Harris v. State

• Decision Date: 08 December 1903
• Citation: 119 Ga. 114,45 S.E. 973
• Parties: HARRIS. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

45 S.E. 973

119 Ga. 114

HARRIS.

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Dec. 8, 1903.

CRIMINAL LAW—CONTINUANCE—HOMICIDE-INSTRUCTIONS.

1. In order for this court to control the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to grant a motion for the postponement of a criminal case to allow counsel to prepare for trial, it is necessary that it should appear that a gross mistake has been made by the trial judge, or that he has displayed a want of consideration for the rights of the accused.

2. The evidence for the state authorized, even if it did not demand, a finding that the accused was guilty of murder. His statement was, in effect, a plea of guilty of this offense. The requests to charge, so far as legal and pertinent, were covered by the general charge. The charges excepted to were free from error, and no sufficient reason has been shown for reversing the judgment overruling the motion for a new trial.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Pulton County; L. S. Roan, Judge.

John Harris was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

S. C. Crane, for plaintiff in error.

C. D. Hill, Sol. Gen., and Jno. C. Hart, Atty. Gen., for the State.

COBB, J. On the night of October 3, 1903, H. C. Drasbach, a policeman of the city of Atlanta, was killed while on duty, wearing the uniform of the police force of the city. Within a few days after the killing an indictment was preferred by the grand jury of Pulton county, charging John Harris with the murder. On Sunday, October 18th, the accused was arrested in the state of South Carolina, and, having been brought to Atlanta, was, on the Monday morning following, arraigned in court under the indictment. He indicated a desire to plead guilty, but the court refused to permit this until he had conferred with counsel. It was then made to appear to the court that he was not able to employ counsel, and the court appointed two members of the Atlanta bar to represent him, and announced to the accused and his counsel that the case would be called for trial on the following morning. At the time this announcement was made, neither the accused nor his counsel asked for more time. When the case was called on the morning of the 20th, one of the counsel appointed to represent the accused asked for a postponement of the trial, in order to give counsel time to prepare the case for trial. The court inquired if counsel had any witnesses they desired brought into court, and they replied that there were none, so far as they knew. Upon being asked on what grounds they desired a postponement, they failed to inform the court of any reason why they were not then as ready for trial as they ever would be. The court then announced that the postponement would be refused unless counsel would assign some reason why more time should be allowed, and, counsel failing to assign any reason, the court orderedthe trial to proceed. Counsel then asked the court for one hour in which to confer with their client and prepare for trial, and this time was given. At the expiration of the hour, the case was again called, and no application was then made for a further postponement. The trial proceeded, and the accused was found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. A motion for a new trial was made upon the general grounds, and an amendment was filed thereto, in which error was assigned upon the judgment overruling the motion to postpone, upon the refusal of the judge to give various requests, and upon certain extracts in the charge. The motion was overruled, and the accused excepted.

1. Undue haste in the administration of the criminal law is as much to be condemned as unnecessary delay. The true course lies between these two extremes. The law vests the determination of questions relating to the time of trial in the discretion of the trial judges, and this court will not interfere with their rulings on the subject unless it is manifest that there has been an abuse of discretion. Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598 (1); Moody v. State, 54 Ga. 660; Walton v. State, 79 Ga. 446 (1), 5 S. E 203; Stevens v. State, 93 Ga. 307 (2), 20 S. E. 331; Charlon v. State, 106 Ga. 400 (2), 32 S. E. 347; Baker v. State, 111 Ga. 141 (1), 36 S. E. 607; Simmons v. State, 116 Ga. 583 (1), 42 S. E. 779. While the time allowed counsel to prepare for trial was very short—only 24 hours—and it would perhaps have been well if the judge had postponed the trial for a few days in...