Baker v. State

• Decision Date: 09 July 1900
• Parties: BAKER. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

111 Ga. 141

36 S.E. 607

BAKER.

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 9, 1900.

CRIMINAL LAW—CONTINUANCE—MANSLAUGHTER—INSTRUCTIONS—NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

1. Under the facts disclosed by the record, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to postpone the trial a second time in order to allow counsel "time for study of case."

2. Neither the evidence nor the statement of the accused would have authorized the trial judge to charge the jury upon the offense of manslaughter. Even if, under the statement, the defense of manslaughter was involved, there was no request to charge upon the subject.

3. The newly-discovered evidence as to the unsoundness of the mind of the accused would, when taken in connection with the counter showing made by the state, not probably produce a different verdict upon another trial.

4. The evidence fully warranted the verdict, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a new trial.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Fulton county; J. S. Candler, Judge.

James L. Baker was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

Lee J. Langley, for plaintiff in error.

C. D. Hill, Sol. Gen., and J. M. Terrell, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SIMMONS, C. J. This case arises upon exceptions taken to the refusal of the court below to grant a motion for a new trial, made by Baker, who had been tried and convicted of murder.

1. The principal ground relied upon here by counsel for the plaintiff in error was the refusal of the judge to continue or postpone the trial of the case upon the facts and circumstances shown in the motion. Counsel had been employed, we infer from the record, at least six days before the trial actually took place. The trial was once postponed for two or three days upon his application, and, when the case was again called, he asked for a further postponement in order that he might study the case. He did not intimate to the court that any of his witnesses were absent, or that he wished time to search for evidence. He simply showed that he had been busy in court with other matters, and wished time for further study of the case. This was a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial judge, who knew the facts and the business in which counsel had been engaged, and who could determine, better than we, whether it was proper to grant the postponement See Moody v. State, 54 Ga. 660; Charlon v. State, 106 Ga. 400, 32 S. E. 347, and cases cited.

2. Complaint is made of the failure of the court to charge upon the subject of manslaughter. We have carefully read the evidence and the statement of the accused, and find nothing in either which would have authorized the submission to the jury of the question of manslaughter. According to the statement, the accused, on Friday evening, went to the house of a neighbor, where his wife, who had separated from him, was living. In the dining room he found his wife and a man named Pitman. On entering the room he saw Pitman with his hands around Mrs. Baker's neck, kissing her, and he thereupon shot her. Even had this statement been true (and it was positively contradicted, as to the position of Pitman and Mrs. Baker, by the witnesses for the state), It was not sufficient to reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The rule, as laid down by decisions of this court, is that, in order to reduce such a homicide to...