Baker v. State

• Decision Date: 07 February 1951
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 991
• Citation: 51 So.2d 376,35 Ala.App. 596
• Parties: BAKER v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

Page 376

51 So.2d 376

35 Ala.App. 596

BAKER v. STATE.

6 Div. 991.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Feb. 7, 1951.

Rehearing Denied March 6, 1951.

Jas. A. McCollum and Jere Campbell, of Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

A. A. Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and Jas. L. Screws, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARWOOD, Judge.

The case below was submitted to the jury on a count charging this appellant with buying, receiving, or concealing certain personal property of the aggregate value of $128, knowing that it was stolen and having no intent to restore it to the owner.

The evidence presented by the State showed without dispute that the property had been stolen.

It further tended to show that several weeks later police officers went to the home of Mr. Hallman in Tuscaloosa County where Mrs. Lee Baker, this appellant, was employed as a practical nurse.

Among these officers were Mr. J. F. King and Mr. Harless.

As to what occurred during this visit we quote the following from Mr. King's testimony on direct examination: A. Asked Mr. Hallman. Well, I went in there and Mrs. Baker had retired, and I asked her, I told her I would like to get the jewelry that Frank McCarter had given her----

'Mr. Campbell: I object.

'Court: On what grounds?

'Mr. Campbell: Qualify him like before, no promise or threat or hope of reward.

'Q. Did you hear Mr. Harless or anyone else make any threats towards Mrs. Baker or hold out any hope of reward or any inducement in order to get her to make a statement? A. No, I didn't make any threats at all to Mrs. Baker, but I did say this to Mrs. Baker, that if she would give it up willingly she wouldn't be involved in this case.

'Mr. Campbell: We make a motion to exclude all that.

'Court: Overruled.

'A. (continuing) Mrs. Baker asked about what it was, I told her it was a green box.

'Q. What was the first thing you said to her about the box of jewelry? A. I just asked about the jewelry that Frank had given her.

'Q. Frank McCarter? A. McCarter. I finally asked her, I said, 'Mrs. Baker, if you don't feel like getting up, if you will tell me where it is I will get it.' She said, 'You can't get it.' I went out of the room, I waited out about five minutes and I asked her if I may come in. Well, I went in and there was a closet and she got a key out of her purse, there was a suitcase there in the closet, and she tried that key and it wouldn't fit, she got a second key and unlocked the suitcase and handed me the green box, and I asked her if it was intact, and she said, 'Yes,' and she handed me the key to the jewelry box and I unlocked it and all this was in it. When she made this remark she said that 'I want you to know that I didn't know where it come from and if I would have known it had been stolen I wouldn't have accepted it, and I says, 'Well, you're not responsible for his acts,' and I asked her when he gave it to her and she said last night.'

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'Q. And she told you that Frank McCarter had given her the box the night before? A. I asked her when Frank had given her the box she said, 'Last night,' that's the way she expressed it.'

Mr. Harless' testimony was largely corroboratory of Mr. King's. Upon direct examination he first testified that no hope of reward or threats were made toward Mrs. Baker, and that her statements were voluntary. He then testified Mrs. Baker had told Mr. King that she had gotten the jewelry the night before and that one Frank McCarter had given it to her, and she had stated that if she had known the jewelry had been stolen she would not have had it.

The cross examination of Mr. Harless discloses the following:

'Q. Mr. Harless, during that first morning did you at any time hear Mr. King offer any reward, hope of reward, if she told where she got the jewelry box? A. The only thing Mr. King ever said to her is that give it up willingly and you won't be involved in this case.

'Mr. Campbell: If Your Honor please, we move to exclude all the testimony that he said about the box on the grounds that there was some inducement or hope of reward.

'Court: Well, I will overrule.

'Mr. Campbell: We except.'

Testifying in her own behalf the appellant admitted possession of the jewelry, but denied she had told the officers that Frank McCarter had given it to her, but insisted that she had told the officers that one Francis Malone had given it to her.

However on cross examination she claimed she did not know Malone's whereabouts; that he was a travelling salesman; and that when she had seen him he had always contacted her by latter; she would meet him away from the house where she was staying and he would leave her at the front gate upon returning from a date, and that no one that she knew of had ever seen them together.

She also denied that she knew McCarter's reputation in the community.

In rebuttal, but over only a general objection, the State was permitted to show by several witnesses that McCarter's reputation was bad.

Of chief concern in this appeal is the character of the statements made by the appellant to the officers at the time they visited the Hallman home and recovered from her the stolen jewelry, for clearly under the testimony of the officers an inducement in the nature of a promise of immunity from prosecution was offered appellant.

The law in this State governing the admission into evidence of inculpatory statements is laid down in McGehee v. State, 171 Ala. 19, 55 So. 159, 160 as follows:

'By the weight of authority, inculpatory admissions not amounting to a specific confession of guilt require when offered by the state no preliminary proof of their voluntary character. 1 Gr.Ev. (16th Ed.) pp. 346, 347; 6 A. & E.Ency.Law, p. 557; 12 Cyc. 419.

'In this state, however, a modified rule has been adopted, and inculpatory admissions in the nature of a confession--that is, directly relating to the fact or circumstances of the crime, and connecting the defendant therewith--are subjected to the same rules of admissibility as direct confessions, and are therefore prima facie involuntary and inadmissible. Wilson v. State, 84 Ala. 426, 4 So. 383; Shelton v. State, 144 Ala. 106, 42 So. 30. But admissions as to purely collateral matters, which are in no sense confessory of guilt, are not within the scope of the rule, and the predicate as for a confession need not be laid. Pentecost v. State, 107 Ala. 81, 92, 18 So. 146; Meadows v. State, 136 Ala. 67, 34 So. 183; Aikin v. State, 35 Ala. 399. And see, also, Love v. State, 124 Ala. 84, 27 So. 217, where the distinction is suggested.'

The standards for determining whether a statement is a confession or an admission were outlined again, in somewhat different fashion in Herring v. State, 242 Ala. 85, 5 So.2d 104, 105, in the following language: 'The rule in this state does not limit confessions, requiring the laying of a predicate, to direct confessions of guilt. It is required, however, that the statement, within itself, shall be incriminating, support an inference of guilt. Statements of collateral facts, not criminating within themselves, but depending on other and outside evidence, disclosing a chain of circumstances incriminating in character, are not confessions within the rule requiring the laying of a predicate, but are deemed voluntary.'

It is fundamental that the possession of recently stolen goods casts upon an accused the onus of explaining his possession, and if he fails to make a reasonable explanation a presumption of guilt arises which will support a conviction. Culligan v. State, 29 Ala.App. 29, 191 So. 405. See also Ala. Dig., Receiving stolen goods k8(1), and (2) for numerous other authorities.

While the State must prove guilty knowledge on the part of the accused, such guilty knowledge may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the property. Vacalis v. State, 204 Ala. 345, 86 So. 92. Guilty knowledge may be inferred from the fact that the goods were purchased for much less than their real value, or from a false denial of the purchase...