BAKER; Bryner Farms, LLC; Pat's Dream Project Trust; and MME Trust, Petitioners, v. David SPEAKS and Elizabeth Speaks, Respondents. Nathan R. Baker; Bryner Farms, LLC; Pat's Dream Project Trust; and MME Trust, Appellants (Defendants), v. David Speaks and Elizabeth Speaks, Appellees (Plaintiffs).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

334 P.3d 1215

2014 WY 117

Nathan R. BAKER;

Bryner Farms, LLC;

Pat's Dream Project Trust;

and MME Trust, Petitioners

v.David SPEAKS and Elizabeth Speaks, Respondents.

Nathan R. Baker;

Bryner Farms, LLC;

Pat's Dream Project Trust;

and MME Trust, Appellants (Defendants)

v.David Speaks and Elizabeth Speaks, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

Nos. S–13–0245

S–13–0266.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Sept. 18, 2014.

Representing Petitioners/Appellants: David H. Day of Day Shell & Liljenquist, L.C., Murray, Utah.

Representing Respondents/Appellees: Paula A. Fleck and Susan L. Combs of Holland & Hart LLP, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Fleck.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE^* , DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] This is the third appeal of matters related to Byron Baker's faulty construction of a cabin for David and Elizabeth Speaks. See Baker v. Speaks, 2008 WY 20, 177 P.3d 803 (Wyo.2008) (Baker I ) and Baker v. Speaks, 2013 WY 24, 295 P.3d 847 (Wyo.2013) (Baker II ). The current dispute concerns the availability of two properties for execution to satisfy the Speaks' judgment against Byron. The two properties were fraudulently transferred by Byron and Rosemary Baker to their son, Nathan R. Baker, and then later transferred to Bryner Farms, LLC, Pat's Dream Project Trust and MME Trust (collectively referred to as “the Baker Defendants”). The district court ruled the undisputed facts established that Rosemary and Byron were not married when they took title to the Corsi Ranchettes lot as tenants by the entirety. Consequently, Byron's interest was not entitled to protection from legal process. The district court also concluded the Speaks brought the action to declare the Misty Meadows lot transaction fraudulent within the applicable limitations period.

[¶ 2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 3] The Baker Defendants present the following issues in this consolidated appeal:

1. Whether the district court erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the marital status of Byron and Rosemary Baker, and that the legal effect of its lack of jurisdiction was that the Corsi Ranchettes Property was not held by the Bakers as tenants by the entireties.

2. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that the applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act does not expire until four years after the conveyance alleged to be fraudulent is actually discovered, and that it was Defendants' burden to prove the date of discovery.

The Speaks restate the issues as:

1. Did the district court properly grant summary judgment regarding the marital status of Byron and Rosemary Baker?

2. Did the district court properly determine that the Speaks' claim regarding the Misty Meadows property was timely?

FACTS

[¶ 4] The factual and procedural histories of this matter are very complicated; consequently, we will distill the current controversies down to their essentials. The Corsi Ranchettes property was transferred by warranty deed to Byron and Rosemary Baker, husband and wife, as tenants by the entirety in 1998. In 2003, Byron and Rosemary conveyed the property to Nathan who then transferred it to Bryner Farms, LLC, a family-owned company, in 2008. Bryner Farms conveyed the Corsi Ranchettes property to Pat's Dream Project Trust in 2010. Rosemary was the trustee of the trust.

[¶ 5] In Baker II, ¶ 54, 295 P.3d at 860, we affirmed the district court's ruling that the 2003 transfer from Byron and Rosemary to Nathan was fraudulent under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34–14–101 through 34–14–113 (LexisNexis 2003) (UFCA). The Baker Defendants asserted the property was, nevertheless, exempt from execution for the judgment against Byron, alone, because it was held by Byron and Rosemary as tenants by the entirety. Because the record was unclear as to Byron and Rosemary's marital status, we remanded for a determination. Id., ¶¶ 57–59, 62, 295 P.3d at 860–62.

