Fayard v. The Design Comm. Of The Homestead Subdiv.
Decision Date | 23 April 2010 |
Docket Number | No. S-09-0145.,S-09-0145. |
Citation | 230 P.3d 299,2010 WY 51 |
Parties | Cynthia FAYARD and Galeforce, LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company, Appellants (Plaintiffs),v.The DESIGN COMMITTEE OF the HOMESTEAD SUBDIVISION, 2nd and 3rd Filings, a Wyoming Unincorporated Association; Sandra Day; Horton Spitzer; and Gary Finkel, each as an individual and as a member of the Design Committee of the Homestead Subdivision, 2nd and 3rd Filings, Appellees (Defendants). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellants: Paula A. Fleck and Susan L. Combs of Holland & Hart LLP, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Fleck.
Representing Appellees: James K. Lubing of Law Office of James K. Lubing, Jackson, Wyoming; Douglas F. Schultz of Schultz Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Lubing.
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.
[¶ 1] Cynthia Fayard and Galeforce, LLC 1 (collectively “Fayard”) own lots in the Homestead Subdivision in Teton County. Fayard filed a declaratory judgment and injunctive action against the Design Committee of the Homestead Subdivision, 2nd and 3rd Filings, and committee members Sandra Day, Horton Spitzer and Gary Finkel (collectively “the Design Committee”), alleging the Design Committee had improperly approved a special assessment to pave the common roads. The district court ruled that the Design Committee had acted within its authority under the subdivision covenants and granted summary judgment in favor of the Design Committee. We affirm.
[¶ 2] Fayard presents a general issue on appeal:
A. Did the District Court err when it granted [the Design Committee's] motion for summary judgment?
The Design Committee's statement of the issues is more detailed:
[¶ 3] Fayard owns two lots in the Homestead Subdivision, Second Filing, and one lot in Homestead Subdivision, Third Filing, in Teton County (Homestead II/III). Homestead II/III is governed by a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CCRs). Homestead II/III is part of a larger development known as the John Dodge development, which includes the John Dodge Homestead subdivisions, the Beehive subdivision, and the Homestead subdivisions. The development shares a common road system.
[¶ 4] In 2005, several portions of the John Dodge development decided to pave their roads. The Design Committee was asked if Homestead II/III wanted to participate in the paving project. The Design Committee polled the homeowners and determined that they were not in favor of paving at that time.
[¶ 5] In January 2006, the Design Committee met at Ms. Fayard's home. The minutes of the meeting stated: Ms. Fayard's term on the Design Committee expired in January 2006.
[¶ 6] In May 2006, the Design Committee learned that the remaining portions of the John Dodge development were going to pave their roads over the summer. Consequently, the committee sent ballots to the lot owners in Homestead II/III to gather votes on using a special assessment to pave the roads in their portion of the development, as well. They also sent ballots to lot owners in the Beehive subdivision. Although the Beehive lot owners did not have an official right to vote on the matter, the Design Committee considered the Beehive vote as advisory. Of the nine lot owners of Homestead II/III, six returned ballots in favor of the paving. The remaining three votes belonged to Fayard; those ballots were never returned, although Ms. Fayard verbally objected to the project. The Beehive subdivision lot owners all voted in favor of the paving and helped pay for it.
[¶ 7] Relying on the vote, the Design Committee issued a resolution on June 14, 2006, approving a special assessment for the paving project. The first phase of the paving was completed that summer and the remainder of the project was completed in the summer of 2007. The Design Committee invoiced the lot owners for the paving costs. Although initially Fayard did not pay the assessment, she eventually tendered payment under protest.
[¶ 8] On August 23, 2007, Fayard filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, challenging the Design Committee's authority to approve a special assessment for paving the roads in Homestead II/III. Fayard sought to have the paving removed and the road returned to its original gravel state. The Design Committee filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because it had clear authority under the CCRs to present the special assessment for paving the roads to the lot owners for a vote and Fayard was barred from bringing her claim by the equitable doctrine of laches.2 After holding a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Design Committee ruling that the Design Committee acted within its authority under the CCRs when it presented the special assessment question to the lot owners. Fayard appealed.
[¶ 9] Our standard of review on a summary judgment order is de novo. Wyoming Med. Center v. Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2010 WY 21, ¶ 11, 225 P.3d 1061, 1064 (Wyo.2010).
Cheek v. Jackson Wax Museum, Inc., 2009 WY 151, ¶ 12, 220 P.3d 1288, 1290 (Wyo.2009).
[¶ 10] In reviewing summary judgment orders involving contracts, the interpretation of the contractual language is a matter of law for the court when the language is clear and unambiguous. Cheek, ¶ 12, 220 P.3d at 1290; Vargas Ltd. Partnership v. Four “H” Ranches Architectural Control Comm., 2009 WY 26, ¶ 11, 202 P.3d 1045, 1050 (Wyo.2009). If the language is not clear or there are other material issues of fact, summary judgment is not appropriate.
[¶ 11] Resolution of this case requires interpretation of the CCRs. The pertinent provisions state:
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