Baker v. State

• Decision Date: 20 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 04-14-00676-CR,04-14-00676-CR
• Parties: Gary L. BAKER, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Gary L. BAKER, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 04-14-00676-CR

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

April 20, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012CR4875

Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Jason Pulliam, Justice

AFFIRMED

Gary Lynn Baker was convicted by a jury of three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by contact. The trial court sentenced Baker to life in prison on each count pursuant to the mandatory enhancement provisions of section 12.42(c)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. Baker appeals the judgment, arguing he did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to counsel, the trial court erred by not finding he was incompetent to represent himself, and the trial court erred by failing to initiate proceedings to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

When Baker's former stepdaughter, A.H., was fifteen, she told her mother, Josefina, that Baker had repeatedly sexually assaulted her over a period of years when she was younger. A.H. testified that Baker began assaulting her after he began living with her, her sister, and Josefina in Galveston, when A.H. was five or six years old. The assaults continued after they moved to San Antonio when A.H. was in the second grade and they occurred three or four times a week. The family left San Antonio and moved several places until Baker abandoned them in Las Vegas. They returned to Galveston, where Josefina gave birth to Baker's child in April 2004. Josefina and Baker married later in 2004 and stayed together until sometime in 2006, when Josefina divorced him. A.H. testified the last time she saw Baker was in the summer of 2006. In 2008, Josefina married Michael. Witnesses testified that Michael and Baker had grown up together and called each other brothers. In 2010, Michael adopted A.H. and her two sisters, including Baker's biological daughter. The same year, A.H. made her outcry.

Baker was indicted by a Bexar County grand jury in 2012, charged with three counts of aggravated assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by contact, all alleged to have occurred in Bexar County in 2003. Baker requested and was appointed counsel to represent him.

At a pretrial hearing on the Friday before the Monday trial was scheduled to begin, Baker's appointed attorney advised the court that Baker wanted him removed as counsel and that Baker wished to represent himself. The trial judge admonished Baker about his rights, the charges against him, and the dangers and pitfalls of representing himself. He also questioned Baker to determine whether Baker understood his rights and the import of waiving his rights. Baker persisted in his desire to represent himself. The trial court allowed it and appointed standby counsel. The court advised the parties that jury selection would begin the following Monday and adjourned so thatBaker could review witness statements and discovery and prepare subpoenas. The court admonished Baker further the following Monday morning and the trial began. The jury found Baker guilty on all counts. Punishment was tried to the court, and the State introduced evidence that Baker had been previously convicted of an offense under section 22.011 of the Texas Penal Code. The trial court therefore imposed a life sentence on each count pursuant to section 12.42(c)(2) of the Penal Code.

Baker appeals, arguing the trial court erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into his competence to stand trial, he did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to counsel, and the trial court erred in finding Baker was competent to represent himself.

COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL

Baker contends the trial court violated his rights by failing to conduct an informal inquiry into his competency. A person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or does not have both a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a) (West 2006); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).

A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(b). However, "[i]f evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion shall suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(b) (West Supp. 2014). When there is a "suggestion" of incompetency to stand trial, the trial court must conduct an "informal inquiry" to determine whether evidence exists to justify a formal competency trial. Id. art. 46B.004(c); Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 691-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). This suggestion of incompetency "is the threshold requirement for an informal inquiry . . . and mayconsist solely of a representation from any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(c-1). "A further evidentiary showing is not required to initiate the inquiry, and the court is not required to have a bona fide doubt about the competency of the defendant." Id.

We review the trial court's decision not to conduct an informal competency inquiry for abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial court's assessment of the defendant's ability to rationally and factually understand the proceedings and to assist counsel is "entitled to great deference" by the reviewing court. McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we determine whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426 (noting that trial court is "in a better position to determine whether [the defendant] was presently competent").

Baker argues that statements he made during the trial court's admonishments and his performance during the trial should have triggered an informal inquiry into his competence to stand trial. Baker first points to the pretrial hearing, when the judge was admonishing him about the dangers of self-representation and questioning him to ensure he understood his rights. The judge asked Baker whether he had any history of mental disorders, psychiatric treatment, or referrals to a psychiatric hospital. Baker responded that he "was in Rusk one time" because he had attempted suicide. Baker told the court he had not been found incompetent. Baker stated he had been in the hospital for about a month, then he appeared before a judge and was allowed to leave. The trial court concluded it had been a civil commitment. Throughout the pretrial hearing, Baker was reasonably articulate and communicated appropriately with the court. Nothing in the record suggested that Baker did not understand exactly what he was charged with. He also madestatements suggesting he fully understood that the State was seeking a mandatory life sentence on each charge. Baker did not display any inappropriate behavior and there was no suggestion that Baker had suffered any recent mental illness. The court asked Baker's appointed counsel, who was standby counsel during trial, whether he had any concerns about Baker's competency or competency to represent himself, and counsel responded that he did not have any such concerns.

The relevant time frame for determining competence is at the time of the proceedings. Jackson, 391 S.W.3d at 143. A person's history of depression or mental illness or a past suicide attempt does not suggest incompetence and trigger an informal inquiry unless there is a suggestion that it impacts the defendant's present ability to understand the proceedings and communicate with counsel. See id. (holding evidence of past emotional issues did not trigger informal inquiry); Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425 (stating "[w]e have held that instances of depression are not an indication of incompetency and that past mental-health issues raise the issue of incompetency only if there is evidence of recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or bizarre acts by the defendant"); Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (holding that "[n]either appellant's history of mental illness nor the fact that appellant may have been on psychiatric medication is sufficient to warrant a competency inquiry absent evidence of a present inability to communicate with his attorney or understand the proceedings"); see also Townsend v. State, 949 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (concluding suicidal tendencies and depression did not raise bona fide doubt about defendant's competency). Here, there is no suggestion in the record, from Baker's statements or conduct or from any other source, that at the time of trial he suffered any current mental illness or depression or that his past commitment affected his abilities to understand the proceedings, consult with counsel, or conduct his defense.

Baker next argues that his incompetence was suggested by his defense strategy, which appellate counsel characterizes as a "delusional" conspiracy theory. He points to his opening statement, in which Baker asserted the charges were brought against him because another man wanted to adopt Baker's child. He also points to Baker's examination of the witnesses that appeared to focus on collateral issues and not on the charges against him.

The State's witnesses were the complainant, an apparently credible nineteen-year-old college student, and her mother, Josefina. From the record, it appears Baker's strategy was to...