[¶ 6] Back in district court, the Speaks moved for summary judgment claiming the undisputed evidence established Rosemary and Byron were not married. The Baker Defendants acknowledged they were not formally married when they took title to the Corsi Ranchettes property, but requested the court to enter an order establishing their marriage under Utah's unsolemnized marriage statute. The district court ruled it could not change Byron's and Rosemary's marital status because they were not parties to the action. Without an adjudication of marriage under the Utah statute, the evidence established the Bakers were not married when they took title to the Corsi Ranchettes property as tenants by the entirety. The district court, therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of the Speaks apparently concluding the property was not held in a valid tenancy by the entirety because the Bakers were not married when they took title to it. The only issue remaining with regard to the Corsi Ranchettes lot after the district court's summary judgment decision was “whether Nathan Baker acted with actual fraudulent intent at the time of the 2003 transfer of the Corsi Ranchettes property, and if not, whether he gave $14,000 consideration for the fraudulent conveyance.” The Baker Defendants filed a petition for a writ of review of the district court's decision that Byron and Rosemary were not married and we conditionally granted it.

[¶ 7] The Misty Meadows property presented a different issue. Rosemary and Byron took title to that property as “Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common.” Rosemary and Byron fraudulently conveyed their interest in the Misty Meadows lot to Nathan on October 1, 2003. Nathan conveyed the property to Bryner Farms in 2008, and Bryner Farms transferred it to the MME Trust in 2010. Rosemary was also the trustee of the MME Trust.

[¶ 8] The Bakers asserted the Speaks did not file their action to set aside the fraudulent transfer of the Misty Meadow property within the limitations period set forth in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34–14–210(a) (UFTA) and that claim was, therefore barred. Consistent with our holding in Baker II, the district court held the statute of limitations applicable to the UFCA, and not the UFTA, applied and the Speaks' claim was timely under that provision. Consequently, the district court found the Speaks were entitled to execute on Byron's interest in the Misty Meadows lot and entered a partial final judgment under W.R.C.P. 54(b). The Baker Defendants appealed that decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 9] Summary judgments are governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c) :

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

We review a summary judgment de novo, using the same materials and following the same standards as the district court. “We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record.” Hasvold v. Park County School Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 11, 45 P.3d 635, 637–38 (Wyo.2002), quoting Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo.1991) and Unicorn Drilling, Inc. v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist., 3 P.3d 857, 860 (Wyo.2000). See also Alpine Lumber Co. v. Capital West Nat'l Bank, 2010 WY 62, ¶ 5, 231 P.3d 869, 870–71 (Wyo.2010).

[¶ 10] We have described the respective obligations of summary judgment opponents in this way:

“A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted.” The party requesting a summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. If he carries his burden, “the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. We have explained the duties of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment as follows:

After a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing there are genuine issues of material fact. The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings ..., and conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden.

Hatton v. Energy Electric Co., 2006 WY 151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 8, 12–13 (Wyo.2006) (citations omitted). See also Fayard v. Design Committee of the Homestead Subdivision, 2010 WY 51, ¶ 21, 230 P.3d 299, 305 (Wyo.2010). We can affirm a summary judgment ruling on any legal ground appearing in the record. Retz v. Siebrandt, 2008 WY 44, ¶ 14, 181 P.3d 84, 90 (Wyo.2008).

DISCUSSION

1. Rule 54(b) Certification

[¶ 11] After the district court certified its decision on the Misty Meadow lot as final under W.R.C.P. 54(b), the Baker Defendants filed a notice of appeal on that claim. At the same time, the Baker Defendants filed a petition for writ of review of the district court's decision on the Corsi Ranchettes lot. We issued the writ on a conditional basis, subject to our later evaluation of the propriety of the Rule 54(b) certification.

[¶ 12] Although neither party challenged the district court's decision to certify the Misty Meadows decision as final under Rule 54(b), we may raise the issue on our own. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bethesda Foundation, 609 P.2d 459, 460–61 (Wyo.1980). Rule 54(b) states:

(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. —When more than one claim for relief is

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